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OF

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
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*E. E. BLYTH*



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AN ANALYSIS OF  
SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY  
WITH NOTES THEREON



AN ANALYSIS  
OF  
THE SIXTEENTH EDITION OF  
SNELL'S  
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY

WITH NOTES THEREON

BY

E. E. BLYTH, B.A., LL.D. (LOND.)

SOLICITOR

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY'S

CLIFFORD'S INN (FIRST) PRIZEMAN, MICH. 1878

BRODERIP CONVEYANCING GOLD MEDALLIST, 1878, AND SCOTT SCHOLAR, 1878

AND FIRST IN FIRST CLASS HONOURS, LL.B., LONDON UNIVERSITY, 1886

*Tenth Edition*

LONDON  
STEVENS AND HAYNES  
Law Publishers  
BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR  
1912

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B6294a

1912

334180

12-2-59

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PRINTED BY  
BALLANTYNE & COMPANY LTD  
AT THE BALLANTYNE PRESS  
TAVISTOCK STREET COVENT GARDEN  
LONDON

## PREFACE.

IN presenting this Analysis, I have to acknowledge my indebtedness to Messrs. Stevens and Haynes for their kindness in sanctioning it, as proprietors of "Snell's Principles of Equity." My further obligations to various authors are apparent and duly acknowledged.

Having experienced in the course of my own reading the advantages of an analysis of this character, I venture to hope that it may prove useful to all law students, especially in preparing for examinations. This analysis is intended as a *companion* to Snell's work, with which it is to be read chapter by chapter. Such being the object in view, it has not been considered necessary, in quoting cases, to give references or details, except where these particulars do not appear in Snell.

E. E. B.





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- 1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 37 (Conveyancing, 1911), 31, 41, 45, 46, 58, 79, 118, 126, 133,  
   134, 151, 156  
                   c. 38 (Moneylenders), 27  
                   c. 46 (Copyright, 1911), 229, 230

ANALYSIS  
OF  
SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY,  
WITH NOTES THEREON.

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PART I.—INTRODUCTORY.

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CHAPTER I.

THE JURISDICTION IN EQUITY.

*Definition of Equity.*

PUTTING out of consideration all that part of natural equity sanctioned and enforced by, or by virtue of, legislative enactments, Equity may be defined as that portion of natural justice which, though of such a nature as to admit of being judicially enforced, was omitted to be enforced by the common law courts, an omission which was supplied by the equity courts.

The distinction between law and equity is a matter of form and history rather than of substance or of principle.

The *old* definitions claim a far wider jurisdiction, which is to be explained by remembering that the principles of equity have varied from time to time. Only extensive principles of jurisdiction could have originated the equity system.

A court of equity is now bound by settled rules and precedents as completely as a court of law, and there is no difference between them in the rules of interpreting laws.

*Origin of Jurisdiction.*

In the early periods of English history, ecclesiastics were the expounders and administrators of the law, who, being

well acquainted with the Roman law, were naturally largely influenced both by its principles and practice.

The growth of equity-jurisdiction may be traced to the following causes :—

- (1.) The common law became a system positive and inflexible too early.
- (2.) The general discouragement of the Roman law ; its being deprived of authority in the courts.
- (3.) The inflexible and cramping system of procedure adopted by the common law courts.

According to the common law, every kind of civil wrong was supposed to fall within some particular class, and for each class an appropriate writ or *breve* (which was the first step in every action) existed.

The evil effects of this system were chiefly two :—

- (a.) Where the wrong to be redressed actually fell within one of the classes recognised at common law, the suitor might select the improper writ, and fail on that account. *Sharrod v. N. W. R. Coy.* This cause of injustice removed by

*Common Law Procedure Act, 1852.*

- (b.) Where the wrong did not fall within any of the recognised classes, the suitor was without remedy.
- (4.) “The statute *in consimili casu*,” 13 Edw. I., stat. 1, provided a remedy by giving a larger discretion to the clerks in Chancery (by whom *all* writs were drawn up at that time) in the drawing up of writs, so that they might be adapted to meet all cases. This enactment proved inadequate for two reasons :—
- (a.) The common law judges were the sole judges of the validity of the adapted writs, and were jealous of innovations.
  - (b.) New and unusual circumstances constantly occurring, increased the difficulty of the clerks in Chancery in adapting the writs, which had to be based on the Roman law. Further, new forms of *defence* arose, for which no provision had been made.
- (5.) Where no relief could be obtained at common law, suitors applied to the King in Parliament (*i.e.*, in his



Council), who referred the matter to the Chancellor. Edward III., by an ordinance (22 Edw. III.), referred all such matters as were "of grace" to the Chancellor: from that time, application by petition or bill was made to the Chancellor *direct* without any preliminary writ, and notwithstanding complaints the Chancery process became an established procedure by the reign of Edward IV. Modern Equity is generally dated from the Restoration.

### *Fusion of Law and Equity.*

By virtue of the Judicature Acts, 1873 to 1907, and the rules and orders made thereunder, one uniform system of procedure has been established in the courts of law and equity. The fusion between law and equity is merely in administration; the principles of equity remain as before.

The Judicature Act, 1873, provided that law and equity shall in every case be administered concurrently; and that, where there is any conflict between the rules of equity and law, the former are to prevail. But the distinction between legal and equitable remedies has not been abolished, and the advantage to be derived from the possession of the legal estate remains untouched.

The following matters are, however, assigned to the Chancery Division exclusively:—

1. Administration of estates of deceased persons.
2. Dissolution of partnerships, and taking of partnership and other accounts.
3. Redemption and foreclosure of mortgages.
4. Raising of portions and other charges on land.
5. Sale and distribution of proceeds of property subject to any lien or charge.
6. Execution of trusts, charitable and private.
7. Rectification, setting aside, and cancellation of deeds and other written instruments.
8. Specific performance of contracts between vendors and purchasers of real estate, including contracts for leases.
9. Partition or sale of real estates.

- 10. Wardship of infants, and care of infants' estates.
- 11. Proceedings under the Trustee Act, 1893.

*Classification of Equity-Jurisdiction.*

- (1.) The originally EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction; the court proceeded on equitable principles and gave equitable remedies.

Although nominally abolished by the Judicature Acts, it is practically retained.

- (2.) The originally CONCURRENT jurisdiction; the court proceeded on legal principles, but gave only an equitable remedy.

*Equitable* rights are enforced in the originally *exclusive* jurisdiction. *Legal* rights are enforced in the originally *concurrent* jurisdiction. This distinction is still of importance.

- (3.) The obsolete AUXILIARY jurisdiction.

Abolished (both practically and nominally) by the Judicature Acts. This jurisdiction existed where COMMON LAW *litigants* required the aid (*auxilium*) of equity in the assertion of their *legal* rights; *e.g.*, the discovery of title-deeds. All such aid can now be obtained in the King's Bench Division itself.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE MAXIMS OF EQUITY.

- I. *No wrong without a remedy.* Equity will not, by reason of a merely technical defect, suffer a wrong to be without a remedy.

This maxim forms the foundation of equity-jurisprudence. Must be understood as referring to wrongs recognisable at law or capable of being judicially redressed.



To it may be referred *Uses and Trusts*.

Illustration—

Equity allowed a mortgagor to sue for land or rent although not possessed of the *legal* estate. By the Judicature Act, 1873, this rule of equity is now made a rule of law.

## II. *Æquitas sequitur legem*. Equity follows the law.

Two applications—

- (1.) As regards *legal* estates, rights, and interests, equity is strictly bound by the rules of law.

Thus all the canons of descent (*e.g.*, the rule of primogeniture) must be observed in equity, although productive of greatest hardship and injustice; but equity may *avoid* the law in effect even while following it. *Alderson v. Maddison*; *Loffus v. Maw*.

- (2.) As regards *equitable* estates, rights, and interests, equity, although not, strictly speaking, *bound* by the rules of law, yet acts in analogy thereto whenever an analogy exists.

Thus the rule in Shelley's case applies to executed trusts.

Illustration of the maxim in *both* applications—

In dealing with the statutes of limitations, as regards *legal* estates (that is to say, in its originally *concurrent* jurisdiction), equity never either exceeds or abridges the limit of time prescribed by law; while on the other hand, as regards *equitable* estates (that is to say, in its originally *exclusive* jurisdiction), equity often abridges (*e.g.*, on the ground of laches), yet never exceeds, the prescribed limit.

Time runs both at law and in equity from the discovery, and not from the perpetration of concealed fraud.

3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 26.

*Gibbs v. Guild*; *Betjemann v. Betjemann*.

And ignorance of one's right induced by fraud will prevent the statute running. *Bulli v. Osborne*

The fraud must be that of the person setting up the statute as a defence.

- III. *Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure.* Where equities are equal, the first in time shall prevail.

Explanation—

As between persons having *only equitable* interests, if such equities are *in all other respects equal*, then *Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure*; i.e., equity will not prefer one to the other on the ground of priority of time only, until it finds there is no other sufficient ground of preference between them. For example, as between equitable mortgagees, negligence on the part of an equitable mortgagee, first in order of date, will deprive him of his priority.

*Farrand v. Yorkshire Bank*; *Rice v. Rice*;  
*Rimmer v. Webster.*

But if the equitable interest involved is PERSONALTY, then the question will turn upon the priority in point of time of the *notice* of the assignments given to the trustees of the fund, and not on the dates of the assignments themselves.

*Lloyds Bank v. Pearson*; *Re Lake.*

- IV. *Inæquali jure melior est conditio possidentis.* Where there is equal equity the law must prevail.

Explanation—

If the defendant has a claim to the passive protection of the court equal to the claim which the plaintiff has to call for the active aid of the court, he who has the legal estate will prevail.

*Thorndyke v. Hunt*; *Taylor v. Blakelock*;  
*London and County Bank v. Goddard.*

But such legal title must be absolutely complete, and not merely inchoate.

*Powell v. Lond. & P. Bank*; *Roots v. Williamson.*

This maxim is not confined in its operation to the tacking of mortgages. It applies in favour of all equitable owners or incumbrancers for value without notice of prior equitable interests. *Bailey v. Barnes.*

The last two maxims (III. and IV.) formerly found their principal application in cases where the defence set up was

*purchase for valuable consideration without notice.* As to when this defence can still be successfully pleaded the following rules have been settled:—

- (1.) Where the defendant has both *legal* and equitable estate, the plaintiff having equitable estate only; the defence is good.

And this whether the defendant—

- (a.) Obtains legal estate at the time of purchase.
  - (b.) Gets in legal estate subsequently without becoming party to a breach of trust.
  - (c.) Although without the legal estate, yet has the best right to call for it.
- (2.) Where the plaintiff has the *legal* estate, the defendant having equitable estate only. A distinction formerly existed between the auxiliary and concurrent jurisdiction.
- (a.) In the obsolete auxiliary jurisdiction this used to be a good defence to an application for relief, and no aid was given to the possessor of the legal title where it was set up.

*Basset v. Nosworthy; Wallwyn v. Lee;  
Joyce v. De Moleyns.*

If, however, the plaintiff could make out his case by independent evidence without the aid of equity, his title prevailed.

- (b.) In the originally concurrent jurisdiction this defence was never any answer. *Williams v. Lambe.*

But now, in consequence of the fusion of law and equity brought about by the Judicature Acts, this defence no longer affords any protection, and *complete* relief must be given, and defendant's title-deeds discovered.

*Ind v. Emerson.*

- (3.) Where neither plaintiff nor defendant has the *legal* estate or the best right to call for it, each having an *equitable* estate only, the rights of the parties are determined by their respective dates.

*Philips v. Philips.*

In cases falling under this rule it is immaterial as regards real estate whether the subsequent incumbrancers had or had not notice of prior incumbrance.

*Ford v. White.*

And a puisne mortgagee of real estate without notice will not gain priority, merely by giving notice to the person having the legal estate.

*Humber v. Richards ; Hopkins v. Hemsworth.*

But if the property subject to the incumbrances be situate in Yorkshire, the priorities of the several incumbrancers will be determined, *inter se* (in the absence of actual fraud), exclusively by the dates of the *registration* of the incumbrances.

*Yorkshire Registries Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 54).*

- (4.) Where the defendant has both *legal* and equitable estates, the plaintiff having a mere *equity* or right and not an equitable estate, this defence is available.

*Sturge v. Starr.*

V. *He who seeks equity must do equity.*

That is to say, in the transaction in which relief is sought.

Where the plaintiff had *legal* rights, there was no necessity for him to come to courts of equity for relief.

Illustrations—

- (a.) Married women's equity to a settlement under law prior to the Married Women's Property Act, 1882.
- (b.) Acquiescence. Person standing by must give compensation.

VI. *He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.*

That is to say, so far as the subject-matter of the litigation is concerned; the claim must not be tainted with illegality or fraud.

*Overton v. Banister.*

VII. *Vigilantibus non dormientibus, æquitas subvenit.* Delay defeats equities.

"Nothing can call forth a court of equity into activity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence."

*Smith v. Clay.*

So far as *legal* claims are concerned, the delay must be such as to constitute a bar under the



Statute of Limitations, but *equitable* claims may be barred by the plaintiff's laches or unreasonable delay.  
*Blake v. Gale.*

VIII. *Æqualitas est summa æquitas.* Equality is equity, or equity delighteth in equality.

Illustrations—

Equity leans against joint-tenancy; thus the survivor is a trustee for the representative of the deceased in proportion to the sum advanced by him (notwithstanding the legal estate is vested in the survivor) in cases of—

(a.) Joint-purchases, where money advanced in *unequal* shares, as appears by the deed.

*Lake v. Gibson; Lake v. Craddock.*

(b.) Joint-mortgages, whether money advanced in *equal* or *unequal* shares.

*Morley v. Bird.*

IX. *Non quod dictum sed quod factum inspiciendum est.*

Equity looks to the intent rather than to the form.

Illustration—

Relief against penalty or forfeiture.

*Peachy v. Somerset.*

To this maxim we owe the equitable doctrines governing Mortgages.

X. *Equity looks on that as done which ought to have been done.*

Explanation—

Equity will treat the subject-matter of a contract as to its consequences and incidents in the same manner as if the act contemplated in the contract had been completely executed—that is to say, in favour of persons who can enforce the contract.

To this maxim may be referred the equitable doctrine of *Conversion*.

XI. *Equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation.*

Explanation—

Where a man, being bound to do an act, does

something capable of being considered as in fulfilment of his obligation, it will be so construed.

*Sowden v. Sowden.*

Under this maxim come the equitable doctrines of *Satisfaction* and *Performance*.

XII. *Æquitas agit in personam.* Equity acts *in personam*.

The only remedy originally to be obtained at common law consisted in *damages*, but equity compelled the wrongdoer to actually *do* what he had contracted to do.

The principal application is in procedure; equity will enforce specific performance of a contract even where the subject-matter of the suit is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, because it acts by process *in personam*.

*Ewing v. Orr-Ewing; Penn v. Baltimore.*

But such an action cannot be entertained if the title itself is in question, for that must be decided by the *lex loci rei sitæ*. *In re Hawthorne.*

To this maxim the former jurisdiction of equity to restrain actions at law by *Injunction* is to be referred.

*Earl of Oxford's Case.*



## PART II.—THE ORIGINALLY EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.

### CHAPTER I.

#### TRUSTS GENERALLY.

THE Statutes of Mortmain having prohibited gifts of lands for religious purposes, the practice grew up (about the time of Edward III.) of making grants or feoffments to *third persons to the use* of the religious houses. At *common law* the estate vested in the grantee only was recognised, and the use engrafted upon it was totally disregarded. But in *equity* the Chancellor—an ecclesiastic—held that the *conscience* of the grantee was charged with the declaration of the use, although it did not attach to the *land* itself, and so compelled him to hold as trustee for the benefit of the persons in whose favour the use was declared. From this period it is clear that the owner of the use (equitable owner) was the real beneficial owner, the original grantee being merely the *legal* owner. The religious houses were speedily deprived of the benefits gained by such a result, a further statute of mortmain being passed in the reign of Richard II. which extended the prohibition to uses, whether direct or indirect. Meanwhile the advantages to be derived from the newly established *uses* had been perceived by others, and in respect of persons other than religious houses the system of uses remained in active operation.

The advantages resulting from possessing a mere *use* in land instead of the legal estate therein were these—

- (1.) Uses were not subject to the law of escheat.
- (2.) Uses were free from feudal burdens, *e.g.*, wardship and marriage.

- (3.) Uses were not liable to be taken in execution under an *elegit*.
- (4.) Uses were devisable, while the land itself could not be dealt with by will.

The Statute of Uses (27 Hen. VIII. c. 10) was passed for the express purpose of abolishing these uses, this dual ownership of land. It enacted that where any person should stand seised of land to the use of another, such other (the person having the use) should be deemed in lawful seisin and possession for such estate as he had in the use. That is to say, the *use* became converted into the *land*.

Examples—

- (a.) Express use. Conveyance to A and his heirs to the *use* of B and his heirs. A, who before the statute took the fee-simple, now takes nothing, the whole estate, both legal and equitable, being at once vested in B.
- (b.) Resulting use. Voluntary conveyance by X to A and his heirs simply. Before the statute X would have been deemed in equity the beneficial owner for want of consideration to pass the estate to A. So after the statute X becomes also the legal owner, and the effect of the conveyance is *nil*, the whole estate, both legal and equitable, at once resulting to X the grantor.

This statute led to the establishment of the modern system of settlement.

The object of the statute was defeated by the *common law* doctrine that there cannot be “a use upon a use,” on the ground that “the use is only the liberty to take the profits; but two cannot severally take the profits of the same land”: a doctrine upon which the famous Tyrrell’s case was based.

Example—

Conveyance to A to the use of B to the use of C. It was held B took the whole estate, but that C’s interest was a use upon a use, which the statute had no energy to reach.

Just as Equity, before the statute, had upheld uses, so in the course of years it began to hold that the use upon a use

ought to be recognised, and to give effect to such use, which became known as a *trust*.

In the example above given, A takes the estate under the old law, B takes it under the statute, but, nevertheless, as trustee for C, in whom at equity the whole beneficial interest is deemed vested.

In all such conveyances there are therefore two estates to be considered—

- (1.) The estate recognised at common law under the statute, *i.e.*, the *legal estate*.
- (2.) The estate, the use upon a use, recognised at equity only, *i.e.*, the *equitable estate* or *trust*.

It must be remembered that trust estates are for the most part subject to all the rules applicable to legal estates. Thus a conveyance unto and to the use of A and his heirs to the use of or upon trust for B and his heirs, or the heirs of his body, gives to B either an equitable estate in fee-simple or fee-tail. And where the estates in possession and remainder are both equitable, the rule in Shelley's case is applicable; and equity follows the law to this extent, that a grant by deed of an equitable estate in land to the grantee simply, without words either of limitation or indication to pass the fee, will confer an estate for the grantee's life only.

An equitable estate in fee-simple belongs to a purchaser of freehold property immediately after the purchase contract is completed. Consequently, if the vendor become bankrupt before completion of purchase, the trustee in bankruptcy cannot disclaim the contract, as the purchaser has an estate in the land. *Re Bastable.*

The Statute of Uses does NOT apply to—

- (1.) Pure personalty. The statute speaks of lands, tenements, and hereditaments only.
- (2.) Impure personalty or leaseholds. } The statute speaks of "seisin,"
- (3.) Copyholds. } a term applicable to freeholds only.
- (4.) *Active* as opposed to *passive* uses, even in respect of freeholds: thus, when the grantee to the use of another has active duties to perform, the legal estate remains in the grantee.

Formerly trusts of all kinds might have been created or transferred by word of mouth, but the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3) requires—

- (1.) All declarations or creations of trusts of *lands, tenements, or hereditaments* to be evidenced by writing. (Sect. 7.)
- (2.) All grants and assignments of ANY trust to be in writing. (Sect. 9.)

With two exceptions—

- (a.) Trusts *arising* or resulting from any conveyance of lands by *implication* or construction of law.
- (b.) Trusts *transferred* or extinguished by act or operation of law. (Sect. 8.)

This statute applies to freeholds, copyholds, leaseholds, and (with the exception of sect. 7) also to personalty.

#### *Definition and Classification of Trusts.*

A TRUST when used in the sense of an equitable interest is a beneficial interest in or a beneficial ownership of real or personal property unattended with the possessory and legal ownership thereof.

A trust has been defined as—

An equitable obligation imposing upon a person (who is called a trustee) the duty of dealing with property over which he has control (which is called the trust property) for the benefit of persons (who are called the beneficiaries or *cestuis que trust*), of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom may enforce the obligation.

(*Underhill's Trusts.*)

Also as—

A confidence reposed in some other, not issuing out of the land, but as a thing collateral, annexed in privity to the estate of the land, and to the person touching the land, for which *cestui que trust* has no remedy but by subpœna in Chancery.

Observe, it is—

- (1.) A confidence.
- (2.) A confidence reposed in some other.



- (3.) Not issuing out of the land, but collateral to it.
  - (4.) Annexed in privity to the estate.
  - (5.) Annexed in privity to the person.
  - (6.) No remedy for *cestui que trust* but in equity.
- (*Lewin on Trusts.*)

Trusts are classified as follows:—

- (1.) Express or declared trusts.
  - (a.) Private trusts.
  - (b.) Public (or charitable) trusts.
- (2.) Implied or presumptive trusts.
- (3.) Constructive trusts.

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## CHAPTER II.

### EXPRESS OR DECLARED PRIVATE TRUSTS.

AN *express* or *declared trust* is a trust which is clearly expressed by the author thereof, whether verbally or by writing, or may fairly be collected from a written document. Express or declared trusts are of various kinds.

#### Firstly, TRUSTS EXECUTED or EXECUTORY.

A trust is said to be *executed* when no act is necessary to be done in order to constitute it, the trust being finally declared by the instrument creating it.

A trust *executory* or *directory* is a trust raised either by a stipulation or by a direction, in express terms or by necessary implication, to make a settlement or assurance to uses, or upon trusts which are indicated in, but do not appear to be finally declared by, the instrument containing such stipulation or direction.

A test question in distinguishing the two is, Has the author of the trust been *his own conveyancer*?

*Egerton v. Brownlow.*

I. *Where trust executed*, the maxim "Equity follows the

law" is always applicable, *e.g.*, the rule in Shelley's case is followed.

II. *Where trust executory*, this maxim is or is not applicable according as a contrary intention on the part of the author of the trust is or is not expressed or implied in conformity with the rules of equity. 3

Executory trusts arise in two ways—

(1.) *Marriage articles or settlements*, the object of which is deemed to be provision for the issue of the marriage.

In these instruments, therefore, an intention *contrary* to the rule laid down in Shelley's case is *always* implied.

*Trevor v. Trevor.*

(2.) *Wills*, in which the intention must appear from the instrument itself: they are construed—

(a.) According to the legal effect of the words used, *unless* a contrary intention is *expressed* on the face of them.

*Sweetapple v. Bindon.*

(b.) According to the contrary intention whenever that is expressed or indicated.

*Papillon v. Voice; Glenorchy v. Bosville.*

## Secondly, TRUSTS VOLUNTARY or for VALUABLE CONSIDERATION.

In order to render a voluntary gift or settlement valid there must be what amounts to either (1) a complete transfer of the property beneficially or in trust, or (2) a valid declaration of trust.

*General Rules—*

(1.) The court will not execute a voluntary CONTRACT, for no action lies upon a contract without consideration.

*Jefferys v. Jefferys.*

(2.) An IMPERFECT voluntary CONVEYANCE will not be enforced.

(3.) An EXECUTED trust is binding although voluntary.

*Ellison v. Ellison.*

The test question is, Has the trust been completely constituted?

These rules are exemplified in the following manner:—



I. *Voluntary trusts will be enforced*

Where the author of the trust has done everything which, according to the nature of the property comprised in the instrument, is necessary to be done in order to transfer the property and render the instrument binding upon him.

*Milroy v. Lord ; Richards v. Delbridge.*

This may be effected—

(1.) Where the donor is both legal and equitable owner—

(a.) By actual conveyance to the donee or a trustee for him. *Ellison v. Ellison.*

(b.) By donor's declaration of trust for donee.

*Ex parte Pye ; Steele v. Walker ; Fox v. Hanks.*

(2.) Where the donor is equitable owner only—

(a.) By direction to trustees to hold on trust for donee.

Except in the case of pure personalty, this direction must be in *writing*.

*Statute of Frauds, s. 7.*

(b.) By conveyance of the equitable interest by *deed*.

*Gilbert v. Overton ; Kekewich v. Manning ;  
Nanney v. Morgan.*

Voluntary trusts in favour of charities or arising under wills are enforced, although executory.

II. *Voluntary trusts will not be enforced*

Whether the donor is legal or equitable owner, where there is no declaration of trust, or the instrument creating the trust is in any way *imperfect*.

Wherever the facts show an intention to transfer property and not to declare a trust, equity will not give effect to an imperfect transfer by treating it as a declaration of trust.

The rule formerly was that a trust would not be enforced where the instrument was imperfect

(1.) If the property comprised in it was assignable at law.

*Antrobus v. Smith ; Searle v. Law ;  
Richards v. Delbridge.*

(2.) If the property was not assignable at law, but the

donor had left something imperfect which it was in his power to render more nearly perfect.

*Fortescue v. Barnett ; Edwards v. Jones.*

The test is whether anything remains to be done by the donor, not by the donee. *Griffin v. Griffin.*

But since the Judicature Act, 1873, the distinction between properties assignable and not assignable at law has become unnecessary; the sole question now being whether the property has been completely and legally assigned or not.

### Thirdly, TRUSTS FRAUDULENT.

Under the provisions of various statutes and otherwise.

- I. By 13 Eliz. c. 5, avoiding as fraudulent against CREDITORS all covinous conveyances and gifts of *lands* or *goods* tending to defeat or delay creditors, except where made on good consideration and *bonâ fide* to a person without notice of such covin. The conveyance will be fraudulent unless made both upon good consideration AND *bonâ fide*.

A VOLUNTARY settlement is void under this statute when it can be shown that its effect was to deprive the settlor of the means of paying certain THEN EXISTING debts; or where there is an express intention of defeating one particular creditor. And creditors subsequent to the settlement may impeach it on this ground. The death of the settlor makes no difference.

*Freeman v. Pope ; Spirret v. Willows ;  
Holmes v. Penny.*

It can be avoided without proof of actual intention to defeat or delay creditors if the circumstances be such that it must necessarily have that effect.

A conveyance for VALUE (whether a conveyance by way of mortgage or on sale) is not void under this statute unless an *express* fraudulent intent or express *mala fides* can be shown.

*Ex parte Chaplin ; Alton v. Harrison.*

And a post-nuptial settlement is regarded as voluntary unless made in pursuance of an ante-nuptial agreement.

But even if the conveyance be void within this statute, a purchase for value from a person entitled thereunder *before* it is set aside is good.

*Halifax Bank v. Gledhill; In re Brall.*

II. Formerly by 27 Eliz. c. 4, avoiding as fraudulent against subsequent PURCHASERS for valuable consideration (whether with or without notice) voluntary conveyances of *lands* of every tenure. The doctrine rested on the ground that by selling for value, the vendor so repudiated the former voluntary conveyance that it must be taken against him and the voluntary grantee that such intention existed when he made the voluntary conveyance, and accordingly that it was made in order to defeat the purchaser for value.

This statute has now been practically repealed by the Voluntary Conveyances Act, 1893, which provides that no *bonâ fide* voluntary conveyance, whether made before or after the Act, shall be deemed fraudulent within the statute of Elizabeth by reason of a subsequent purchase for value. In future, therefore, to defeat a voluntary conveyance it must be shown to be *malâ fide*.

With regard to the statute 27 Eliz. c. 4, note—

- (1.) It had no application to chattels personal.
- (2.) Where a voluntary assignee of leaseholds undertook to observe covenants contained in the lease of an onerous nature, the assignment was not avoided thereby.

*Price v. Jenkins.*

But such an assignment might be void under the 13 Eliz. c. 5.

*Ridler v. Ridler.*

- (3.) Only purchasers direct from the voluntary settlor *himself* could claim the benefit of the statute, and mortgagees and lessees were deemed purchasers *pro tanto*.
- (4.) It did not avoid a purchase for valuable con-

sideration from a person entitled under a voluntary conveyance *before* it was set aside.

*George v. Milbanke.*

*Bonâ fide* purchasers are such as take *bonâ fide* and for valuable consideration.

*Meritorious* (or good) considerations are such as blood or natural affection.

*Valuable* considerations are money, marriage, forbearance, or the like.

ANTE-nuptial agreements must be in writing (Statute of Frauds, s. 4), and when followed by the marriage, the wife becomes a PURCHASER within the 27 Eliz. c. 4.

But in absence of fraud a post-nuptial settlement made in pursuance of an ante-nuptial *verbal* agreement recited in the settlement will satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

*Re Holland.*

*Bonâ fide* POST-nuptial settlements were supported on very slight considerations, so as not to be void by this statute.

*Hewison v. Negus.*

*Malâ fide* ANTE-nuptial settlements were and will continue to be void within the 13 Eliz. c. 5, the marriage being in such cases no real consideration.

*Re Pennington; Columbine v. Penhall.*

The Voluntary Conveyances Act, 1893, affords no protection to *malâ fide* settlements.

As to the question who are within the scope of the marriage consideration, so as to prevent a settlement being voluntary, it was formerly considered that the children of wife by a former husband were within it.

*Newstead v. Searles.*

And, on the other hand, that the children of husband by a former wife were not.

*Cameron v. Wells.*

But now it appears to be settled that in both cases the settlement will be deemed voluntary.

*De Mæstre v. West; Att.-Gen. v. Jacobs-Smith.*

In family arrangements all persons within the scope of them are deemed purchasers for value.



- III. By the Bills of Sale Acts, 1878 and 1882, avoiding as fraudulent bills of sale of personal chattels remaining in the possession of the grantor, unless duly registered within seven days from the date thereof, and the other provisions of the Acts duly complied with.

The consideration must be truly stated in the bill of sale. A bill of sale given by way of security is void under the Act of 1882 if it is given for less than £30, or if it be not substantially in the form specified in the schedule to that Act.

*Ante-nuptial* settlements or agreements for a settlement, and assignments made in pursuance of ante-nuptial agreements, are exempted from the operation of these Acts. Personal chattels comprised in such agreements would only require delivery to complete the title of the settlement trustee.

*Ex parte Salaman.*

- IV. By the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, avoiding as fraudulent *against the trustee* in bankruptcy POST-nuptial settlements (other than property accruing to the settlor after marriage in right of his wife)—

- (1.) If settlor becomes bankrupt within two years.
- (2.) If settlor becomes bankrupt at any subsequent time within ten years, unless the parties claiming thereunder can prove that settlor was, at the time of the settlement, able to pay all his debts without the aid of the settled property, and that his interest therein had passed to trustee of settlement on its execution.

All agreements to settle *future acquired* property (even ante-nuptial) are void under this Act against the trustee upon settlor's bankruptcy (except where acquired in right of his wife), unless *prior* to the bankruptcy such property has been both acquired and paid, or transferred or delivered pursuant to the agreement.

It was formerly considered that a purchaser for value deriving title under a voluntary settlement

could not get an unimpeachable title until ten years had elapsed since the date of the settlement.

*Briggs v. Spicer.*

But it has now been settled that the word "void" in the Act should be read "voidable," so that any *bonâ fide* alienation for value prior to bankruptcy of the settlor will be good.

*In re Brall; In re Carter & Kenkerdine; Sanguinette v. Stuckey.*

And a declaration of trust is enough to make the property pass.

*Shrager v. March.*

But it has been doubted whether a purchaser would be absolutely safe until the expiration of three months from such alienation.

*Re Reis.*

Note—A man cannot settle his own property so as to take an interest determinable on his *bankruptcy*, such a settlement being deemed a fraud upon creditors.

*Higinbotham v. Holme.*

The Bankruptcy Act also avoids as fraudulent preferences every conveyance or transfer of property made within three months of his bankruptcy by a person unable to pay his debts in favour of a creditor with the view of giving him a preference.

This, however, does not prevent the preference of a *surety* by the debtor, as a surety is not a creditor.

#### Fourthly, TRUSTS IN FAVOUR OF CREDITORS.

Voluntary trusts of personalty are *irrevocable*, and were never affected by the 27 Eliz. c. 4. But trusts in favour of CREDITORS form exceptions to this rule, as being illusory trusts, merely dispositions made for the benefit or convenience of the SETTLOR.

*Garrard v. Lauderdale.*

- (1.) When a debtor conveys property to trustees for payment of his debts, the *debtor* alone (not the creditors) is thereby constituted *cestui que trust*.

*Walwyn v. Coutts.*

As a general rule, therefore, the debtor may vary or revoke the trusts at pleasure; but this right of revocation is strictly personal to the debtor.

*Fitzgerald v. White.*



And if the relationship of trustee and *cestuis que trust* has been actually constituted the deed is irrevocable.

*Sharp v. Jackson.*

- (2.) A trust in favour of creditors is *irrevocable* AFTER communication to the creditors, IF they have thereby been induced to a forbearance in respect of their claims which they would not have otherwise exercised, or if they have in any way assented to and acquiesced in the deed creating the trust, or acted under its provision and complied with its terms.

*Acton v. Woodgate ; Garrard v. Lauderdale ;*

*Field v. Donoughmore.*

Should the trust-deed contain no provision as to surplus after payment of debts in full, there is no resulting trust in favour of the debtor, but the surplus (if any) will belong to the *creditors*.

*Cooke v. Smith.*

- (3.) Where a creditor is party to a trust-deed and has executed it, or been instrumental in causing its preparation, as to him the deed is irrevocable.
- (4.) A creditor, ignorant of the existence of the trust-deed, cannot claim the benefit of its provisions.

*Jones v. James.*

- (5.) Trust-deeds in favour of creditors must be registered under the Deeds of Arrangement Act, 1887.

But a trust-deed for the benefit of specified creditors only, and not the whole body of creditors, does not fall within the Act.

*Re Saumarez.*

- (6.) Such a deed is an act of bankruptcy, and therefore no payment can safely be made to the trustee under the deed until three months have elapsed.

*Davis v. Petrie ; Ponsford v. Union Bank.*

- (7.) The trustee is entitled to be indemnified out of the assets, his title being paramount to the creditors.

*Harper v. Riley.*

#### Fifthly, EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENTS.

Choses in action were formerly not assignable at *common law*, although assignments of equitable choses in action for valuable consideration have always been enforced in *equity*.

The following exceptions have, however, been engrafted upon the ancient common law rule, which is now practically abrogated—

- (1.) Contracts with the sovereign.
- (2.) Negotiable instruments, formerly by the law merchant, but now by the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882.
- (3.) Where the debtor assented to the transfer of the debt.
- (4.) Contingent interests in real estate, by 8 and 9 Vict. c. 106.
- (5.) Bail bonds, by 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16.
- (6.) Bills of lading, by 18 & 19 Vict. c. 111.
- (7.) Policies of life assurance, by 30 & 31 Vict. c. 144.
- (8.) Policies of marine assurance, by 6 Edw. VII. c. 41 (repealing and re-enacting in this respect 31 & 32 Vict. c. 86).
- (9.) Debts and other legal choses in action where the assignment is absolute, by Judicature Act, 1873.

In equity the mode or form of assignment is absolutely immaterial provided the intention of the parties is clear; so a mere order given by debtor to creditor upon a third person is deemed a binding assignment or appropriation.

*Diplock v. Hammond.*

But a mere revocable mandate is insufficient; and no appropriation or assignment is effective unless the fund, from which payment is to be made, be indicated. The bankruptcy of the debtor revokes a mere mandate, as such a mandate is only agency.

The assignee of a chose in action must give NOTICE to the holder of the fund assigned in order to obtain a right *in rem*; without notice he has merely a right *in personam* against the assignor, and third parties will not be bound. When the fund is in court, a stop-order must be obtained, which has all the effect of notice. This doctrine relating to assignments of equitable interests in pure personalty is known as the

*Rule in Dearle v. Hall.*

That is to say, where a fund is legally vested in trustees, an assignee who (not having had at the time of taking his

security notice of any prior incumbrance) gives notice to the trustees has a better title in equity than an assignee of an earlier date who has not given notice. The question of priority between such incumbrancers depends solely upon priority of notice.

Notice should be given to each trustee, as although notice to one of several trustees is notice to all, yet, if the trustee to whom notice is given die without having communicated the notice to his co-trustees, and after his death the *cestui que trust* creates an incumbrance, and the assignee gives notice to the surviving trustees, then the subsequent incumbrancer might have priority over the previous incumbrancer.

*Warde v. Duncombe.*

Where the *assignor* is himself one of the trustees notice should be given to his co-trustees. *Lloyds Bank v. Pearson.*

If notice be given to all the trustees who are such at the date of the assignment priority is preserved even though all the trustees die and new ones are appointed who have no knowledge of such notice: and there is no obligation on the incumbrancer to renew his notice upon a change of trustees.

*Re Phillips Trusts; Brittin v. Partridge.*

The rule applies even to a trustee in bankruptcy, who must give notice in order to *preserve* his priority.

*Re Stone's Will.*

But a trustee in bankruptcy takes the debtor's choses in action subject to existing equities and cannot obtain priority over an incumbrancer antecedent to the bankruptcy by giving notice.

*Re Wallis.*

The rule is not applicable to shares in registered companies, or to equitable or chattel interests in real estate, although it is applied to proceeds of sale of real estate.

*Lloyds Bank v. Pearson.*

The assignee of a chose in action takes subject to all equities subsisting against the assignor; *e.g.*, assignee of a residue takes subject to payment of costs of administration action.

*Turton v. Benson; Knapman v. Wreford;*

*Christmas v. Jones.*

*Except* in the case of negotiable instruments or debentures payable to bearer.

By the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, debts and other legal choses in action are rendered assignable at law *subject* to all equities affecting the assignor, provided the assignment—

- (1.) Is absolute, not purporting to be by way of charge,
- (2.) Is in writing under hand of assignor, and
- (3.) Express notice in writing thereof be given to the holder of the fund.

A mortgage of a chose in action is within the terms of this section, provided there is an actual assignment of it and not a mere charge.

*Tancred v. Delagoa Bay.*

The assignment must extend to the whole debt.

*Forster v. Baker.*

Upon the assignment of a chose in action notice is necessary

- (1.) To prevent the debtor paying the assignor.
- (2.) To prevent a subsequent assignee gaining priority by notice.
- (3.) In the case of debts due to the assignor in the way of his trade, to take them out of his order and disposition under the Bankruptcy Act.
- (4.) In the case of legal choses in action, to enable the assignee to sue in his own name under the provisions of the Judicature Act, 1873.

Equity will not, as a general rule, enforce the following assignments, on the ground that they are contrary to public policy:—

- (1.) Assignments of alimony, or of pensions and salaries of public officers, unless office is a sinecure or duties have ceased and pension or salary is not expressly rendered inalienable.
- (2.) Assignments affected by champerty, maintenance, or other corrupt considerations.
- (3.) Assignments of mere *lites pendentes*, but a purchase from *defendant* is always valid.
- (4.) Assignments by incapacitated persons, *e.g.*, purchase by solicitor of subject-matter of action in which he is retained.



The assignment of a debt illegal in its conception to a purchaser for value *bonâ fide* and without notice will not get rid of the illegality; so the transferee of a mortgage taken by a moneylender not in his registered name (as provided by Moneylenders Act, 1900) obtains no rights under the transfer. *Re Robinson.*

But now under Moneylenders Act, 1911 (unless transaction is invalid apart from the Act of 1900), such a security will be valid in favour of a *bonâ fide* assignee.

A partner cannot assign his partnership share so as to give the assignee the right of interfering in the management; but an assignment by a limited partner with the consent of the general partners will give the assignee all the rights of the assignor, under the Limited Partnership Act, 1907.

### Sixthly, PRECATORY TRUSTS.

A trust which may fairly be collected from a written instrument is an express trust: thus where property is given *absolutely* to any person who is by the donor recommended, entreated, or wished to dispose thereof in favour of another, a trust termed a Precatory Trust is held to be created, *provided* there are present the following requisites, known as the

#### Three Certainties

which are essential to every express trust.

- (1.) The words in question are so used that on the whole they ought to be construed as imperative or certain. No technical words are necessary.

The present tendency of Equity is strongly *against* construing recommendatory words (*e.g.*, in full confidence) as imperative so as to create precatory trusts. *In re Adams v. The Kensington Vestry.*

But they may be so construed where there is a gift over. *Comiskey v. Hanbury.*

*And*

- (2.) The subject-matter of the recommendation or wish be certain.

The subject-matter is never certain where the first taker has a discretionary power to withdraw any *indefinite* part of it from the objects of the recommendation or wish.

*And*

- (3.) The objects or persons intended to have the benefit of the recommendation or wish be certain.

*Harding v. Glyn.*

If *any one* of these "three certainties" be wanting no valid trust is ever held to be created. If (1) be wanting, no trust is created; and if (2) or (3) be wanting, although a trust may be constituted, it is void for uncertainty.

Whenever it is clear that a *trust is* INTENDED (although not validly created), the devisee or legatee *cannot take* beneficially, but is excluded for the benefit of the heir or next of kin.

*Briggs v. Penny.*

### Seventhly, SECRET TRUSTS.

Where a will makes no disposition of the beneficial interest in property, which is thereby given to a trustee or vests in the executor, and nothing appears *on the will* suggesting the inference that the trustee or executor is to take beneficially, no secret trust will be enforced; and the trustee or executor will take for the benefit of the heir or next of kin.

Where it does so appear that the trustee or executor is to take beneficially, no secret trust affecting it will be enforced:

*Except* on the ground of *fraud*, in which case the trustee or executor will be compelled to disclose the trust, and, if lawful, to execute it.

In order to bind the devisee or legatee by a secret trust, it must be communicated to him in the *testator's lifetime*, and he must accept that particular trust, otherwise he is entitled to hold beneficially.

*Boyes v. Carritt; Hetley v. Hetley.*

And if necessary the memorandum embodying the secret trust will be treated as part of the will. *Re Maddock.*



Eighthly, POWERS *in the Nature of* TRUSTS.

POWERS are not imperative, and, as a general rule, equity will not execute an unexecuted power.

TRUSTS are always imperative, and equity will execute them.

*Powers in the nature of trusts* combine the qualities of the two in such a manner that equity will enforce their execution, but there must be a true trust power or equity will not interfere.

Where there is a *general* intention in favour of a class, and a *particular* intention in favour of individuals of that class, who are to be selected by another person, and the particular intention fails from that selection not being made, the court will carry into effect the *general* intention in favour of the class.

*Burrough v. Philcox.*

Ninthly, PURCHASER'S LIABILITY *to see to APPLICATION of Purchase-Money where there are* Cestuis que trust.

Prior to the statutes hereinafter referred to, a purchaser was bound to see that his purchase-money was applied in fulfilment of the trust, unless expressly exonerated by the author thereof. In cases of—

## (1.) Personalty

Purchaser from executor was exonerated from this liability, except in case of his *fraud*.

## (2.) Realty

## (a.) Trust or charge for payment of

Debts generally	} Purchaser was exonerated.
Debts and legacies generally	

## (b.) Trust or charge for payment of

Specified debts	} Purchaser was not exonerated.
Legacies, or	
Annuities only	

*Elliot v. Merryman.*

Lord St. Leonards' Act (22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, now styled "The Law of Property Act Amendment Act, 1859"), and Lord Cranworth's Act (23 & 24 Vict. c. 145), contain

provisions exonerating purchasers and mortgagees under instruments made subsequent to their respective dates of commencement.

The Trustee Act, 1893, s. 20 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 53), repeating a similar provision in the Conveyancing Act, 1881, applies to ALL TRUSTS WHENEVER CREATED, and makes the written receipts of trustees sufficient discharges in every case.

The Settled Land Act, 1882, which is also retrospective, contains similar provisions as regards moneys arising thereunder. But purchasers from a tenant for life to be exonerated from liability must see that the purchase-money is paid either into court or to at least two trustees of the settlement, as the tenant for life may direct.

The implied power given to executors by a charge of debts would appear to be paramount to that of the tenant for life under the Settled Land Acts, so that his consent would not be necessary to the sale.

The Land Transfer Act, 1897, vests realty as well as personalty in the personal representatives, so that it would appear in future realty will be on the same footing as personalty in respect to this question.

Generally, therefore, a *bonâ fide* purchaser is now exonerated in every case, not only in respect of debts, but also legacies and annuities.

Where, however, land is devised *subject* to a specified charge, the purchaser must still see to the application of the purchase-money.

It is important for purchasers to see that the person professing to sell as trustee is in fact the person authorised for that purpose by the instrument creating the trust, and also that the power or trust for sale *still exists*.

Note that in the case of real estate a presumption arises after the lapse of twenty years that debts have been paid, in which event the power of sale may be gone.

*Re Tanqueray Willaume.*

But this presumption does not arise in respect of leaseholds.

*Re Venn and Furze.*

Unless the purchaser knows all the debts have been paid.

*Re Verrel.*

And by the Conveyancing Act, 1911, s. 10, for the purchaser's protection the trustees' power of sale continues until the trust property has been actually conveyed to the beneficiaries.

So where the transferee of a mortgage is selling, it must be seen that the power of sale is exercisable by an assign of the mortgagee.

*Rumney v. Smith.*

The provisions of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, that a receipt, in the body of or indorsed upon a purchase-deed, shall be sufficient authority for paying the purchase-money to the solicitor of the vendor, did not apply to the case of vendors who were trustees, and they had no power to authorise one of their number to receive the purchase-money.

Now the Trustee Act, 1893, has placed trustee-vendors in the same position as other persons in this respect.

But a trustee-vendor cannot authorise his attorney to appoint a solicitor to receive purchase-money on his behalf.

*Re Hetling and Merton.*

And a power of attorney to sell land does not empower the attorney to sell land of which the principal is mortgagee only.

*Re Dowson and Jenkin.*

### CHAPTER III.

#### EXPRESS PUBLIC (OR CHARITABLE) TRUSTS.

CHARITIES, in the legal acceptation of that term, are and comprise—

*Firstly*, Charitable Uses recognised as such by 43 Eliz. c. 4 (now repealed, but practically re-enacted by the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888), namely: every disposition having for its object relief of the poor, advancement of learning or the Christian religion, or any other useful public purpose.

*Secondly*, Charitable Uses similar to those specified in the statute and which have been held to be within its spirit, *e.g.*, repair of church monuments, foundation of lectureships.

Charities must be of a PUBLIC character, and objects merely for the benefit of individuals are not charitable in the legal sense, but a gift to the vicar and churchwardens for the time being is charitable.

The court usually settles a scheme for administration of charitable legacies. The Charity Commissioners may also settle schemes, but a charity supported entirely by voluntary contributions is not liable to be controlled by the Commissioners. An *eleemosynary* charity is administered without regard to religious beliefs of recipients unless it be an ecclesiastical charity.

A sale or mortgage of the land of a charity liable to be controlled by the Charity Commissioners requires the consent of the Commissioners to validate it.

I. Charities are treated with more favour than private individuals in the following respects:

(1.) A GENERAL intention of charity will be effectuated.

(a.) A gift to a charity will be upheld as valid, no matter how uncertain the objects may be, provided the intention be *distinctly* charitable. The nomination of the objects will be treated as the *mode*, and the gift to charity as the *substance* of the disposition.

If the gift be for purposes other than those distinctly charitable, *e.g.*, for charitable or religious purposes, it will be void as not exclusively charitable. Philanthropic purposes are not charitable in the legal sense.

(b.) Where the literal execution of the trusts becomes inexpedient or impracticable, the court will execute them *cy-pres*, *i.e.*, as nearly as possible in conformity with the original intention, which must be a *general* intention of charity. *Moggridge v. Thackwell.*

But the *cy-pres* doctrine is not to be applied until it is established that the directions cannot be carried into effect. *Re Weir Hospital.*

Note—The *cy-pres* doctrine is not applicable unless there was a general charitable intention; it cannot



be applied on failure of intention to carry out a particular object. *Fowler v. Att.-Gen.*

In both (a.) and (b.) a private individual would receive no help from equity.

(2.) Defects in conveyances supplied. A private individual would receive no help from equity to perfect an imperfect voluntary gift.

(3.) No resulting trusts.

(a.) Where there is a general intention of charity there will be no resulting trust to the settlor, for the court will execute the intention.

(b.) Where the increased revenues of a charity give rise to an excess of income beyond the specified objects, the court will apply the surplus in conformity with the original intention.

EXCEPTION IN BOTH CASES.—Where the settlor merely *appropriates part* only of the capital or income to the charity, the residue will result to him.

(4.) Charities are not within the rule against perpetuities, *i.e.*, a charitable trust remains binding for ever.

(5.) Even prior to the Voluntary Conveyances Act, 1893, a purchaser who purchased with notice of a charitable gift, or without notice from a person who had notice, took subject to it, and derived no benefit from 27 Eliz. c. 4.

*Att.-Gen. v. Newcastle ; Ramsay v. Gilchrist.*

II. Charities are treated on a level with private individuals in the following respects:—

(1.) Want of executor or trustee supplied.

(2.) Lapse of time a bar. But the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, provides that as between an express trustee and his *cestui que trust*, no lapse of time is a bar, except in so far as the Trustee Act, 1888, applies.

(3.) Separation of legal from illegal objects, where the charitable purposes are legal and the properties appropriated thereto are ascertainable.

(4.) Trusts for accumulation of income disregarded when



the capital has vested absolutely, the rule in *Saunders v. Vautier* being applicable.

III. Until recently charities have been treated with less favour than private individuals in the following particulars:—

- (1.) Assets were not marshalled in favour of a charity in the absence of an express direction to that effect in the will; for to do so would have been to contravene the provisions of the Mortmain Acts.

The rule of the court adopted in all such cases was to appropriate the fund as if no legal objection existed as to applying any part to the charity legacies, and then holding so much of the legacies to fail as would in that way fall to be paid out of the prohibited fund. *Williams v. Kershaw.*

But the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 73), has now practically swept away the restrictions on gifts by will of real estate to charities by making such gifts valid, while compelling the charities to sell within a year. The court, however, may authorise the retention or purchase of land when required for actual occupation by the charity. This Act applies to wills of testators dying after its passing, whenever made.

Proceeds of sale of land subject to an immediate trust for sale do not fall within the Act, and the trustees may therefore retain the land unsold without the leave of the court, but they may not postpone the sale indefinitely. *Re Sidebottom.*

And the Mortmain Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 11), makes valid gifts of land by deed to a Local Authority for any charitable purpose for which such authority is empowered by statute to acquire land.

- (2.) Charitable gifts of a superstitious character are void as contrary to public policy; *e.g.*, saying masses for the dead. But if the purposes of the gift are legal, the trust is valid; so trusts for the support of animals

or maintenance of the settlor's tomb in a churchyard are valid if they do not tend to perpetuities.

By the Charitable Trusts Acts, 1853-1894, considerable powers are vested in the Charity Commissioners with reference to the administration of charities. They are empowered to appoint and remove trustees, to make vesting orders, and to authorise sales and leases, and to settle schemes for the administration of the charity, but such schemes should be *ex-pres* the original objects of the trust. The jurisdiction of the Commissioners, however, only arises where there are endowments; and where a charity is only in part supported by voluntary contributions, it is to that extent exempt from the control of the Commissioners.

Charitable trusts can only be enforced by or through the Attorney-General.

## CHAPTER IV.

### IMPLIED AND RESULTING TRUSTS.

AN *implied* or *presumptive* trust is a trust which is founded on an unexpressed but presumed (*i.e.*, implied) intention of the party creating it.

A *resulting* trust is a trust which is *implied* in favour of the *person creating* it, or his representatives.

ALL resulting trusts are implied trusts, but not every implied trust is a resulting trust, strictly so called.

Distinguish a resulting trust from a resulting use. In the former it is the beneficial interest, but in the latter it is the legal estate, which results.

The chief instances of implied trusts are—

- I. Resulting trust to person who advances the purchase-money for property which is conveyed to a third person.

*Dyer v. Dyer,*

- (1.) Parol evidence is always admissible to show the actual purchaser, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds. For—
- (a.) It is a trust resulting by operation of law.
  - (b.) The parol evidence is merely for the purpose of proving that the nominal purchaser is but the *agent* of the actual purchaser.
- (2.) No resulting trust where the law would be infringed.
- (3.) Resulting trusts may be rebutted—
- (a.) By parol evidence showing that the nominal purchaser was intended to take the whole beneficial interest.
  - (b.) By the contrary equitable presumption of *advancement* which will be raised in favour of—
    - (a.) A legitimate but not illegitimate child of the purchaser, including now child of second wife, sister of deceased first wife.
    - (β.) A person to whom the purchaser has placed himself *in loco parentis*, even an illegitimate child.
    - (γ.) Wife of purchaser, but not a woman with whom he has contracted an illegal marriage.

*Drew v. Martin; Soar v. Foster.*

But in general there is no presumption of advancement when the purchaser above mentioned is the *mother*, as a married woman is not primarily liable for the maintenance of her children.

The equitable presumption of advancement (being only a *prima facie* presumption) may be again rebutted by parol evidence to the contrary, such as the *contemporaneous* acts and declarations of the purchaser, which are receivable in evidence both for and against him. *Williams v. Williams.*

The *subsequent* acts and declarations of the purchaser are evidence against him, but not for him.

On the other hand, the subsequent acts and declarations of the child are evidence for the purchaser against the child. *Sidmouth v. Sidmouth*

## II. Resulting trust of unexhausted residue.

- (1.) A trustee is excluded, by the very fact of being named trustee, from benefiting by a resulting trust. A devisee *subject to a charge* merely, takes beneficially; but a devisee *upon trust* takes no benefit even after satisfaction of the specified purposes of the trust.

*King v. Denison.*

- (2.) Where a trust of property has been created, and there is no one in whose favour it can result.

- (a.) *As to real estate*, where the *cestui que trust* dies intestate and without heirs. Prior to the Intestates' Estates Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 71), the trustee, being seised in fee, would have held the lands discharged from the trust.

*Burgess v. Wheate.*

So also in the case of a mortgage in fee, on the death of the mortgagor intestate and without heirs, the equity of redemption would have belonged to the mortgagee, and no escheat taken place.

*Beale v. Symonds.*

Copyholds in all these respects were like freeholds.

*Gallard v. Hawkins.*

Under the Intestates' Estates Act, 1884, however, the rule is altered, and there would now be an escheat to the Crown or the lord in all cases.

- (b.) *As to personal estate* where the *cestui que trust* dies intestate and without next of kin, the Crown takes it as *bona vacantia*. If, however, it vests in the executor *virtute officii*, he may (unless he is also appointed trustee) retain it as against the Crown.

*Roose v. Chalk.*

This is not affected by the Intestates' Estates Act.

- (3.) Formerly executors took undisposed-of residue of testator's personal estate, unless excluded by testator's express or implied intention.

By the 1 Will. IV. c. 40, executors were made trustees for the next of kin in respect of any such undisposed-of personalty, in the absence of any



contrary intention in the will, which intention would be inferred from an express legacy given to them ; but the executors can still retain beneficially as against the Crown if there are no next of kin.

*In re Lacy.*

III. Resulting trusts, under head of Conversion, *vide infra*, chap. ix.

IV. Implied trusts arising out of joint-tenancies. Joint-tenancy is not favoured in equity, and very slight circumstances will be considered sufficient to treat such a tenancy as one in common, and the surviving joint-tenant will be deemed a trustee for the representatives of the deceased.

- (1.) Joint-advance of purchase-money in *unequal* proportions, appearing on the deed itself, will be deemed to create a tenancy in common.

*Lake v. Gibson ; Lake v. Craddock.*

- (2.) Joint-advance on mortgage in *equal* or *unequal* proportions will be treated as a tenancy in common.

*Morley v. Bird.*

Equity will not treat the mortgage as joint, even though it contain an express declaration that advance was made on a joint-account.

*Smith v. Sibthorpe.*

- (3.) Joint commercial purchases are deemed tenancies in common.

- (4.) Land devised to joint-tenants who treat it as partnership assets will be deemed to be held in common.

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## CHAPTER V.

### CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.

A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, as distinguished both from express and implied trusts, is a trust which is raised by construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice *without*



reference to any *presumable intention* of the parties, either express or implied.

The chief instances of constructive trusts are—

I. LIEN ON LAND sold. This constitutes a *charge* in equity upon the lands irrespective of possession.

(1.) Vendor's lien for unpaid purchase-money; it arises at the time fixed for completion, and may be enforced against—

(a.) The purchaser and all volunteers taking under him.

(b.) Subsequent purchasers for value with notice.

(c.) Trustee in bankruptcy although without notice.

(d.) Subsequent purchasers for value even without notice, if they have not obtained the *legal estate*.

*Mackreth v. Symmons.*

Unless the vendor has been guilty of *negligence*.

*Rice v. Rice.*

But this lien cannot in any case be enforced against a *bond fide* purchaser for value without notice who has the *LEGAL* estate.

The lien will not be lost *merely* by the vendor's taking collateral security; the question of abandonment depends upon the *nature* of the security, as amounting to evidence of intention to rely upon such security solely.

*Mackreth v. Symmons.*

(a.) A *personal* security will not *per se* prove an intention of waiver.

(b.) The question to be considered in every case will be—Is the security *substitutive* of, or only *cumulative* with, the lien?

*Buckland v. Pocknell.*

The vendor's lien is assignable, even by parol.

Not being an express trust, the vendor's right to recover the unpaid purchase-money may be barred by the Statutes of Limitation.

The receipt of the vendor in the body of or indorsed upon the conveyance protects a *bond fide* purchaser.

(2.) Vendee's lien for prematurely paid purchase-

money, which may be enforced generally against the like persons as the vendor's lien; so when deposit paid and sale goes off without purchaser's default, he has an equitable lien on the land for deposit paid.

As regards lands (not of copyhold tenure) in Yorkshire, a lien arising since 31st December, 1884, will not prevail, unless it be registered; and priority of registration will determine priority of title except in cases of actual fraud.

*Yorkshire Registries Act, 1884.*

The law as to vendor's and purchaser's lien applies to personalty as well as real estate. *Davies v. Thomas.*

## II.—Renewal of lease by trustee in his own name.

A trustee renewing a lease in his own name, even after refusal of the lessor to grant a new lease to the *cestui que trust*, will be held a constructive trustee for the benefit of the *cestui que trust*.

*Keech v. Sandford (the Romford Market Case).*

The same rule applies to all persons standing in a fiduciary relation in respect of the property affected, *e.g.*, a tenant for life exercising powers conferred on him by the Settled Land Act or a partner renewing a lease.

Where a lease renewed by a trustee in his own name contains other lands in addition to those demised by the old lease, the constructive trust will apply to the latter lands only. *Acheson v. Fair.*

## III. Allowance of expenditure for improvements, where same are necessary and permanently beneficial.

Where a part-owner, acting *bonâ fide*, permanently benefits an estate by necessary repairs or improvements, a constructive trust may arise in his favour in respect of his expenditure.

Improvements by a tenant for life should now be made under the provisions of the Improvement of Land Act, 1864, Settled Land Act, 1882, and Agricultural Holdings Act, 1908.

Trustees have a lien on trust funds for expenses properly incurred by them.

Where payments have been made to prevent the lapse of a policy of insurance, the payer (not being a volunteer) has a lien on the policy or its proceeds, but not on the footing of salvage moneys.

*Leslie v. French.*

- IV. Formerly the heir of mortgagee in fee dying intestate was held a constructive trustee of the estate for the benefit of the personal representatives.

*Thornborough v. Baker.*

Now under the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 30, upon the death of the mortgagee (testate or intestate) the legal estate devolves upon the personal representatives.

But this provision does not apply to legal estate in copyholds.

*Copyhold Act, 1894, s. 88.*

And under the Land Transfer Act, 1897, real estate (other than the legal estate in copyholds) devolves upon the legal personal representatives like chattels real, and they become trustees for the persons beneficially entitled.

*Re Somerville v. Turner.*

The legal estate was held to vest in all the executors (both proving and non-proving) except such as renounced.

*Re Pawley.*

But now under the Conveyancing Act, 1911 (which applies to all dispositions since 1910), the proving executors alone are empowered to pass the legal estate.

As to equity's mode of constructing trusts—

The inquiry is first made—Who has got the *legal* estate? Then equity builds or constructs upon such **LEGAL ESTATE** the trust in question. The rule being in all cases to construct a trust upon the *legal estate only*.

## CHAPTER VI.

TRUSTEES AND OTHERS STANDING IN A FIDUCIARY  
RELATION.

A TRUSTEE should be a person capable of taking and holding the legal estate, and possessed of natural capacity and legal ability to execute the trust. A corporation may be trustee; indeed, the Public Trustee is a corporation.

An infant, although not incapable, is unsuited for the office of trustee on account of disability, by reason of which (1) his power of conveying trust property vested in him is limited; (2) he is unable to execute a trust involving the exercise of a discretion; and (3) he is free from liability for breach of trust during minority except in cases of fraud.

Since the Naturalisation Act, 1870, and Married Women's Property Act, 1882, there is no legal objection to an alien or married woman being a trustee, but the court will not appoint a person not resident within the jurisdiction.

Formerly it was necessary for the husband of a married woman trustee (other than a bare trustee) to concur in her conveyance of real estate, which must have been duly acknowledged. *Re Harkness and Alsop.*

But this disability has now been removed by the Married Women's Property Act, 1907.

Trustees have been classified as passive or active: *passive* when by the trust instrument they are simply directed to hold the trust property for the *cestui que trust*, and *active* when special duties or powers are given involving actual dealings with the trust property.

Where once a trust exists, equity never wants a trustee, but will follow the legal estate, and declare the person in whom it is vested to be a trustee. The lapse of the legal estate in no way affects the beneficial interest, for the court will provide a trustee or assume the office in the first



instance. Under the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, a judicial trustee may be appointed.

A trustee is the *servant* of his *cestui que trust*, embracing under that term the aggregate body of persons (born and unborn) having beneficial interests; but the *controller* of his *cestui que trust*, when that term refers to a person having only a *partial* interest in the trust-fund. The majority of the *cestuis que trust* may, upon the total failure of the purposes of the trust, demand back the trust-fund.

*Wilson v. Church.*

Trustees may be compelled to perform any particular duty.

A trustee cannot renounce after accepting the trust, and the taking of probate by an executor-trustee is an acceptance of the entire trust. The only methods by which trustees could formerly be released were—

- (1.) By the court.
- (2.) Under a special power in the trust instrument.
- (3.) By consent of all parties, being *sui juris*.

But now, under the Trustee Act, 1893, s. 11, a trustee may retire by deed from the trust, provided two trustees remain, who, with the person authorised to appoint new trustees, consent to such retirement.

If, however, a trustee retire without a proper and adequate reason, he must do so at his own expense.

*Re Beveridge's Trusts.*

And under the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, a judicial trustee may retire on giving notice to the court and reporting what arrangements have been made for the appointment of his successor.

### *Delegation by Trustees.*

*Delegatus non potest delegare*—a trustee cannot delegate his office, which is one of personal confidence, in the absence of express authority; that is to say, as long as he remains a trustee.

*Dewar v. Brooke.*

Such delegation is, however, permitted where there is a moral necessity (which includes regular course of business) for it.

*Joy v. Campbell.*



But this rule does not extend to protect trustees where the delegation is to an agent who is not reasonably fitted by character or calling properly to perform it, *e.g.*, leaving bearer bonds indefinitely with solicitors; they may, however, safely deposit such with their bankers. *Fry v. Tapson.*

Under the Trustee Act, 1893, a trustee may depute his solicitor to receive purchase-money for an estate or policy moneys.

### *Diligence Required of Trustees.*

- (1.) As regards *duties*—*Exacta diligentia*. The utmost diligence is the only protection against liability, as a trustee is bound to do the thing prescribed and has no discretion. Breaches of duty are such as permitting the trust-fund to remain unnecessarily in the power of a third person, or mixing the trust-fund with his own moneys.
- (2.) As regards *discretions*. Diligence such as usually exercised by men of ordinary prudence in the management of their own affairs is sufficient. There is no rule of law that a trustee is liable to make good loss sustained by retaining an authorised security in a falling market if he acted prudently, believing it was to the interest of all parties. A trustee having a discretionary power of investment must not invest in securities in which he would not place his own moneys. He must exercise a just discretion. *Cocks v. Chapman*;

*Whiteley v. Learoyd*; *Andrews v. Weall.*

Nothing will justify a dishonest exercise of the discretion. *Smith v. Thompson.*

When lending money upon the security of any property, a trustee must see that the security is one authorised by the trust instrument, and take care not to lend more than two-thirds of the value, as ascertained by the report of a properly qualified valuer specially employed *by him* for the purpose; and further, he should require the advice of the valuer as to the loan, to be expressed in his report. The so-called two-

thirds rule represents the normal risk and minimum protection—i.e., the trustee must properly exercise his discretion.

If, however, the loan exceed this limit and loss arises, the trustee was formerly liable for the whole, taking over the improper security, but now he will only be liable for the excess, provided the investment is in all other respects proper. *Trustee Act, 1893, ss. 8, 9.*

Prior to this Act the rule was that trustees must not advance more than two-thirds of the value of land, or one-half of the value of house property. There is, however, no hard-and-fast rule that trustees must not advance more than half the value of business premises.

*Palmer v. Emerson.*

In case of loss, it is no defence that the trustees believed the borrower to be well able to pay the loan on his personal covenant.

An executor or administrator is a trustee within the meaning of the Trustee Acts.

When a tenant for life exercising his powers under the Settled Land Acts directs capital money to be invested on mortgage, the trustees are not bound to do so unless all the precautions required by the Trustee Act, 1893, have been complied with. *Re Hotham.*

The tenant for life in giving directions is in the position of a trustee, and may be restrained from directing investments not suitable for trust-funds, although falling within the actual words of the Act.

*Bulteel v. Lawdeshayne.*

And by the Conveyancing Act, 1911, the tenant for life is empowered to direct the trustees not to sell land vested in them on mortgage discharged from right of redemption but to make it subject to the trusts of the settlement.

The solicitor to a trustee concerned in the matter of an unauthorised investment is not liable as constructive trustee for loss arising therefrom.

It is a breach of trust to invest trust-moneys on a contributory mortgage. *Webb v. Jonas.*

A mortgage upon which trustees advance should be a *first* mortgage and a *legal* mortgage; for upon a second mortgage they neither get the legal estate nor the title-deeds, and they may not have funds available to redeem the prior mortgage if foreclosure is threatened.

But it has been said there is no fixed rule that a trustee lending trust-funds on second mortgage is liable for loss, the onus being on the trustee to show it was a proper investment. *Want v. Champion.*

Under the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, the court may relieve a trustee from all liability for a breach of trust where the court is of opinion that the trustee has acted honestly *and* reasonably in the matter and ought fairly to be excused, which appears to mean in such a way as the court would have authorised if applied to for directions. *Chapman v. Browne.*

Where the right of redemption of property mortgaged to trustees is barred by Statute of Limitations, foreclosure, or otherwise, the mortgagee holds the same on trust for sale with power of postponement.

*Conveyancing Act, 1911, s. 9.*

### *Remuneration of Trustees.*

The general rule is that no remuneration can be allowed to trustees, for they must not profit by their trust.

*Robinson v. Pett.*

Trustees may, however, receive remuneration

- (1.) Under an express or implied provision in the trust instrument.

But the authority given by a testator to a solicitor-trustee to charge costs is a legacy, and so, if the estate prove insolvent, such costs are not recoverable.

*Pennel v. Franklin.*

And such an authority extending to professional and other charges does not authorise non-professional work unless expressly employed by the trustees to do it.

*Re Devereux.*

- (2.) Under an express contract between the trustee and *cestui que trust*, being *sui juris*.
- (3.) Where expressly allowed by the court.
- (4.) Under the provisions of the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896.
- (5.) Where a person is a constructive trustee merely through having employed the money of another in his business.
- (6.) A solicitor-trustee may be employed by his co-trustee to defend legal proceedings instituted against the trustees, and will be entitled to his ordinary costs.

*Cradock v. Piper.*

But this rule did not extend to mortgages, so that a solicitor-mortgagee employed by his co-mortgagees to bring foreclosure proceedings or defend a redemption action was not entitled to profit costs.

*Hibbert v. Lloyd.*

But now the Mortgagees' Legal Costs Act, 1895, enables solicitor-mortgagees to make the same charges as if acting for a client, including the scale fee for negotiation. It is conceived the Act does not apply where the solicitor-mortgagee is a trustee.

*Re Norris.*

Further, trustees may not derive any advantage out of the trust; for example, they are not allowed to charge more than they gave for incumbrances on the trust estate, nor to employ trust-funds in business while merely paying interest thereon. In fact, all profits made by trustees by virtue of their office belong to the beneficiaries. This rule applies also to constructive trustees, and generally to all persons clothed with a fiduciary character; *e.g.*, agents, directors, company promoters.

*Keech v. Sandford; Fox v. Mackreth;  
Griffith v. Owen.*

#### *Purchases by Trustees.*

A trustee for *sale*, that is, a trustee who is selling, is absolutely disabled from purchasing the trust estate,



A trustee will not, as a general rule, be allowed to purchase the trust estate from the *cestui que trust*. The exceptions to this rule are where—

- (1.) Trustee gives a fancy price.
- (2.) The offer to sell proceeds from *cestui que trust*, and trustee gives market price, keeping him at arm's-length.
- (3.) The sale is by public auction, and trustee has leave of court to bid. *Boswell v. Coaks.*
- (4.) The trustee is only a bare trustee, or has retired from the trust for a considerable time.

And a tenant for life exercising powers conferred by the Settled Land Act is bound to have regard to interests of all parties under the settlement and is deemed a trustee for those parties, and so in exercising his statutory power he cannot sell to himself.

*Wheelwright v. Walker ; Middlemas v. Stevens.*

But the mere fact that a *bonâ fide* sale by him is at an under-value will not *per se* invalidate the sale.

*Hurrell v. Littlejohn.*

A sale, void within this rule, may by lapse of time become impossible of rescission, although in general the Statute of Limitations is no bar ; but damages may be given where rescission would be inequitable.

### *A Constructive Trustee*

is not liable to the same extent as an express trustee ; for example, a vendor, although called a constructive trustee for the purchaser, is only a trustee to the extent of his obligation to perform the purchase agreement, an obligation which may be barred by lapse of time. The rule has hitherto been that time is no bar in the case of an express trust, but that it bars a constructive trust.

*Soar v. Ashwell ; Knox v. Gye.*

Now, under the Trustee Act, 1888, trustees (whether express or constructive) have the full benefit of Statutes of Limitation exactly as if they were not trustees, except in cases of fraud ; but as against beneficiaries the statutes only



run from possession, so tenant for life may be barred and the reversioner not.

If trustees pay the wrong person proceedings must be taken by the right person within six years. *Re Croydon.*

### *Liability of Trustee for Co-trustee.*

Trustees must all join in giving receipts, their power being a joint one.

A non-receiving trustee who has joined in a receipt is guilty of *neglect of duty* in subsequently *leaving* moneys in the hands of the recipient trustee, and will be liable for such co-trustee. *Townley v. Sherborne.*

(a.) A non-receiving trustee who joins in a receipt for sake of conformity is not by *that act alone* rendered liable for co-trustee; and the Trustee Act, 1893, recognises this principle.

(b.) A trustee, although joining in receipt for conformity only, will be liable for neglect of duty in allowing money to *remain* in power of recipient trustee longer than the circumstances reasonably require, as it is the duty of trustees to have trust-money as soon as reasonably possible placed under their joint control. *Brice v. Stokes.*

### *Liability of Executor for Co-executor.*

Executors need not all join in receipts, their power being joint and several.

(a.) An executor joining in a receipt is PRIMÂ FACIE liable for co-executor since he does an unnecessary act and is not fulfilling a duty merely as in the case of a trustee. *Brice v. Stokes.*

(b.) This PRIMÂ FACIE liability may, however, be displaced by the executor proving that he did not in fact receive. *Westley v. Clarke.*

The real test appears to be whether the money, although not actually received by all the executors, was *under their control*. *Joy v. Campbell.*

But where a non-receiving executor is proved to have been guilty of *wilful default* he will be held liable even for money which he has not received.

*Styles v. Guy.*

Note that, although the appointment of debtor as executor operates in law as a merger of the debt, equity would compel the debtor-executor to pay the debt for benefit of creditors and legatees, but not for residuary legatees or next of kin.

### *Contribution and Recoupment.*

Where trustees are held liable for breach of trust, and there is a judgment against all, the trustee making good the breach (unless he is also a beneficiary) may, by *independent action*, have contribution against his co-trustees; but as regards the costs of the action for the breach, a trustee paying the whole has no such right, either for recoupment or contribution, but the court may make an order therefor in the action itself; and the Statutes of Limitation do not begin to run against the trustees' right to contribution until judgment has been obtained.

When the breach is fraudulent and all the trustees are parties to the fraud there is no right of contribution.

Trustees have a right to be reimbursed out of the trust-estate the costs and expenses of actions properly instituted or defended for the protection of or with reference to the estate, but in all cases of doubt trustees should obtain the opinion of the court as to the propriety of instituting or defending proceedings, as otherwise the onus is on the trustees to show that the costs incurred were properly incurred.

*Re Beddoe.*

*Usual indemnity clauses* are now implied by the Trustee Act, 1893 (repeating similar provisions in Lord St. Leonards' Act). Such clauses, whether express or implied, do not extend to protect a trustee from neglect of *duties*. This protection can only be obtained by the insertion of special clauses exempting trustees from liability for acts which would otherwise be breaches of trust.

*Wilkins v. Hogg.*

*The Primary Duties of Trustees*

are to carry out the directions of the author of the trust and to secure the trust-fund: thus—

- I. Trustee must be active in reducing choses in action into possession or quasi-possession.
- II. Trustee must realise moneys outstanding on *personal* security, in the absence of express authority to the contrary.
- III. Trustee must invest trust-fund in authorised securities.

The investments open to trustees, executors, and administrators are now regulated by the Trustee Act, 1893.

Under the provisions of this Act (which applies to trusts created before as well as after the Act), a trustee, *unless expressly forbidden* by the trust instrument, is authorised to invest in the following securities:—Parliamentary stocks or public funds, or Government securities of the United Kingdom; real securities in Great Britain or Ireland; stock of the Bank of England or of Ireland; India  $3\frac{1}{2}$  and 3 per cent. stocks; securities the interest of which is guaranteed by Parliament; colonial stock listed by the Imperial Treasury; consolidated stock of the London County Council; stock of railway and other companies under restrictions specified in the Act; and in any of the stocks, funds, or securities for the time being authorised for the investment of cash under the control of the court. And, unless expressly excluded, a power to vary investments is implied by the Act.

And by the Trustee Amendment Act, 1894, trustees are allowed to continue an investment which, since the date of investment, has ceased to be an authorised investment.

Under the term “trustees,” executors, administrators, and constructive trustees are included.

“Real securities” do not comprise a *purchase* of lands; but include first legal mortgages and (unless expressly forbidden

by the trust instrument) leasehold property held for an unexpired term of not less than 200 years at a rent not exceeding one shilling, not being subject to any right of redemption or condition for re-entry except non-payment of rent.

*Trustee Act, 1893, s. 5.*

IV. Trustee must (in the absence of directions or indications of testator's contrary intention) convert terminable and reversionary property comprised in *residuary* bequest, and so protect remainderman and tenant for life respectively. This rule, known as the *Howe v. Dartmouth* Rule, is based on the presumed intention of testator that both tenant for life and remainderman should enjoy the same thing successively: it does not apply to a deed. The conversion should be effected within a year from the testator's death.

*Brown v. Gellatly.*

The rule does not apply if testator has indicated an intention that the property should be enjoyed *in specie*; and power given by testator to retain existing investments is evidence of such intention whether such investments be wasting or hazardous and the tenant for life is entitled to the whole income.

*Re Nicholson.*

If the trustee fail to exercise any discretion at all the tenant for life will be enabled to claim for loss of income so occasioned.

*Rowlls v. Bebb.*

Where there is a trust for conversion with power to postpone, unless all trustees agree to postponement the trust for sale prevails.

*Re Hilling.*

V. Trustee must, when outstanding inconvertible securities fall in, distinguish between capital and income.

*In re Chesterfield's Trusts.*

In calculating interest the rate is now to be 3 instead of 4 per cent.

*In re Woods.*

Where the security is authorised, principle as to the apportionment to be made between capital and income when there has been a loss appears to be



that the amount realised is to be divided between capital and income in the proportion which the capital sum originally invested bears to the actual arrears of simple interest at the date of realisation.

*Re Atkinson.*

If, however, there is a loss of capital on realisation of a security which was an unauthorised investment, the tenant for life is not entitled to share in the amount realised without bringing into account all the past income he has received from the security.

*In re Bird.*

- VI. Trustee must give reasonable information as to the trust-estate to his *cestui que trust*, and furnish him with accounts; but he need not answer the inquiry of a third party as to whether the *cestui que trust* has incumbered his interest. If he does answer the inquiry, he must give what he believes to be a true answer.

*Low v. Bouverie.*

*Liability of Trustee for Non-investment.*

- (1.) Where trustee has power to invest in Government or real securities, and neglects to do either, he is answerable *only for the principal money and interest*, upon the principle that he is only liable for what the *cestui que trust* must in any event have been entitled to. *Robinson v. Robinson.*
- (2.) Where trustee has power to invest in Government securities *only*, and neglects to do so, it appears that he is answerable, at the option of the *cestui que trust*, for the principal money and interest at £4 per cent., or the stock which might have been purchased at the time when investment should have been made, with subsequent dividends.
- (3.) Where trustee sells trust securities for the purpose of making an improper investment, he is bound to replace the stock sold or pay the proceeds of sale at the option of the *cestui que trust*. *Clark v. Trelawney.*

Trustees cannot mortgage the trust-estates without an

express power, but such a power by implication authorises the insertion of a power of sale in the mortgage.

And under the Land Transfer Act, 1897, the legal personal representative may in the course of administration sell or mortgage the deceased's real estate before he has assented to any beneficial devolution thereof.

Trustee carrying on trade of testator by directions in his will is personally liable for debts incurred in so doing, but has a right of indemnity against so much of the estate of the testator as he directed to be so employed. As a consequence, the trade creditors are entitled to stand in the place of the trustee and by means of this right of *subrogation* to claim the benefit of such indemnity; but they have no lien on the assets of the testator which were outstanding at his death.

This rule does not apply where the trustee is in default to the specific trust-estate devoted to the trade.

Where the trustee is not authorised by the testator to carry on his trade, the trustee has no such right of indemnity, nor can the creditors have any such right of subrogation.

A receiver and manager appointed by the *court* on the winding up of a company or in a debenture-holder's action has a similar right of indemnity out of the estate, extending even to money properly borrowed to carry on the business.

### *Remedies of Cestui que trust upon a Breach of Trust.*

#### (1.) Right of action against trustee.

A breach of trust constitutes a simple contract debt only.

The personal liability of trustees is a joint and several liability.

In certain cases, solicitors to trustees and third parties in respect of the breach of trust may be held liable.

A bankrupt trustee who has obtained his discharge is now released from his liability for a breach of trust unless it be of a *fraudulent* character.

*Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 30.*

And a trustee who has committed a breach of trust is entitled to the protection of the Statutes of Limitation as if proceedings for breach of trust were enumerated therein, except when—

- (a.) He has been guilty of fraud ;
- (b.) The trust property remains under his control ; or
- (c.) He has converted it to his use.

*Trustee Act, 1888, s. 8 ; How v. Earl Winterton.*

The action therefore must be brought within six years from the breach.

- (2.) Right of following trust-estate into the hands of any alienee, EXCEPT a *bond fide* purchaser for value without notice having the legal estate. A purchaser or mortgagee cannot protect himself by taking a voluntary conveyance of the legal estate after notice of the trust.

If a defaulting trustee when bankruptcy is impending makes good the breach out of his own property, the transaction is not a fraudulent preference.

*Re Stubbins ; Sharp v. Jackson.*

- (3.) Right of following the property into which the trust-estate has been converted, so long as it can be traced or, in other words, as it is ear-marked.

Where a trustee mixes trust-money with his own, and the trust-funds are still in his hands, the *cestui que trust* will be entitled to all which the trustee cannot prove to be his own. *Re Hallett's Estate.*

- (4.) Right of impounding beneficial interest.

Where a trustee, who has committed a breach of trust, is entitled to any beneficial *equitable* interest under the trust instrument, such interest will be *impounded* by the court until the default has been made good. *Dixon v. Brown.*

The *equitable* interest of any beneficiary who has participated in a breach of trust may in like manner be impounded, and the right of impounding will rank before a mortgagee of such equitable interest, and also before the trustee in bankruptcy of the beneficiary.

*Bolton v. Currie ; Turner v. Watson.*

This rule does not apply if the interest be *legal* and not equitable. *Fox v. Buckley.*

Where a trustee is liable for interest in default of investment, the rate is usually £4 per cent., but he will be charged with a higher rate where he—

- (1.) Ought to have received more, *e.g.*, if he has improperly called in a mortgage bearing 5 per cent.
- (2.) Has actually received more.
- (3.) Must be presumed to have received more, *e.g.*, if he has traded with the money, when *cestui que trust* has the option of claiming the trade profits or 5 per cent. interest. *Vyse v. Foster.*
- (4.) Guilty of direct breaches of trust or gross misconduct. *Davis v. Davis.*

Remedies of *cestui que trust* against trustee for breach of trust may be barred by—

- (a.) Concurrence. Persons under disability (who have not been guilty of active *fraud*) are not barred by concurrence; and (prior to the Trustee Act, 1888) even in the case of active fraud, the concurrence of a married woman would not have been a bar when the trust was for her separate use without power of anticipation. *Ellis v. Johnson*; *Bateman v. Faber.*

But now under the Trustee Act, 1893, where the breach has been committed at the instigation or request (which need not be in writing), or with the written consent of the beneficiary, the court may (even in the case of a married woman restrained from alienation) impound the interest of a beneficiary in order to recoup the trustee.

And under the Married Women's Property Act, 1893, a married woman's separate estate, although restrained from alienation, may be made liable for cost of litigation *instituted* by her.

- |                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| (b.) Acquiescence | } With full knowledge of all the facts of the case, unless under disability. |
| (c.) Release      |  |
| (d.) Confirmation |  |
- Brice v. Stokes.*
- (e.) Under the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, the court may relieve a trustee from liability where he has acted



honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused. But the onus lies on the trustee to satisfy the court as to the reasonableness of his action. *In re Stuart*.

And a trustee who allows his co-trustee to conduct the business of the trust without inquiry is not acting reasonably. *Re Turner*.

In all matters of doubt and importance the trustee should apply to the court for directions.

A trustee who has retired will not be responsible for subsequent breaches of trust, unless the retirement was with a view of facilitating a contemplated breach.

*Head v. Gould*.

A new trustee is not liable for breaches of trust occurring before his appointment, but his duty is to recover, if possible, the outstanding damages for such breaches.

### *Rendering and Settlement of Accounts.*

A trustee is bound to render proper accounts, and is entitled to have them examined, and the *cestui que trust*, if satisfied and *sui juris*, ought to close the account or have the accounts taken.

Usually settled accounts are not opened, liberty being given to "surcharge and falsify."

*A surcharge* is the showing an omission for which credit ought to have been taken.

*A falsification* is the proving an item to be wrongly inserted.

As a general rule, it need not be shown that the entries or omissions are the result of fraud. *Williamson v. Barbour*.

The Trustee Act, 1893 (containing similar provisions to the Trustee Act, 1850, and the Trustee Extension Act, 1852), empowers the Chancery Division to appoint new trustees wherever it is inexpedient, difficult, or impracticable to do so without its aid. It will seldom be necessary to resort to these provisions, as ss. 10-12 of the same Act provide very fully for the appointment of new trustees, and enable separate sets of trustees to be appointed for separate parts of the trust property.

The principal points for consideration by the court on application to appoint new trustees are whether it is (1) expedient, and (2) inexpedient, difficult, or impracticable to make the appointment without the aid of the court. If satisfied on these points, the court will as regards the persons to be appointed consider—

- (a.) The wishes of the author of the trust ;
- (b.) Whether the proposed trustees would be likely to act impartially ; and
- (c.) The nature of the trust.

The donee of a power of appointing new trustees cannot in general appoint himself, because he is deemed to be in a fiduciary position.

*Skeats v. Allen.*

But there is no absolute rule precluding him from doing so, and in exceptional cases such an appointment would be sanctioned by the court.

*Montefiore v. Guedalla.*

It has been held that the representatives of a last surviving trustee may execute the trusts until ousted by the appointment of new trustees.

*Re Routledge.*

And now under the Conveyancing Act, 1911, in the absence of any contrary provision in the trust instrument the personal representatives of sole or surviving trustee may execute the trust until the appointment of new trustees.

The court has an inherent jurisdiction to remove trustees and to appoint new ones in their place where in the opinion of the court the interests of the beneficiaries require it.

Hitherto when a trustee became lunatic, although a new trustee could be appointed by the Chancery Division, any vesting order required had to be made in Lunacy, but now by the Lunacy Act, 1911, the Chancery Division has jurisdiction to deal with the whole matter.

Further, the Trustee Act, 1893, s. 42 (repeating like provisions in the Trustee Relief Act, 1847), empowers trustees to transfer the trust-fund into court, to be administered there ; but recourse should not be had to this section unless there is a real difficulty in the administration of the trust. The trustee should at once give notice of the transfer to the beneficiaries.

Under the term "trustees," executors and administrators are included, so that legacies and shares of residue will be payable into court under this section.

The Public Trustee Act, 1907, constitutes the office of Public Trustee. When the Public Trustee is appointed trustee by the trust instrument his position is that of an ordinary trustee; but when appointed only as custodian trustee then the trust property will be vested in him and the trust securities held by him, but the other or general trustees (called "managing trustees") will execute the trust in the ordinary way. The Public Trustee may, on being required so to do, accept the trusteeship of small estates not exceeding £1000 in value at the time of application, and he is precluded from accepting the administration of any trust involving management of a business or the trusteeship of insolvent estates or under a deed of arrangement, or any trust exclusively for religious or charitable purposes. He is empowered to hold land, but, being a corporation, cannot be admitted to copyholds.

An executor or administrator may at any time transfer to the Public Trustee the whole future administration of the estate, and in this way discharge himself from future liability; but before appointing the Public Trustee he should try to obtain some members of the family to accept the trust.

*Re Hope Johnstone.*

The court can appoint the Public Trustee to be sole trustee although the trust instrument provides there shall never be less than two.

## CHAPTER VII.

### DONATIONES MORTIS CAUSÂ.

"A DONATIO MORTIS CAUSÂ is a gift of PERSONAL property made by one who apprehends that he is in peril of death, and evidenced by a manual delivery by him, or by another person in his presence by his direction, to the donee or some one else for the donee, of the property itself, or of the

means of obtaining possession of the same, or of the writings by which the ownership thereof was created, and conditioned to take effect absolutely in the event of his not recovering from his existing disorder and not revoking the gift before his death.” (Sm. Man.)

The *essentials* of a valid *donatio mortis causâ* are—

- I. It must be made in expectation of death.
- II. Conditioned to become absolute only on the donor's death by his existing disorder.
- III. Actual delivery.
  - (a.) *Writing without delivery* will be construed as testamentary, and therefore void unless the Wills Act complied with. It will not operate as a declaration of trust in favour of a volunteer.
  - (b.) *Intentional testamentary gift*, if imperfect, will not be supported as a *donatio mortis causâ*.  
*Mitchell v. Smith.*
  - (c.) *Intentional gift inter vivos*, ineffectual as such, will not be supported as a *donatio mortis causâ*.  
*Edwards v. Jones.*

As to what is a sufficient delivery—

- (1.) It must be made to the donee or donee's agent.

*Farquharson v. Cave.*

There must be an actual transfer of the property, and a mere delivery to the *donor's agent* as such will be insufficient.

*Trimmer v. Danby.*

Where the donor *retains control* over the property, the donee will be considered as the *donor's agent*.

*Hawkins v. Blewitt.*

- (2.) It must be actual, or of some effective means of obtaining the property.

*Moore v. Darton.*

But the delivery (*traditio*) may precede the actual gift.

*Cain v. Moon.*

It is not absolutely essential that corroborative evidence of the gift should be produced by the donee.

*Farman v. Smith*



The following have been held good subjects of *donationes mortis causâ* :—

A promissory note, bill of exchange, or cheque of a third person payable to order though not indorsed, banker's deposit note, Post Office Savings Bank deposit book, mortgage deeds, bond, policy of assurance.

The following have not been so allowed :—

Railway stock, money for which donor's own cheque drawn unless cashed or *negotiated* in his lifetime, title-deeds.

A *donatio mortis causâ* differs from a LEGACY, and resembles a gift *inter vivos*, thus : it—

(1.) Takes effect *sub modo* from delivery in donor's lifetime.

(2.) Requires no assent on the part of the executor.

It differs from a gift INTER VIVOS, and resembles a legacy, thus : it is—

(1.) Revocable during donor's lifetime.

(2.) Good between husband and wife independently of Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 50.

(3.) Liable to donor's debts on deficiency of assets.

(4.) Subject to legacy and, in effect, to estate duty.

The expression "testamentary expenses" includes estate duty payable in respect of personalty, which therefore falls on the general residuary estate.

*Yeo v. Clemow* ; *Wild v. Stanham*.

But estate duty on the subject-matter of a *donatio mortis causâ* is not a testamentary expense, and therefore falls on the donee.

*Re Hudson* ; *Spencer v. Turner*.

So also settlement estate duty if payable at all must come out of the *donatio mortis causâ* itself.

*Travers v. Kelly* ; *Thorne v. Gibbs*.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## LEGACIES.

A LEGACY is “a gift by will of a chattel.” At common law no action could be brought against an executor for a legacy unless he had assented thereto. Equity, however, exercised an exclusive jurisdiction over legacies in the absence of the executor’s assent, and a concurrent jurisdiction where such assent had been given, upon the ground that the executor was a *trustee* for the benefit of the legatees.

Legacies have been classified as—

- (1.) *General*. A legacy payable only out of the general assets of the testator; *e.g.*, £100, a diamond ring.
- (2.) *Specific*. A legacy of a particular or specific part of the testator’s personal estate; *e.g.*, *my* diamond ring.
- (3.) *Demonstrative*. A legacy which is in its nature general, but there is a particular fund pointed out to satisfy it; *e.g.*, £1000 out of my reduced 2½ per cents.  
*Ashburner v. Maguire.*

Note the following distinctions between them:—

- (1.) Upon deficiency of assets a *general* legacy is liable to abatement, but a *specific* legacy is not; the forgiveness of a debt is a specific legacy, and therefore not liable to abatement.  
*Re Wedmore.*

A mere direction that a legacy is to be paid first will not save it from liability to abatement.

- (2.) A *specific* legacy is, however, always liable to ademption, and therefore fails upon an alienation thereof in the testator’s lifetime; but if the specific legacy exists, though *notionally* altered, the legacy remains good.

A specific legatee takes all profits accrued since testator’s death, and must also bear all expenses incurred; *e.g.*, for upkeep and preservation.

- (3.) A *demonstrative* legacy is the most beneficial for a legatee, since it is not liable to—

(a.) Abatement with general legacies until the fund out of which it is payable is exhausted.

(b.) Ademption by its alienation, the fund pointed out being deemed only the *primary* fund for payment.

In general a legacy given in satisfaction of a debt is not entitled to priority, but a legacy given in lieu of dower (if testator died seised of lands out of which his widow can claim dower) has priority.

A gift of an annuity is a legacy, and it is payable from death in absence of contrary direction. If the trustees of the will are *directed* (instead of *authorised*) to purchase an annuity, the annuitant may claim the purchase-money in lieu of the annuity, unless the purchase is directed to be made in the names of the trustees and there is a gift over on alienation.

In the case of a legacy of shares, an accretion belongs to the legatee, if declared after the testator's death, not otherwise. As between tenant for life and remainderman accretion declared out of capital will be capital, and out of profits (whether accumulated or not) income (the company's decision determining the question), but where shares are sold *cum div.* no apportionment will be made.

### *Legacies Purely Personal.*

In construing these, equity follows the rules of the civil law as acted on in the old ecclesiastical courts; thus they—

- (1.) Do not lapse by death of legatee before time of payment.
- (2.) Carry interest at £4 per cent. as from one year after the testator's decease. *General* legacies given in satisfaction of a debt which carries interest, or to an *infant child* not otherwise provided for, carry interest from the death of testator. A *specific* legacy carries all income and profits accruing upon it, after testator's decease. A *demonstrative* legacy, like a general legacy, is payable one year after testator's decease, and carries interest from that date. If, however, a legacy is payable exclusively out of reversionary property, and is not made payable until

such reversion falls in, interest will only run from the time of such falling in.

### *Legacies Charged on Land.*

In construing these, equity follows rules of common law ; thus they—

- (1.) Although vested, sink for the benefit of the land on death of legatees before time of payment.
- (2.) Carry interest at £4 per cent. from testator's decease; or if given subject to a life interest, from the death of the tenant for life.

Where a legacy is given to an infant contingent on attaining twenty-one (but only if the contingency is the attainment of full age or some event occurring before then), the income of the investment is available for the interim maintenance of the infant.

A general direction to pay legacies out of a mixed fund of real and personal estate charges them rateably on the portions attributable to realty and personalty, and so far as they are attributable to realty they are real estate, and must bear their own estate duty. *Re Spencer Cooper.*

But notwithstanding being payable out of proceeds of realty, interest does not run on the legacy or any part of it until expiration of one year from testator's death.

*Turner v. Buck ; Re Waters.*

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## CHAPTER IX.

### CONVERSION.

CONVERSION has been defined to be "that change in the nature of property by which, *for certain purposes*, real estate is considered as personal and personal estate as real, and transmissible and descendible as such."

The doctrine depends on the *intention* of the testator, settlor, or other author of the trust. When once intention



is sufficiently expressed, it does not matter whether conversion has actually been made, for equity considers that done which ought to be done. The test is—Has the author of the trust absolutely directed the real estate to be turned into personal or the personal estate to be turned into real?

*Fletcher v. Ashburner ; Lechmere v. Carlisle.*

Aye or No, was there an enforceable trust for sale?

*Re Grimthorpe.*

Conversion may be said to arise either by act of the parties, or by title or authority paramount.

### CONVERSION BY ACT OF PARTIES.

Conversion arises in two ways—

- |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| <p>I. Under wills,</p> <p>II. Under deeds or other instruments <i>inter vivos</i>,</p> | } | <p>Either in reference to conversion of land into money or money into land.</p> |
|--|---|---|

In every case there must be considered—

1. What words are sufficient to produce conversion.
2. From what time conversion takes place.
3. The general effects of conversion.
4. The results of a total or partial failure of the objects and purposes for which conversion has been directed.

1. *What words are sufficient to produce conversion.* The direction to convert must be clear and *imperative*—in other words, there must be an obligation under a trust or contract to make an actual conversion. The direction may be—

(1.) Express.

*Curling v. May.*

(2.) Implied. As where (notwithstanding the trustee has apparently an option) the trusts and limitations are exclusively applicable to land, or *vice versa*. *Earlom v. Saunders ; Morris v. Griffiths.* A mere *power*—as distinguished from a *trust*—to convert is not imperative.

*Pitman v. Pitman ; Re Dyson.*

2. *Time from which conversion takes place.* The general rule is that conversion takes place—

I. Under wills, from death of testator.

II. Under deeds or other instruments *inter vivos*, from date of execution.

“The *principle* is the same in the case of a deed as in the case of a will, but the application is different, by reason that the deed converts the property in the lifetime of the author of the deed, whereas in the case of a will the conversion does not take place until the death of the testator.”

*Griffiths v. Ricketts.*

The rule is the same, notwithstanding the trust for sale contained in the deed is not to arise *until after* the settlor's death.

*Clarke v. Franklin.*

And this whether it be a case of conversion of land into money or money into land. *Wheldale v. Partridge.*

The rule is *not applicable* where conversion is not the intention, as in the case of mortgage deeds; in such cases there is no *notional* conversion.

*Wright v. Rose; Bourne v. Bourne;*

*Chadwick v. Grange.*

Or where a notice to treat is given under the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, but not duly followed up.

Cases of conversion *depending upon a future option* to purchase vested in some third person must be specially considered: where—

(1.) Option is created by testator *previously* to his will.

In the case of—

(a.) *General devise.* The property is deemed converted into personalty as from the date of the instrument creating the option.

*Lawes v. Bennett; Collingwood v. Row.*

Until the option is actually exercised, however, the rents will go as realty. *Townley v. Bedwell.*

The rule applies even if the option be not exercisable until after testator's death. *Isaacs v. Reginald.*

- (b.) *Specific devise.* The property is deemed converted into personalty only as from the exercise of the option; the principle being that where the testator, knowing of the existence of the option, devises the *specific* property without reference to such option, he indicates an intention that the devisee should have all his interest therein; either the property or the purchase-money.

*Drant v. Vause; Emuss v. Smith.*

- (2.) Option is created by testator *subsequently* to his will.  
In the case of—

- (a.) *Specific devise.* The property is deemed converted into personalty as from the exercise of the option.

*Weeding v. Weeding.*

- (b.) *General devise.* The same rule will *a fortiori* apply; a specific devisee being always more favoured than a general one.

Where the option is created after the will, there is a suspensory conversion, and a suspensory ademption from the devisee, which subsequently operates or not as a complete conversion and complete ademption, according as the person possessing the option does or does not exercise it. Such options fall within the Perpetuity Rule.

*Woodall v. Clifton.*

But although, owing to this rule, the option may be unenforceable, yet damages may be recovered for breach of contract.

*Worthing v. Heather.*

3. *As to the effects of conversion.* To make real estate personal and personal estate real, although no actual conversion takes place.

- (1.) Converted realty devolves on personal representatives and is subject to legacy and estate duty (formerly probate duty); while converted personalty goes to the heir, or if entailed to the heir in tail.
- (2.) Converted personalty is subject to curtesy and dower.
- (3.) Although prior to the Wills Act an infant under twenty-one had power to make a will of personalty, he could not dispose of converted personalty by will.

- (4.) It would appear that before the Wills Act a will of converted personalty must have been executed with the formalities prescribed by the Statute of Frauds for wills of realty.
- (5.) Converted realty would not formerly have gone to the Crown, either by way of escheat or as *bona vacantia*, nor would converted personalty have escheated. It appears that under the Intestates' Estates Act, 1884, there would now be an escheat in all such cases.
4. *Results of total or partial failure of purposes for which conversion directed.*

"A total failure occurs where no beneficial trusts are declared concerning the converted property, or if such trusts are declared and they are all incapable of taking effect. A partial failure occurs where the trusts declared do not exhaust all the converted property, or if the trusts exhaust all the interest, but some of them are incapable of taking effect."

#### TOTAL FAILURE.

The *universal* rule is, that where there is a total failure before the instrument directing the conversion comes into operation, no conversion will take place, but the property will result to the testator or settlor with its original form unchanged.

*Clarke v. Franklin ; Smith v. Claxton.*

#### PARTIAL FAILURE.

When there is a partial failure a sale is always necessary. Three questions will generally arise, namely :

First, To what extent is the trust for conversion still in force ?

Second, Who is to benefit by the failure ?

Third, In what character (realty or personalty) will the benefit accrue ?

These questions may be considered under the following heads :—



I. Under wills: the conversion is only for the purposes of the will, and not "out and out," therefore all that is not wanted for those purposes must go to the person who would have been entitled but for the will.

(1.) *Land into money.*

The undisposed-of or lapsed surplus lands or proceeds of sale result to the *heir* of the testator. There must be a gift over to exclude the heir.

*Ackroyd v. Smithson.*

But this doctrine, in the absence of special circumstances, does not apply to sale by the court.

*Buyers v. Booth; Steed v. Preece; Hyett v. Mekin; Re Dodson.*

As to the character in which it is taken—

The true rule appears to be, "Where there is a partial undisposed-of interest of real estate directed to be sold, that interest results to the heir of testator, and it becomes *personal estate in his hands*," and the heir "takes the property in the state into which it is converted by the will."

*Jessop v. Watson; Smith v. Claxton; Re Richerson; Scales v. Heyhoe.*

If there is no trust for sale, but merely an absolute power, the exercise of the power after the death of the heir will not alter the devolution; the proceeds will devolve as realty.

*Re Dyson.*

If, however, the trust for conversion is not directed absolutely for all the purposes of the will, but merely for a particular purpose, such as the payment of debts, then the undisposed-of or lapsed surplus lands or proceeds of sale result to the heir *as land*, just as if the conversion had entirely failed.

(2.) *Money into land.*

The undisposed-of or lapsed money results to the next of kin of the testator.

*Cogan v. Stephens.*

As to the character in which it is taken—

It appears to belong to the next of kin as realty whether the money has actually been invested in land or not.

*Curteis v. Wormald.*

The blending of realty and personalty does not exclude the principles above laid down.

*Jessop v. Watson.*

II. Under deed or other instruments *inter vivos* : the conversion is always "out and out."

- |                      |   |
|----------------------|---|
| (1.) Land into money | } The property results to the settlor in its <i>converted</i> form. |
| (2.) Money into land |   |

*Griffiths v. Ricketts*; *Wheldale v. Partridge*;  
*Clarke v. Franklin.*

It will be remembered that the reason of the distinction between the result of a partial failure under a will and a deed is, a will operates from the death of the testator; but a deed takes effect in the *settlor's lifetime*.

#### CONVERSION BY TITLE OR AUTHORITY PARAMOUNT.

In the consideration of conversion by act of parties the question at issue has been, What was the intention of the author of the trust? Under this head, however, conversion takes place without reference to any wish or intention on the part of the owner of the property. The question to be considered being, Is the property, though *de facto* converted, to be treated to any and what extent as not converted?

The chief instances are—

- I. *Lands taken under powers conferred by Act of Parliament*, in which the point is, What is the intention, *i.e.*, what are the words of the Statute? Statutes must, however, be construed so as to vary as little as possible the rights of third persons.

*Richards v. Attorney-General of Jamaica.*

Persons whose lands are taken from them by Parliamentary authority may be classified thus:—

- (1.) Absolute owners who, under Parliamentary compulsion, contract for the sale of their land. The land is converted from date of contract.

- (2.) Absolute owners who refuse to contract. In spite of such refusal the sale is completed and purchase-money paid into the Bank of England under the 76th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, whereby a conversion is effected forthwith.
- (3.) Limited owners and persons under disability. The purchase-money is paid into court under the 69th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, until a reinvestment in land can be effected, and meanwhile there is *no* conversion.

In the consideration of this head, note the provisions of the Settled Land Acts, whereby full power is given to limited owners while in possession to effect sales; the purchase-money, however, being still considered *land* in the contemplation of equity.

## II. *Lands sold under the authority of the Court.*

When lands have been sold by direction of the court, there is a conversion out and out from the date of the order, even though the purposes of the sale do not exhaust all the proceeds. "The true principle is this, that the moment a sale is *properly* made conversion follows, and there is no equity to reconvert the surplus." *Re Dodson*; *Steed v. Preece*; *Hyett v. Mckin*; *Burgess v. Booth*; *Fauntleroy v. Bebee*.

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## CHAPTER X.

### RECONVERSION.

RECONVERSION is that notional or imaginary process by which a prior constructive conversion is annulled and taken away, and the constructively converted property restored in contemplation of a court of equity to its original actual quality.

Reconversion may take place in two ways :—

- A. By the act of the parties.
- B. By operation of law.

#### RECONVERSION BY ACT OF PARTIES.

The principle of this doctrine is the *right* of every absolute owner *to elect* to dispense with the execution of any trust in the performance of which he alone is interested.

Reconversion, therefore, depends upon the right of election, and may be considered under the two following heads. (*Haynes' Eq.*)

- I. Who may elect so as to effect a reconversion, and to what extent.
  - (1.) *Absolute* owner may reconvert ; but onus of proof will be on those who allege that he has done so.
  - (2.) Owner of *undivided* share of—
    - (a.) Money to be converted into land : undivided owner may reconvert. *Seley v. Jago.*
    - (b.) Land to be converted into money : undivided owner may *not* reconvert, for the sale of an undivided share would be less beneficial than share of proceeds of entirety. *Holloway v. Radcliffe.*
  - (3.) *Remainder-man* may reconvert to the extent of his own interest only, that is to say, as between his own real and personal representatives. *Triquet v. Thornton ; Gillies v. Longland.*
  - (4.) *Infant* cannot reconvert usually. If matter won't wait, the court will elect, but without prejudice to the diverse rights of the real and personal representatives of the infant dying under age.
  - (5.) *Lunatic* cannot reconvert. His committee may do so with sanction of court, but without prejudice to the rights of lunatic's representatives. Under the Lunacy Act, 1890, property of a lunatic may be ordered to be sold, but unapplied purchase-moneys will devolve under the order as real estate.



(6.) *Married women*, independently of the operation of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, cannot elect by ordinary deed. As to—

(a.) Money to be converted into land.

(a.) Formerly a married woman effected a reconversion by being examined in open court.

*Oldham v. Hughes.*

Or by making sham purchases of land, and then levying a fine with concurrence of her husband.

(β.) Now she reconverts by means of a deed acknowledged. 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74.

Or without acknowledgment if entitled for her separate use.

(b.) Land to be converted into money.

(a.) Formerly a married woman effected a reconversion by levying a fine with concurrence of her husband.

*May v. Roper.*

(β.) Now she reconverts by means of a deed acknowledged under 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74.

*Briggs v. Chamberlain.*

Even if her interest be in reversion or remainder.

*Tuer v. Turner.*

But not if it be a mere expectancy or *spes successionis*.

*Allcard v. Walker.*

And if she is entitled to the property as separate estate, an acknowledged deed is not necessary.

Since the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, it would appear that a married woman has the same power to elect so as to effect a reconversion of her *separate* property as if she were a *feme sole*.

## II. Mode in which the election may be made.

(1.) By express direction.

(2.) By implied direction, from conduct. As to—

(a.) Land to be converted into money, slight circumstances are sufficient to effect a reconversion.

*Davies v. Ashford.*

- (b.) Money to be converted into land. Slight circumstances are insufficient, but it is enough if the court is satisfied the party means the money to be taken as such.

#### RECONVERSION BY OPERATION OF LAW.

There are two essentials to this reconversion.

- (1.) The property must be in the actual possession of the person who had in himself both the executors and the heirs.

*And*

- (2.) That person must have made no declaration of his intention concerning it.

When these two things are proved, the onus of proof to the contrary rests on the party denying reconversion.

*Chichester v. Bickerstaff; Pulteney v. Darlington.*

Where the property is *at home*, that is to say, in the possession of the person under whom both executor and heir claim, the heir cannot take it; but if it be outstanding in the hands of a third party, or if any outstanding partial interest stand in the way, he possibly may do so.

*Wheldale v. Partridge; Wallrond v. Rosslyn.*

## CHAPTER XI.

### ELECTION.

ELECTION has been defined as "the choosing between two rights where there is a clear intention that both were not intended to be enjoyed." The doctrine originates in two inconsistent alternative donations, the one of which the donor has no power to make without the assent of the donee of the other.

The commonest application of the doctrine is where a person, having by any instrument in terms disposed of the property of another, has by the same instrument given property of his own to that other; in such a case a condition is implied that the donor's gift of his own property is to be absolute only upon the donee's ratification of the attempted disposition of his (the donee's) property to a third person.

The FOUNDATION of the doctrine is the *intention* of the author of the instrument, and its *characteristic* is the effectuation of a gift made by a donor of property not belonging to him.

*Dillon v. Parker.*

The doctrine, although professing to be based on intention, seems to be really independent of it, for an intention is *presumed* "on the part of the author of every instrument that all persons deriving benefits under that instrument shall be bound to give effect to all dispositions thereby made of their own property, and no evidence will be allowed to be given to show that such presumed intention could not really have existed."

*(Haynes' Eq.)*

The doctrine of election is doubtless derived from the civil law, from which, however, it differs in one important particular, namely, in applying the principle to those cases in which the author of the instrument disposes of property under the erroneous impression that it is his own.

*Whistler v. Webster.*

The principle on which the doctrine is based is that a man is not allowed to approbate and reprobate, and if he approbates he must do all in his power to confirm the instrument which he approbates.

*Cavendish v. Dace.*

In order, therefore, to raise a case of election two essential circumstances must concur.

- I. Property which belongs to one person (A) must be given to another by the author of the instrument.

*And*

- II. The donor must at the same time give property of *his own* to A.

In such a case of concurrence, A will be put to his election, and will have two courses open to him—

- (1.) Election under the instrument, and consequent submission to all its terms.
- (2.) Election against the instrument, in which case the question arises as to whether *compensation* or *forfeiture* on the part of the refractory donee is to result. The rule has been settled thus—
  - (a.) Equity sequesters the benefits intended for the person electing against the instrument in order to *compensate* him whom this election has disappointed.

When the election arises under a will the amount of such compensation is to be ascertained as at date of testator's death, not at date of election. *Hancock v. Pawson.*

- (b.) The surplus after compensation is restored to the refractory donee. *Gretton v. Haward.*

No case for the doctrine of election arises where testator—

- (1.) Simply makes two dispositions of *his own* property in the same instrument.
- (2.) Does not dispose of some property *actually his own* so as to furnish a fund from which compensation can be made.

*Bristow v. Warde ; Whistler v. Webster.*

#### *Cases of Election under Special Powers.*

These cases may be summarised—

- (1.) Person entitled *in default* of appointment is put to his election.
- (2.) Person entitled *under* the power is *not* put to his election, for no property *belonging* to him has been given to another, since the person *entitled in default* of appointment is the *owner* of the property improperly appointed to another not an object of the power. *Whistler v. Webster.*
- (3.) Where directions modifying the appointment are appended—



- (a.) When modification is contrary to law (*e.g.*, infringes the rule against perpetuities), it is altogether invalid, and no case of election is raised. *Woolridge v. Woolridge; Re Nash.*
- (b.) When modification is not contrary to law, and clear and imperative so as to amount in effect to a trust, a case of election is raised.

*Blackett v. Lamb*

*Cases of Election arising from Attempts of Testator to dispose of his own Property by Ineffectual Instrument.*

- (1.) Infancy. Previously to the Wills Act, an infant could by will dispose of personal estate, but not real estate; under such a will there was no case of election.
- (2.) Coverture. Where testatrix is incompetent to make a will through coverture; there is no case of election. Since the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, these cases can seldom arise.

But where a married woman is entitled to property, which she is restrained from anticipating, she is exempted from the obligation to elect, and it makes no difference if she become a widow before the necessity for election arises.

*Haynes v. Foster.*

Under old law before Wills Act—

- (a.) Where will *not properly attested* to pass freeholds; the heir was not bound to elect.
- (b.) Where will *properly attested* but testator attempted thereby to dispose of after-acquired property; the heir was put to his election.
- (4.) Under law previous to Preston's Act (55 Geo. III. c. 192), copyholds must have been surrendered to the use of his will before a testator could thereby dispose of them. Where devise was made of unsurrendered copyholds, the heir was put to his election.
- (5.) Scotch property. Where will is not properly executed

to pass Scotch property, the Scotch heir will be put to his election. *Brodie v. Barry ; Orrell v. Orrell.*

The same rule will apply to foreign lands generally.

- (6.) Derivative interest. Where a person is only derivatively entitled under another who was bound to elect and has done so ; there is no case of election.

*Cooper v. Cooper.*

### *Cases of Election in respect of Dower*

where the Dower Act (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 105) does not apply, for under that Act dower raises no case of election. The widow will be put to her election—

(1.) At law. By express words.

(2.) At equity.

(a.) By express words.

(b.) By necessary implication, to constitute which the provisions of the instrument must be clearly inconsistent with her dower being assigned by metes and bounds. *Buteher v. Kemp.*

And conversely a husband may be put to election under his wife's will.

In all cases, in order to raise a case of election, there must appear *on the instrument* itself a *clear intention* on the part of the testator to dispose of property *not his own*. Where, therefore, a testator has a limited interest, he is presumed to have given his own property only, and any general words used will be deemed to apply to such property as he is capable of disposing of by his will.

*Wintour v. Clifton ; Johnson v. Telfourd ;  
Shuttleworth v. Greaves ; Dummer v. Pitcher.*

The intention must in all cases appear on the instrument itself, and extrinsic evidence will not be admissible to raise a case of election. *Clementson v. Gandy.*

### *Mode of Election.*

(1.) By married women.

(a.) As to realty, by deed acknowledged under 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74.

- (b.) As to personalty, by direction of the court after inquiry made, except as to reversionary interests, in respect of which election may be made by deed acknowledged under Malins' Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. 57).

So far as her *separate* property is concerned, she can elect in the same way as if she were a *feme sole*. *Re Quæde's Trusts.*

Except where she is restrained from anticipation, in which case she can only elect with the aid of the court under s. 7 of the Conveyancing Act, 1911 (replacing s. 39 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881), which can only be given when the election would be for the *benefit* of the married woman.

*In re Vardon's Trust.*

So practically in such a case it appears no election would ever be made, as without it the married woman can have both benefits.

If no restraint, she may elect by conduct under the doctrine of estoppel.

*Seaton v. Seaton; Bateman v. Faber.*

- (2.) By infants.

(a.) Generally by direction of the court upon inquiry made.

(b.) In other cases the election is deferred until the infant comes of age. *Streatfield v. Streatfield.*

- (3.) By lunatics. By direction of the court upon inquiry made.

- (4.) Generally.

(a.) By express words.

(b.) By implication, as a result of conduct and dealing with the property. But acts to be binding must be done with *intention* of electing.

Persons bound to elect may previously ascertain the relative values of the two properties between which they are called upon to choose.

Neglect to elect within a limited time will generally imply an election to take against the instrument.

Observe the different sense in which the word *election* is

used, as regards the doctrine of election, to that in which it is used in treating of *reconversion*. Here it is “the *obligation* to elect between two species of property or benefit, while in reconversion it is *the right* to elect to take, in lieu of the proceeds or fruit of any given property, the property itself.”  
 (Haynes’ *Eq.*)

## CHAPTER XII.

### PERFORMANCE.

THE doctrine of performance is based upon the maxim, “Equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation.”

Two classes of cases occur—

- I. Where there is a covenant to *purchase* and settle realty, followed by a purchase but no settlement is made.
- II. Where there is a covenant to *leave* personalty, and the covenantee receives a share under the intestacy of covenantor.

I. *Covenant to purchase and settle.* This class is well illustrated by the cases *Lechmere v. Carlisle* and *Wilcocks v. Wilcocks*, under which four points have been established—

- (1.) Performance may be good *pro tanto* where lands purchased are of less value than covenanted.
- (2.) Lands purchased before covenant entered into—no performance.
- (3.) Lands purchased which do not answer description of covenant—no performance.
- (4.) Absence of trustees’ consent immaterial.

*Sowden v. Sowden.*

Note, a covenant to settle creates a mere *specialty debt*, and not a *lien* upon the lands.

This class must be distinguished from cases depending upon the right of *cestui que trust* to



follow trust-fund into any subject-matter into which it has been wrongfully converted. In such cases all turns on the circumstance that the purchase has been in fact made with *trust-money*.

*Trench v. Harrison ; Lench v. Lench.*

As to agreements for settlement of wife's after-acquired property.

Although often inserted in marriage settlements, the covenant is not a usual one.

Unless the covenant contains express words showing a contrary intention—

- (1.) It is limited to property acquired "during the coverture," and so does not extend to property vested in wife before marriage or acquired by her after a judicial separation.

*Re Bland ; Davenport v. Marshall.*

- (2.) It covers gifts from husband to wife.

*Ellis v. Ellis.*

- (3.) Life interests and life annuities are not caught by it.

- (4.) It does not extend to general powers of appointment, for a power of appointment is not property, although property may be created by its exercise.

*Tremayne v. Rashleigh ; Vetch v. Elder.*

II. *Covenant to leave.* Where husband, having covenanted to leave his wife money, dies intestate, so that she becomes entitled to a share under the Statute of Distributions, the question arises whether such share is a performance of the covenant, or whether she can claim in addition the money due thereunder. Two rules apply—

- (1.) When the husband's death occurs *at or before* time covenant ought to be performed, so that during husband's lifetime there is no breach of covenant and no debt—distributive share is a performance either *in toto* or *pro tanto*.

*Blandy v. Widmore ; Goldsmid v. Goldsmid.*

- (2.) When husband's death occurs *after* time covenant

ought to be performed, *i.e.*, after a breach, whereby the obligation becomes a debt—distributive share is no performance. *Oliver v. Brickland.*

## CHAPTER XIII.

### SATISFACTION.

SATISFACTION has been defined as “the making of a donation with the intention, express or implied, that it shall be taken as an extinguishment of some claim which the donee has on the donor.”

The doctrine rests upon *intention*, but must not be confounded with performance, in which the *identical* thing agreed to be done is considered to have been done, while in satisfaction the thing done is something different from and *substituted* for the thing agreed to be done.

Cases on this doctrine may be considered under four heads, *viz.*, satisfaction of—

- I. Debts by legacies.
- II. Legacies by subsequent legacies.
- III. Legacies by portions.
- IV. Portions by legacies.

#### I. *Satisfaction of debts by legacies.*

The general rule is that a man must be just before he is generous, the maxim being *Debitor non presumitur donare*. But equity leans *against* this presumption of satisfaction, and the following special rules have been laid down:—

- (1.) A legacy imports a *bounty*.
- (2.) Legacy equal to or greater than debt and given *simpliciter*—satisfaction. *Talbot v. Shrewsbury.*  
A legacy exactly equal to a debt is deemed by the discharge of the debt. *Gillings v. Fletcher.*
- (3.) Legacy less than debt—no satisfaction, even *pro tanto*.
- (4.) Debt contracted *after* will—no satisfaction.

(5.) Slight circumstances rebut the equitable presumption of satisfaction ; such as—

(a.) Where the will contains an express direction for payment of debts and legacies,

<i>Chancey's Case</i>	}	no satisfaction.
or debts only,		

*Bradshaw v. Hwisk*

(b.) When legacy is made payable *after* debt—no satisfaction.

*Clarke v. Sewell.*

But when payable *before* debt—a satisfaction.

*Wathen v. Smith.*

(c.) Where legacy is of residue or otherwise contingent or uncertain—no satisfaction.

*Barrett v. Beckford ; Devese v. Pontet.*

Using the term *less* in the sense familiar to the civil law, it may be said generally, there is no satisfaction when the legacy is less than the debt.

## II. Satisfaction of legacies by subsequent legacies.

Two cases occur according as the legacies are given by the same or by different instruments.

Firstly, Under the same instrument.

(1.) Equal legacies given to the same person *simpliciter* are *substitutive*. *Greenwood v. Greenwood.*

(2.) Unequal legacies are *cumulative*. *Hooley v. Hatton*

Secondly, Under different instruments.

(1.) Equal or unequal legacies given to the same person *simpliciter* are *prima facie* cumulative.

(2.) Where legacies are not given *simpliciter*, but a motive is expressed, then when in EACH instrument there is both the *same* motive AND the *same* sum, they are substitutive. *Benyon v. Benyon.*

As to extrinsic evidence, it is—

(a.) Admissible in *support* of will where the court itself *raises* the presumption of satisfaction.

(b.) Not admissible to *contradict* will where the court does *not* raise such presumption.

III. *Satisfaction or ademption of legacy by PORTION, e.g.,* where father first gives his child a legacy and subsequently makes other provision for it.

IV. *Satisfaction of PORTION by legacy, e.g.,* where father *agrees* to make provision for a child and afterwards gives it a legacy. "In each of these cases the rule of the court is, that benefits given to the child by the second instrument, settlement, or will, as the case may be, are to be viewed as a satisfaction of the benefits conferred by the first, whether will or settlement." For the court leans against double portions.

The foundation of the doctrine is the parental relation or its equivalent.

Note, where a father gives a legacy to a child *simpliciter*, the court understands him as giving a PORTION. *Pym v. Lockyer.*

A portion means "something given to establish a child in life." *Taylor v. Taylor.*

A portion given to a child during his father's lifetime is called an *advancement*.

When the *will* comes *first* and the settlement afterwards, the term *ademption* is used instead of satisfaction. *Coventry v. Chichester.*

With regard to both these cases (III. and IV.) the following points should be noted:—

(1.) In the case of double provisions, the doctrine of satisfaction only applies where the *parental* relation, or its equivalent, exists. But

(a.) An *illegitimate* child is a *stranger* in the eye of the law, and will therefore be entitled to both provisions. *Ex parte Pye.*

Where, however, the case is a mixed one of *children* and *strangers*, the shares of the strangers will not be increased by the satisfaction of the children's shares. *Meinertzhager v. Walters.*

(b.) Even between *strangers*, where *both* provisions are expressed to be made for the *same* particular purpose, there is a satisfaction. *Monck v. Monck.*



The presumption against double provisions is said to be founded on good sense. If the parental relation exists, the court, from its knowledge of the ordinary dealings of mankind, concludes that the parent does not mean to provide doubly for any one of his children. As between strangers, there is no reason within the knowledge of the court for regarding the second benefit to be a satisfaction of the first.

*Suisse v. Lowther ; Lawes v. Lawes.*

- (2.) Although the doctrine does not, as a general rule, apply between strangers, yet it does apply where the donor has placed himself *in loco parentis* towards the beneficiary.

As to what is putting one's self *in loco parentis*, the expression may be taken to mean "a person meaning to put himself *in loco parentis* with reference to the office and duty of the parent to make provision for the child."

*Powys v. Mansfield.*

Under this rule an *illegitimate* child may be deprived of the double benefit to which he might otherwise be entitled as a consequence of the first rule.

- (3) Equity leans most strongly *against* double provisions and in favour of satisfaction. In the case of *debts* and legacies the leaning was in the contrary direction.

Consequently, slight circumstances will not rebut the equitable presumption of satisfaction: *e.g.*, the doctrine applies even though the sums be different in amount or payable at different times. The doctrine even applies where there is a difference in the mode of limitation for the benefit of the child, and also where the benefit conferred by the second instrument is not of any distinct or definite sum, whether—

- (a.) The will precedes the settlement.

*Durham v. Wharton ; Montefiore v. Guedalla.*

But a codicil confirming will made before settlement rebuts the presumption! *Re Scott.*

or

## (b.) The settlement precedes the will.

*Thynne v. Glengall.*

But there is no satisfaction when there is a *substantial* difference. When the settlement precedes the will it must always be remembered—

- (a.) The parties claiming under the *settlement* are *quasi-purchasers*, and, as such, cannot be deprived of their rights upon any presumed intention of the testator. At the utmost, they can only be put to their *election* whether to take under the settlement or the will.

*Chichester v. Coventry; Re Shafto.*

- (β.) The question of satisfaction cannot arise as regards advances *actually made* or property actually transferred upon a settlement, but only in respect of those *agreed* to be made.

But where under a special power an appointment is made by will to all the members of a class, and afterwards an appointment is made by deed to one member of a part of the fund if appointed by the mother—there is no satisfaction, as the amount appointed would not be a “portion.”

*Ingram v. Papillon.*

But if appointed by the father the appointed funds would be portions for the purpose of the doctrine, and—there is satisfaction.

*Re Peel's Settlement.*

- (4.) Where the sum given by the settlement is less than that previously given by the will, the less sum is a satisfaction *pro tanto* only.

*Pym v. Lockyer.*

Where the settlement precedes the will, the question cannot in practice arise, for the parties claiming under the first instrument are *purchasers*.

- (5.) Where a *parent* makes provision for a child to whom he is already *indebted*—

- (a.) “A *legacy* does not (except when it would do so between strangers) operate as a satisfaction of the debt.”

*Stocken v. Stocken.*

- (b.) An *advancement* made upon marriage or otherwise will *prima facie* be considered a satisfaction.

*Wood v. Briant; Plunkett v. Lewis.*

And *c converso* where a child is indebted to his father and the father forgives the debt, such a transaction will be deemed an advancement.

*Blockley v. Blockley.*

- (6.) The doctrine is not confined to marriage settlements, but applies equally to all gifts made by a parent with the object of advancing the child in life.

But small sums paid by a father are not construed as advances.

- (7.) As to extrinsic evidence, the rule as to satisfaction, being merely a presumption of law, may be rebutted by evidence not contained in the written instruments themselves. Such evidence is admitted only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the presumption which the law has raised be well or ill founded. Thus

- (a.) Where no *presumption of law* against double provisions is raised in the first instance, such evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict the plain effect of the instruments.

*Hall v. Hill.*

- (b.) Where such *presumption of law* is raised, such evidence is admissible to rebut or support it.

*Kirk v. Eddowes.*

## CHAPTER XIV.

### ADMINISTRATION OF ASSETS.

THE word "assets" is derived from *assez*, enough. "The primary meaning of 'assets' was not that so much property was applicable for the payment of the debts, but that the personal representative as to the personal estate and the heir as to the descended real estate were respectively held *personally* liable for the debts at the suit of the creditors, the amount of the personalty vested in the one and the value of the realty descended to the other being the measure of their respective liabilities." (*Eddis on Assets.*)

Assets have accordingly been divided into "real assets,"

or "assets by descent," and "personal assets," or *assets entre main* of an executor. From the primary meaning, the word "assets" has now come to mean "all property available for the payment of the debts of a deceased person"; and by administration of assets is meant the application of such assets to the payment of the deceased's funeral and testamentary expenses and debts.

Assets are subdivided into two great classes—*legal assets* and *equitable assets*.

Legal assets denote "property which *creditors* might make available in a court of law for the payment of debts as having devolved upon or been recoverable by the executor or administrator, as such, for that purpose simply by virtue of his office, even though the property might be of an equitable nature, and he had consequently been obliged to resort to a court of equity to vest it in himself."

Equitable assets denote property which *creditors* could make available only in a court of equity for payment of debts by virtue of an express disposition of the property, or, from its peculiar nature, which must have been carried into effect or administered by a court of equity. (Sm. Man.) *Cook v. Gregson*.

It is therefore the REMEDY OF THE CREDITOR which determines whether the assets are legal or equitable.

The distinction between the two was formerly important and consisted in this—that out of legal assets specialty debts were properly payable before the simple contract debts, while out of equitable assets both classes of debts were payable *pari passu*.

This distinction has lost most of its importance since 1869, as will hereafter appear. It is still of moment in questions as to

- (1.) Executors' or administrators' right of retainer.
- (2.) Remedy of creditor against executor in an action at law.

Prior to 1870, the following was the



*Order in which Debts were Payable out of LEGAL Assets.*

Reasonable funeral and testamentary expenses are payable first of all. *Re Griffith.*

Estate duty payable in respect of *personalty* falls within the expression "testamentary expenses."

*Re Clemow; Re Treasure; Re Pullen.*

But estate duty in respect of realty does not.

*Re Sharman.*

- (1.) Debts due to the Crown by record or specialty.
- (2.) Debts to which particular statutes give priority: *e.g.*, debts owing to building or friendly societies by their officers, income-tax, poor-rates.
- (3.) Judgments duly registered against the deceased, and unregistered judgments if recovered against the personal representatives. The reason for the necessity of registration is to prevent the risk which the personal representatives would otherwise run of committing a *devastavit* by paying debts of inferior degree without being aware of judgments.
- (4.) Recognisances duly enrolled.
- (5.) Specialty debts for valuable consideration, whether the heir be or be not bound, arrears of rent, even though reserved by parol, ranking equally with specialties. This last priority is said to have arisen from what is called in law *privity of estate*.
- (6.) Simple contract debts and unregistered judgments against the deceased. But debts due to the Crown by simple contract would be paid first.
- (7.) Voluntary bonds or covenants; but a voluntary bond assigned for value without notice in the lifetime of the deceased ranks equally with specialty debts, *i.e.*, in the fifth group.

If the estate is insolvent, voluntary bonds now rank equally with the specialty debts, following the rule in bankruptcy.

*Re Whitaker.*

The order in which the different species of debts have always been payable out of EQUITABLE assets is obtained by

bracketing together groups 5 and 6; and Hinde Palmer's Act (32 & 33 Vict. c. 46, now styled "The Administration of Estates Act, 1869") abolished the priority of specialty over simple contract debts in the administration of the LEGAL assets of persons dying on or after 1st January, 1870, thus putting both on the same footing wherever the Act applies.

This statute does not deprive the Crown of its priority, so where the Crown is simple contract creditor, the assets must be divided rateably between the specialty and simple contract creditors, and then the Crown will be paid first out of the proportion allocated to the simple contract debts.

*Re Bentinck.*

As the result of this statute an executor can prefer a simple contract to a specialty creditor.

*In re Samson* (overruling *Re Hankey*).

The above is the "due order of administration"; but an executor *before* judgment in administration action, when no receiver has been appointed or injunction obtained, may prefer one creditor to another, or even pay a statute-barred debt. To prevent this, it is necessary to obtain

(a.) An injunction.

or (b.) Appointment of receiver before judgment; but a receiver will not be appointed by the court merely to prevent an executor exercising this right.

*Molony v. Brooke.*

or (c.) Speedy consent judgment for administration, but this can only be obtained with great difficulty.

*Lane v. Lane: In re Wilson.*

But the issue of an originating summons will check the executor's action so far as regards any question raised by the summons.

*Hunt v. Wenham.*

### *Administration of Real Estate.*

It may be well to trace here the gradual process by which real estate was rendered liable to the payment of debts, and the following points should be noted:—

(1.) In early times creditors by simple contract or specialty not binding the heir had no remedy against real

estate, and even if the heirs were bound, the debtor might devise his lands to another, who would be under no liability to pay the debt; or the heir might dispose of the descended lands before action brought against him by the creditor, who would in that event have no claim either on the lands or the purchase-money.

- (2.) The Statute of Fraudulent Devises (3 Will. & Mary, c. 14) made devises void against specialty creditors where the heirs were bound, and gave such creditors an action of *debt* against the heir *and* devisee jointly.
- (3.) Sir Samuel Romilly's Act (47 Geo. III. c. 74) enacted that the fee-simple estates of a deceased *trader* within the Bankruptcy Laws should be assets to be administered in equity for payment of his *simple contract* as well as *specialty* debts.
- (4.) The 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Will. IV. c. 47, repealed the former Acts, but re-enacted them with variations; in particular, providing that creditors might bring an action of debt *or* covenant against the heir *or* devisee.
- (5.) The Administration of Estates Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 104), provided in effect that all the real estate of any deceased person (trader or non-trader) should be assets to be administered in equity for payment of his *simple contract* as well as *specialty* debts; but preserved the priority of creditors by specialty, in which the heirs were bound over the creditors by simple contract, or specialty in which heirs were not bound.
- (6.) The Administration of Estates Act, 1869, in effect abolished the distinction between specialty and simple contract debts, and thus the priority preserved by the Administration of Estates Act, 1833, disappeared.
- (7.) It should be noted that none of the foregoing statutes interfered with testamentary dispositions providing, either by way of trust or charge, for payment of debts.
- (8.) Under the Land Transfer Act, 1897, the administration may be wholly out of court.

Such dispositions constituted the lands *equitable assets* out of which the creditors were paid *pari passu*.

It seems that the equitable doctrine of conversion is not recognised in settling the order of application of assets for payment of debts. *Trott v. Buchanan*.

*Legal assets* include lands not charged with the payment of debts, estates *pur autre vie*, equity of redemption of leaseholds, as well as freeholds.

*Equitable assets* have been classified as of two kinds—

Firstly, Equitable assets which are so by virtue of their own nature, not attainable by executor *virtute officii*, consisting of

- (a.) Property actually appointed by testator under a general power, to the extent the power is exercised.

Where the appointor is a married woman such assets will be liable for her post-nuptial as well as her ante-nuptial debts, if contracted with reference to her separate estate.

*Willoughby v. Holyoake*; *Bell v. Stoker*.

- (b.) Separate estate of a married woman.

Secondly, Equitable assets so created by the act of the testator charging or devising his land for payment of debts.

Note—

- (1.) The distinction between a charge and a trust. A trust imposes a duty on the trustee to look after the creditor, who will not be barred by lapse of time.

*Judicature Act*, 1873, s. 25, subject to the *Trustee Act*, 1888 (*vide ante*, pp. 48 and 55).

Whereas a creditor who has only a *charge* in his favour must look after himself, and will be barred after lapse of twelve years. 37 & 38 *Vict. c. 57*.

The Land Transfer Act, 1897, has not altered the rule, so that the creditor still has twelve years instead of six in which to sue. *Re Balls*.

But a trust of *personal* estate (which is primarily liable for debts), created by WILL only, does not prevent the Statute of Limitations running.



Observe, the Statutes of Limitations, 21 Jac. I. c. 16, and 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, bar the remedy only, but do not extinguish the right; while the statutes 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, and 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, not only bar the remedy but extinguish the right or debt itself. When once a debt is barred under these last-named statutes, no acknowledgment will revive it, and an executor must not pay a debt which has been wholly extinguished under the last-mentioned statutes.

An executor is not bound to plead the Statute of Limitations, but must not pay a statute-barred debt after judgment for administration.

(2.) What amounts to a charge.

A mere general direction by a testator that his debts should be paid was held to constitute a charge upon the real estate.

*Silk v. Prime; Legh v. Warrington.*

To this rule there were two exceptions—

(a.) Where a particular fund specified by testator for payment of debts.

(b.) Where *executors*, to whom real estate had not been devised, were directed to pay debts.

A specific lien upon real estate will not be affected by a general charge of debts, but neither specialty nor simple contract debts constitute such a lien. If, however, an action for administration has been commenced and registered as a *lis pendens*, a purchaser would not be safe in completing.

By the Judgments Act, 1864 (27 & 28 Vict. c. 112), judgment debts, although duly registered, do *not* constitute a lien or charge upon the debtor's land *until* such lands shall have been actually delivered in execution by virtue of a writ of *elegit*, or other lawful authority. The appointment of a receiver would amount to an equitable execution, *i.e.*, such a delivery by a legal authority as the subject-matter admits of; *Hood Barrs v. Cathcart; Wells v. Kilpin.* and this is so even where the subject-matter is a legal interest, and as such capable of being delivered in execution under a writ of *elegit*. *In re Pope.*

But a legal remainder appears to be incapable of being delivered in execution. *Harrison v. Bottomley.*

And under the Land Charges Act, 1888, the writ of elegit or receivership order must be registered in order to affect purchasers.

*Effect of Judicature Acts.*

By the Judicature Act, 1875, s. 10, it is enacted that in the administration BY THE COURT of the assets of any person dying insolvent after the Act the same rules shall prevail as to *the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors, and as to debts and liabilities provable, and as to the valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities respectively, as are in force in bankruptcy.*

Accordingly the rules in bankruptcy, instead of the previously existing rules of equity, are adopted whenever the insolvent estate of a deceased person is administered by the court, in three particulars—

- (1.) As to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors.
- (2.) As to debts and liabilities provable.
- (3.) As to the valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities.

With reference to this section, note that it *only applies* to—

- (a.) Insolvent estates. If an estate being administered as an insolvent estate turns out to be solvent, the section will not apply.
- (b.) Estates administered by the court.
- (c.) A limited extent, not importing *all* the rules of bankruptcy, but only those relating to the administration of the *estate* of the deceased—that is, practically the three particulars above specified.

Apparently the order for payment of debts in bankruptcy must be followed in Chancery, except that the Crown still retains priority for debts of record or specialty, and the personal representative still has a right of retainer against creditors of equal degree.

(1.) *As to Secured and Unsecured Creditors.*

The Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 168, defines a *secured creditor* to be “a person holding a mortgage charge or lien on the property of the debtor, or any part thereof, as security for a debt due to him from the debtor.”

The rule in equity as to secured creditors prior to the Judicature Acts was that the creditor might, in addition to his rights under his security, prove for the *whole* amount of his debt against the estate. *Mason v. Bogg.*

In bankruptcy the rule was the reverse, and under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the secured creditor may either—

- (a.) Prove for his whole debt on surrendering his security, or
- (b.) Prove for the balance due after realising or giving credit for the value of his security.

As to the precise effect of sect. 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, it does not mean the respective rights of the classes of secured and unsecured creditors as against each other, but the respective rights of the members of the classes *inter se*: as regards these rights *inter se* the rules in bankruptcy are now applicable. *Re Whitaker.*

A judgment creditor does not become a secured creditor merely by obtaining the appointment of a receiver.

*In re Dickinson.*

The execution (whether legal or equitable) must be duly followed up to render the judgment creditor secure.

(2.) *As to Debts and Liabilities Provable.*

Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, all debts and liabilities, present or future, certain or contingent, to which the debtor is subject, are provable in the bankruptcy, but any provable debt or liability may be declared by the court to be incapable of fair estimation, in which case it ceases to be a provable debt. The Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act, 1888, provides that on a winding up or a bankruptcy (including in this term the administration of the estates of

deceased insolvents, whether by the Bankruptcy or Chancery Divisions) the following classes of debts to the extent specified in the Act are given priority over all others :—

- (a.) Parochial and local rates and assessed taxes.
- (b.) Wages and salaries of clerks and servants, to which is now added workmen's compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906.
- (c.) Wages of labourers and workpeople.

But the Judicature Act, 1875, in speaking of the "debts and liabilities provable," said nothing about their "priorities" *inter se*; and the rules of bankruptcy limiting the landlord's right of distress, or as to reputed ownership or the avoidance of voluntary settlements, have no application to administration by the Chancery Division.

A creditor, however, can now come in and prove at any time if there are assets still undistributed, and his proof does not interfere with a prior distribution, just as in bankruptcy. *In re M'Murdo.*

Voluntary bonds are no longer postponed and rank *pari passu* with the debts for valuable consideration.

By the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1897, the debts mentioned in the Preferential Payments Act of 1888 are given preference over the claims of debenture-holders on the winding up of a company or the appointment of a receiver for debenture-holders.

### (3.) *The Valuation of Annuities and Future and Contingent Liabilities.*

By the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the trustee is to make an estimate of the value of any provable debt or liability which does not bear a certain value; and the rules in force in bankruptcy as to such estimate apply in the administration of assets in equity. *Hill v. Bridges.*

Insolvent estates of deceased persons may now, under the 125th section of the Bankruptcy Act, be wholly wound up in bankruptcy, and proceedings for administration commenced in the Chancery Division *may* be transferred to the Bank-



ruptcy jurisdiction, even after decree, either on the application of a creditor or without any such application; but not as a matter of course. *Atkinson v. Powell.*

*Creditor's Action for Administration of Deceased Debtor.*

Under Order lv. r. 10, the court has a discretion as to granting or refusing general administration, and now, as a rule, makes an order for limited administration, restricting the accounts and inquiries to what is indispensable.

I. Personal estate.

- (1.) In ordinary cases; an account is directed of debts and funeral expenses and of the personal estate received and outstanding. The executor is allowed in his account testamentary expenses and all just allowances, and so they are not specified in the judgment.

After judgment the executor should not exercise his powers without sanction of the court. The judgment operates for the benefit of all the creditors of the deceased who prove under it. When the estate is insolvent, interest is only allowed in accordance with the rule in bankruptcy.

- (2.) In partnership cases; the judgment would commence with a declaration that all the creditors of the deceased are entitled to the benefit of the judgment, and that the surplus (after payment of funeral expenses and separate debts) is liable to the joint debts. It would proceed to direct an account of the funeral expenses, of the separate debts, and the joint debts, and an inquiry as to the amount of the personal estate of the deceased.

II. Real and personal estate.

Formerly a creditor had to sue on behalf of all creditors of deceased, or deceased's realty would not be available for administration, but since the Land Transfer Act, 1897, this is no longer necessary. *Re James.*

After the usual accounts the judgment would direct (in case the personal estate should prove insufficient) an inquiry to be made as to the real estate of the testator, and the incumbrances affecting the same, and then order a sale thereof, the proceeds to go in aid of the personal estate in payment of debts, &c.

A judgment for administration is a judgment against the estate whenever realised, and enures for the benefit of all creditors who come in under it.

The costs exclusively occasioned by the administration of the realty are thrown upon the realty, and this rule is not altered by the Land Transfer Act, 1897.

*Patching v. Barnett ; Re Betts.*

If an executor administer the personal estate either under the direction of the court or the provisions of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, he is not personally liable to any claims of creditors of which he has NO NOTICE that may be made subsequently ; but if otherwise, he remains liable to any unpaid creditor, having the right, however, of calling upon the residuary legatees or next of kin to refund.

But such right is purely equitable and will not be enforced if, in the circumstances, it would be inequitable so to do.

*Blake v. Gale.*

And a creditor can also follow the assets into the hands of beneficiaries whether the executor is entitled to follow them or not and whether the executor can be made liable to the creditor or not.

*Marsh v. Russell.*

As the right arises in equity only, the beneficiary is entitled to set up any equitable defence.

Legatees and devisees are *postponed* to creditors, but, being express objects of the testator's bounty, are *preferred* to the next of kin and heir-at-law ; and among legatees, the *residuary* legatees are regarded as the least favoured objects of the testator's generosity.

The next important point to be considered is the

### *Order of Application*

of the different assets (as between such assets themselves

only) for payment of debts. This order of liability to debts has been settled as follows :—

- I. The general personal estate, not bequeathed at all, or by way of residue only.
- II. Real estate devised in trust to pay debts.
- III. Real estate descended and not charged with debts.
- IV. Real or personal estate charged with the payment of debts, and devised specifically or by way of residue, or suffered to descend or specifically bequeathed, subject to that charge.
- V. General pecuniary legacies, including annuities and demonstrative legacies which have become general.
- VI. Specific legacies (including demonstrative legacies that so remain), specific devises and residuary devises, not charged with debts.
- VII. Real or personal estate subject to a GENERAL power of appointment which has been *actually* exercised by deed in favour of *volunteers* (if fraudulent under 13 Eliz. c. 5) or by will.
- VIII. Paraphernalia of widow.

The Land Transfer Act, 1897, provides that in the administration of the estate of a person dying after 1st January, 1898, his real estate shall be administered in the same manner as if it were personal estate, but not so as to alter or affect the order in which real and personal assets respectively are now applicable for payment of funeral and testamentary expenses, debts, or legacies: the residuary personal estate will therefore still remain the primary fund for payment. And where personal representatives convey real estate to the devisee or heir subject to a charge for any money which the personal representatives are liable to pay, the creditors cannot follow the real estate into the hands of

a purchaser; and if the usual statutory notices have been given and the personal representatives have no notice of any outstanding claims, and they convey or assent, the remedy of the creditors will be against the heir or devisee only. *Re Cary and Lott.*

Of these in their order—

I. The general personal estate not bequeathed at all, or by way of residue only, and which is generally *legal assets*, constitutes the primary and natural fund for the payment of debts *except*—

(1.) Where there are express words or a plain intention of the testator to exonerate his personal estate; and to constitute such intention, it must be shown that it was meant not merely to charge the real estate, but so to charge it as to discharge the personal estate. As to which note— *Ancaster v. Mayer.*

(a.) If the real estate is directed to be sold for payment of debts, *and* the personal estate is expressly bequeathed to legatees, the personal estate will be exonerated by necessary implications. Neither of these circumstances *alone* is sufficient; nor is it sufficient if the real estate is devised subject to and charged with debts, funeral and testamentary expenses and legacies.

(b.) Where the testator gives his personal estate as a whole, and not as a residue, by way of specific legacy to one who is not executor, and another fund is supplied for payment of debts, &c., the personal estate is exonerated.

(c.) Where the testator converts his real and personal estate, and creates a mixed fund out of the produce, and appropriates that fund for payment of debts, &c., the two estates are applicable *pro rata*.

(d.) Where a devise is made subject to the payment of an existing incumbrance, or the residue of proceeds of real estate after payment of debts is devised, the personal estate is exonerated.



- (2) Where the charge or incumbrance is in its own nature real, as in the case of a jointure or pecuniary portions to be raised out of lands. A mortgage debt is not considered as in its own nature real.
- (3.) Where the debt was not contracted by the person who died last seised or entitled, but by some other person from whom he took it by descent or devise, or by some other person from whom he purchased it, or from whom his vendor derived it. (*Sm. Man.*)
- (4) Cases coming under Locke King's Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 113, now styled "The Real Estate Charges Act, 1854") and its amending Acts. Apart from statutory enactments, mortgage debts, like any other debts, are primarily payable out of the personal estate of the testator, unless devised *cum onore*, or the personalty otherwise exonerated, or the mortgage debt is an ancestral debt which has not been adopted by the testator as his own. For equity, following the Roman law, regarded a mortgage as only a *collateral* security for the debt.

The Real Estate Charges Act, 1854, however, provided "that when any person shall die seised of or entitled to any estate or interest in any *land or other hereditaments*, which shall at the time of his death be charged with the payment of any sum or sums of money by way of *mortgage*, and such person shall not by his will, or deed, or other document, have signified *any contrary or other intention*, the *heir or devisee* to whom such lands or hereditaments shall descend or be devised shall not be entitled to have the mortgage debt discharged or satisfied out of the personal estate or any other real estate of such person, but the land or hereditaments so charged shall, *as between the different persons claiming*, through or under the deceased person, be *primarily* liable to the payment of all mortgage debts with which the same shall be charged." The Act does not prejudice the right of mortgagees to enforce payment out of personal estate.

A mortgage by a deceased partner of his separate property to secure a partnership debt is not within these Acts, at any rate when the partnership assets will satisfy all partnership liabilities.

*As to the Effect and Construction of this Statute.*

- (a.) Freeholds, copyholds, and equitable mortgages were within its provisions; but not *leaseholds*.

*Solomon v. Solomon; Hill v. Wormsley.*

Leaseholds are now, however, included by the second Amending Act (40 and 41 Vict. c. 34), which applies to any testator or intestate dying *after* 31st December, 1877, seised or possessed of *lands of any tenure*. Notwithstanding that, strictly speaking, the word *tenure* is not applicable to leaseholds.

*Drake v. Kershaw.*

Pure personalty remains unaffected by these Acts, so where a specific legacy is subject to a charge created by testator the charge must be paid out of the residuary estate.

- (b.) The Act refers only to specified charges, "sums by way of mortgage," and does not apply to a *vendor's lien* for any unpaid purchase-money.

The first amending Act (30 & 31 Vict. c. 69) provided that the word "mortgage" in the Act should be deemed to extend to any lien for unpaid purchase-money upon any lands or hereditaments purchased by a *testator*.

The second amending Act (40 & 41 Vict. c. 34) extended the application of the previous Acts to any mortgage or equitable charge or lien for unpaid purchase-money in the case of either a *testator* or *intestate*.

Where the mortgage comprises both real and personal estate, the liability must be borne *pro ratâ*.

- (c.) As to a "contrary or other intention."

In order to take a case out of the Act, it is only necessary to show a "contrary or other intention."

It is therefore sufficient to charge the personal estate without at the same time discharging the real estate, but a mere general direction for payment of debts is not sufficient. *Eno v. Tatham.*

By the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 69, it is provided that a general direction for payment of debts out of personal estate shall not be sufficient to indicate a contrary intention unless *mortgage debts* are expressly or by necessary implication referred to; and

By the 40 & 41 Vict. c. 34, it is further provided that a contrary intention shall not be indicated by a charge of or direction for payment of debts upon or out of residuary real and personal estate or residuary real estate.

Such intentions therefore can only be shown by words referring to *mortgage debts*.

*Newmarch v. Storr*; *Valpy v. Valpy.*

A direction that the mortgage be paid out of proceeds of sale of an estate which proves insufficient does not show such intention.

Executors are bound to provide for payment of the mortgage debts of their testator before distributing the assets, and if they neglect to do so, will be liable as for a devastavit. They may, however, be protected by the Statutes of Limitation combined with the acquiescence of the mortgagee, in which case the only remedy for the mortgagee for the recovery of his debt will be the equitable one of calling upon the distributees to refund: and even then, the mortgagee may be barred by his own laches. *Blake v. Gale.*

But in a distribution under the direction of the court no provision will be made for a mere contingent liability and the executors are protected by the order of court.

*Mellor v. South Australian Coy.*

II. Lands devised for payment of debts are *equitable assets*.

III. Real estates descended are *legal assets*.

IV. Real or personal estate charged with debts are *equitable assets* and contribute *pro rata*. The heir taking a lapsed devise takes it as *devisee*, and not in his character as heir, and in respect thereof will therefore stand in the fourth line of liability. A residuary devise before the Wills Act was deemed specific, and this has been held to be still the case.

V. All general legacies, &c., contribute *pro rata*.

A doubt was cast upon the order of application of the assets classified under the last two heads by the decision of *In re Bate*, which transposed that order; but this case has not been followed and is treated as overruled.

*Re Stokes; Re Roberts.*

VI. Specific legacies, specific devises, and residuary devises not charged with debts, contribute *pro rata*.

It has been settled that *residuary* devises are to be deemed *specific*, and to be ranked among specific devises for all purposes of administration.

*Lancefield v. Iggulden.*

And the Land Transfer Act, 1897, does not affect this or any other rule of administration.

*Kempster v. Kempster.*

VII. Appointed property. The appointed property is treated as assets, so far as the appointment extends, because by the actual exercise of the power the appointor has virtually made it his own,

And under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the same rule applies where the appointor is a married woman.

*Re Ann: Wilson v. Ann.*

VIII. Paraphernalia of widow. This ranks last because, though liable to husband's debts, it cannot be disposed of by his *will* without concurrence of wife.

The foregoing order regulates the administration of the



assets only as between the testator's own representatives, devisees, and legatees, and does not affect the rights of creditors.

#### EXECUTOR'S RIGHT OF RETAINER.

The right of an executor to retain his own debt out of his testator's assets is said to have arisen from the executor's inability to sue himself in a court of law for the recovery of his own debt. It arises out of the possession of the assets by the creditor.

With regard to this right note the following points :—

- (1.) It exists in respect of LEGAL ASSETS only, and not equitable assets, but applies to equitable as well as legal debts.
- (2.) It has not been abolished by the Administration of Estates Act, 1869 ; *Wilson v. Coxwell.*  
or the Judicature Act, 1875, s. 10. *Lee v. Nuthall.*
- (3.) It is a right *inter pares* only, i.e., as against creditors in an equal degree with the executor, e.g., an executor *simple contract* creditor cannot retain as against a *specialty* creditor or a judgment creditor notwithstanding *Hinde Palmer's Act*.

*In re Briggs ; Wilson v. Coxwell ; Crawler v. Marvin.*

But he can retain against a specialty of which he has no notice. *Wingfield v. Erskine.*

- (4.) It is not lost by an administration decree.

*Campbell v. Campbell.*

Or an order for account under R. S. C. xv. 1.

*Whitaker v. Barrett.*

Or by the making of a "balance order" in the winding up of a company.

*International Marine Co. v. Hawes.*

Or the payment of assets into court.

*Richmond v. White.*

- (5.) As the right depends upon possession it is taken away by the appointment of a receiver ; but is allowed in respect of the legal assets recovered by the executor before the receiver is appointed. *Calver v. Laxton.*

A receiver will not, however, be appointed on purpose to defeat the executor's right.

*Molony v. Brooke.*

Nor will money in court be paid out to give the executor the right.

*Trevor v. Hutchins.*

The right cannot be set up after a creditor has obtained judgment.

*Re Marvin.*

- (6.) It exists in favour of a married woman in respect of loan to her deceased husband for purposes of his business.

*Re Ambler; Crawford v. May.*

- (7.) It exists although the debt is a joint-debt, but cannot be exercised by one joint-creditor to the prejudice of another.

*Crowder v. Stewart.*

Nor can an executor exercise the right to the prejudice of his co-executor, if a creditor of equal degree.

An executor can retain a simple contract debt due to firm in which he is a partner.

*Re Jennes.*

- (8.) It exists notwithstanding the debt is statute-barred ;

*Hill v. Walker.*

provided the court has not adjudged the debt to be irrecoverable ;

*Midgeley v. Midgeley.*

but does not extend to a debt not enforceable by the Statute of Frauds.

*Field v. White.*

It exists where the claim of the executor is as surety only ;

*Jones v. Pennefather.*

in respect of debts, but not of mere liabilities.

*Lee v. Binns.*

A *cestui que trust* cannot compel an executor who is a trustee of a debt due by his testator to retain.

*Re Ridley's Trusts.*

- (9.) It does not exist in respect of moneys which executor holds as trustee only for the estate of the testator.

*Talbot v. Frere.*

But it does extend to a debt of which the executor is only a trustee.

- (10.) There is no retainer except out of assets come to the executor's own hands. The right is limited to assets recovered by the executor in his lifetime ;

but if, as to such assets, the executor has in his lifetime asserted the right, his representatives may insist upon it. *Norton v. Compton.*

The retainer may be of the estate *in specie*.

*Re Gilbert.*

- (11.) It extends not only to an executor, but also to an administrator (who takes out administration as *next of kin*), to an administrator *de bonis non* and to the executor of an executor, but not the executor of one of several executors, one or more of whom is still living. *Trevor v. Hutchins; Hopton v. Dryden.*

But an administrator who is an undischarged bankrupt cannot retain a debt due to him from deceased.

But an administrator who takes out administration as CREDITOR was formerly considered to be entitled to the right, as he was only prohibited by the bond from exercising *undue* preference, but the terms of the bond now expressly prevent any retainer.

*Davies v. Perry; Re Brackenbury.*

- (12.) It does not exist when the estate is being administered in Bankruptcy, and is lost by the transfer from the Chancery Division to Bankruptcy on an administration order under sect. 125 of the Bankruptcy Act, except as to assets previously received by executor.

*Re Rhoades; Atkinson v. Powell.*

But such transfer will not be made merely for the purpose of defeating the right. *Earp v. Briggs.*

An heir-at-law or devisee has no right of retainer out of lands made assets by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 104, nor, generally, out of any lands whatsoever. *Davidson v. Illidge.*

An executor has no right of retainer against real estate; and the Land Transfer Act, 1897, does not alter the law in this respect. *In re Williams.*

The right of retainer produces inequality, and will not be assisted by the court.

A legatee indebted to testator's estate can receive nothing from testator's bounty until he has brought into account

the amount of his debt, even if the debt be statute-barred ; but this principle does not apply where the debt is owed by a firm of which legatee is a member.

*Re Bruce ; Turner v. Turner.*

An executor's liability extends not only to the assets which he has received, but also to what, but for his "wilful default," he might have received.

Actions for administration can only be brought by persons whose claims to recover are not barred by any Statute of Limitations ; such claims as regards personal estate can be kept alive by the acknowledgment of any one of the executors.

The estates of officers and soldiers in actual service are administered under the provisions of the Regimental Debts Act, 1893.

## CHAPTER XV.

### MARSHALLING ASSETS.

THE general doctrine has been defined as "such an arrangement of the different funds of the common debtor of two or more creditors as may satisfy every claim, so far as without injustice such assets can be applied in satisfaction thereof, notwithstanding the claims of particular individuals to prior satisfaction out of some one or more of these funds."

The principle of the rule is, "that a person having two funds to satisfy his demands shall not by his election disappoint a party who has only one fund." *Aldrich v. Cooper.*

"There are two essentials to marshalling :—

"(1.) The creditor who has been paid out of one fund must have had the right of recourse to the other.

"(2.) The creditor or other person who has been disappointed must have had a right to the fund out of which the other creditor has been paid.

"A person is said to 'marshal' against those assets which



he is entitled to have applied in priority to his own particular fund.” (Eddis' Assets.)

It is clear that there can be no marshalling except as between creditors of the *same* debtor. Consider—

I. Marshalling as between creditors.

II. Marshalling as between beneficiaries under a will.

- I. Prior to 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 104, simple contract creditors could marshal against the real assets to the extent the specialty creditors might have exhausted the personal assets. This Act and the Administration of Estates Act, 1869, have rendered marshalling between creditors of little importance. The same principle has been applied to the case of securities.

The doctrine of marshalling of *securities* has been stated thus:—

“When two properties belonging to the same owner have been mortgaged by him to the same mortgagee, or are otherwise subject to some paramount charge affecting both, and he has subsequently assigned over one of them for valuable consideration, whether on sale, mortgage, or settlement, then if the paramount incumbrancer satisfy the security out of the property so assigned, the assignee is entitled in equity as against the owner, the trustee in bankruptcy and his representatives taking by succession after his death and subject to any agreement to the contrary to have the securities marshalled, that is, to stand in the place of the paramount incumbrancer with regard to the other property to the extent of the value of the property taken to satisfy the paramount charge.” (W. V. & P. p. 483.)

- II. As between beneficiaries under a will, questions of marshalling arise chiefly from the disturbing action of creditors in taking some part of the assets out of their usual order; for it must be remembered that the order of application of assets does not affect the right of

*creditors* to resort in the first instance to any of the funds to which their claims extend. *Aldrich v. Cooper.*

The principle of marshalling in these cases is derived from the order of application of assets. Substitute for each of the properties specified on p. 99 *ante* the persons to whom they would go in the absence of debts. Thus:—

1. Next of kin or residuary legatee.
2. Devisee upon trust (really heir-at-law).
3. Heir-at-law.
4. Charged devisees (specific and residuary) and charged specific legatees.
5. Pecuniary legatees.

As to 4 and 5, however, note the former doubt mentioned on p. 104 *ante*.

6. Devisees (specific and residuary) and the specific legatees contribute rateably *inter se*.
7. Voluntary appointees by deed or will.
8. Widow.

If any of the above beneficiaries is deprived of his benefit by creditors appropriating the fund intended for him, then he may recoup himself by appropriating in his turn the fund intended for any one or more of the beneficiaries *prior* (but not subsequent) to himself in the above list.

Marshalling arises not only in consequence of the disturbing action of a creditor, but also from the presumption that a testator leaving legacies wishes that if possible they should be paid. Legacies are not payable out of *real* estate UNLESS in some way *charged* upon it by the testator, for no statute has ever done for legatees what 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 104, did for creditors.

The Land Transfer Act, 1897, which vests realty in the personal representatives, expressly enacts that the existing order of application is not to be altered or affected thereby.

As to what will amount to a charge of legacies on realty note—

- (1.) The intention must be manifest.

- (2.) An implied charge arises when a testator, after a general gift of legacies, gives all the residue of his real and personal estate to specified persons.

Observe further—

- (a.) If legacies *charged* on real estate should be paid out of personal estate so as to leave insufficient personalty to pay other legacies *not so charged*, then equity will marshal the assets, so that the legacies payable out of the personal estate only will be thrown on the real estate to the extent they have been deprived of the personal estate.
- (b.) When a legacy charged on real estate fails, equity will *not* marshal assets so as to throw it upon the personal estate and render it transmissible.
- (c.) Assets, if not marshalled by the testator himself, were formerly never marshalled in favour of *charities*, for a court of equity would not support a bequest contrary to law. The rule adopted was laid down in *Williams v. Kershaw*, for which *vide ante*, p. 34.

But now under the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1891, real estate may be lawfully given by will to charities, so that the necessity for marshalling no longer exists.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### MORTGAGES.

A **LEGAL** mortgage is a debt secured on lands or other property; the legal ownership is vested in the creditor, the equitable ownership remains in the debtor.

There are some species of property which are unmortgageable, *e.g.*, the profits of an ecclesiastical benefice, an interest in property which is defeasible on an attempt to mortgage it, and the separate property of a married woman which she is restrained from anticipating.

A limited company has no power to borrow unless authorised by its constitution so to do either expressly or impliedly.

Accordingly in taking securities from limited companies it should be ascertained that the company—

- (1.) Has power to borrow, and is not exceeding such power.
  - (2.) Is not borrowing for an unauthorised purpose.
  - (3.) Has power to validly charge the property in question.
- And specific mortgages by a company of its land or book debts must now be registered under the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908.

In the interpretation clause of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, the term *mortgage* is stated to include “any charge on any property for securing money or money’s worth.”

At law a mortgage was strictly an estate upon condition, the estate being forfeited upon the condition being broken, or, in other words, “an absolute conveyance subject to an agreement for a re-conveyance on a certain given event.” In equity, however, “a mortgage debt is a sum of money the payment whereof is secured, with interest, on certain lands, and being money, is personal property, subject to all the incidents which appertain to such property”; in fact, a mortgage was regarded merely as a *security or pledge*. As a necessary result, it was held that after the day fixed in the mortgage for payment of the money had passed, the mortgagor (notwithstanding the estate of the mortgagee had become *absolute at law*) had still a right to redeem his estate on payment within a reasonable time of all principal, interest, and costs, due upon the mortgage to the time of actual payment. This right still exists, and is known as the mortgagor’s *equity of redemption*. (Vide *Wms. R.P.*)

Courts of equity went on to hold that the maxim *Modus et conventio vincunt legem* did not apply to mortgages, and accordingly that the debtor could not by any agreement entered into at the *time of the loan* part with this right to redeem; and further, that the principle universally applied, “Once a mortgage, always a mortgage,” *i.e.*, that an estate could not at one time be a mortgage and at another time cease to be so *by one and the same deed*.

*Howard v. Harris; Salt v. Northampton;  
Jarrah, &c., v. Samuel.*



But the mortgagor and mortgagee may by an independent transaction *subsequent* to the mortgage make an agreement which will deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem.

*Lisle v. Reeve.*

The equity of redemption must not be clogged by any restrictive provisions.

*Field v. Hopkins.*

But collateral advantages may be stipulated for, provided the equity of redemption is not really clogged or fettered, *e.g.*, in the mortgage of a public-house to a brewer it may be validly agreed that the mortgagor shall take all beer from the mortgagee during the *continuance* of the mortgage.

*Biggs v. Hoddinott; Rice v. Noakes.*

Note, that any stipulation for enjoyment of a collateral advantage by the mortgagee *after* the mortgage is paid off, although no fetter is put upon the redemption of the mortgage, is determined as soon as the mortgage is paid off.

*Carritt v. Bradley.*

As regards redemption a mortgage must be distinguished from a *bonâ fide* sale and conveyance with option of repurchase; thus

(a.) On such a sale the time limited for repurchase must be strictly observed, for no relief will be given by equity.

(b.) In case of the option being exercised after death of purchaser, the purchase-money went to the *real* representative, whereas mortgage money went to the *personal* representative of the mortgagee. Under the Land Transfer Act, 1897, realty now vests in the personal representative, but the ultimate benefit will be as before, *i.e.*, in the former case for the heir or devisee, and in the latter for the next of kin or residuary legatee.

Three old forms of mortgage may be noticed—

(1.) *Vivum vadium*, an absolute conveyance of land by a debtor to his creditor, to be held by him until he was repaid principal and interest out of the rent and profits.

(2.) *Mortuum vadium*, a feoffment of land by a debtor to his creditor, to be held by him until payment of a given sum, he meanwhile receiving rents and profits *without account*.

(3.) *Welsh mortgage*, a conveyance similar to the last, the estate being redeemable at any time, and the creditor receiving the rents and profits in lieu of interest.

The mortgagee had no right to foreclose or sue for his money under any of the foregoing securities.

### *As to Redemption.*

In all the old forms of mortgage the estate was never lost, but in a modern mortgage the mortgagor's equity of redemption may be barred, *e.g.*, by an order of foreclosure absolute, or sale by the mortgagee under his power.

The equity of redemption is not a *mere right*, but an *estate* in the land, and will consequently devolve as the land, *e.g.*, it is subject to curtesy. *Casborne v. Scarfe.*

Any person entitled to any estate or interest in the equity of redemption has a right to redeem before foreclosure, *e.g.*, heir, tenant for life, &c.

When a mortgage comprises real and personal property, and the mortgagor dies intestate, and the heir-at-law is not known, the legal personal representatives of the mortgagor may redeem the whole. *Hall v. Heward.*

And every person entitled to redeem may redeem any prior incumbrance on payment of principal, interest, and costs, which is called "the price of redemption." The costs connected with the creation of the mortgage form no part of the price of redemption. *Wales v. Carr.*

But the costs of protecting the security and of redemption or foreclosure do. *Re New Zealand Ry. Co.*

The rule in foreclosure actions is to offer to redeem all incumbrances prior in date to the plaintiff, and to claim to foreclose all incumbrances subsequent in date, and is thus expressed: "Redeem up, foreclose down." In ordinary cases the rule now is to give only one time for redemption to all the puisne mortgagees, including the mortgagor, and not, as formerly, successive times to each.

*Glegg's Case; Smith v. Olding.*

If the mortgagee has refused an offer rightly made to

redeem him, he will have to bear the costs of the redemption action thereby occasioned.

Under the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 15, a person entitled to redeem may compel the mortgagee, instead of reconveying, and on the terms on which he would be bound to reconvey, to transfer the mortgage to a third person; and by the Conveyancing Act, 1882, s. 12, this right is extended to each incumbrancer or the mortgagor, notwithstanding any intermediate incumbrance.

No redemption is allowed before the time appointed for payment in the mortgage,

*West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life; Brown v. Cole; Williams v. Morgan.*

even though it be stipulated the loan shall continue for a number of years.

*Biggs v. Hoddinott.*

After the time fixed for payment has passed, the mortgagor cannot redeem without giving the mortgagee six months' notice, or six months' interest in lieu thereof, unless the mortgagee has taken possession or has demanded, or commenced proceedings to recover payment; but this rule does not necessarily apply to *equitable* mortgages. A mortgagee having once demanded payment cannot withdraw his demand and claim notice, and if punctual payment be not made on expiration of notice, the mortgagee cannot upon tender being made demand fresh notice or interest in lieu.

*Edmondson v. Copland.*

A mortgagor having once given notice cannot withdraw it without the mortgagee's consent.

The mortgagee is bound to accept the six months' interest in lieu of notice.

*Johnson v. Evans.*

A mortgagor having given notice to pay off must punctually pay or tender the money at expiration of notice, or the mortgagee will be entitled to fresh notice.

When a certificate has been made in a foreclosure action, the mortgagor cannot redeem without paying interest up to the date fixed for redemption in the certificate.

*Hill v. Rowlands.*

Under the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Viet. c. 57), no redemption will be allowed after the

expiration of twelve years from the time when the mortgagee took possession, or from the last *written* acknowledgment of the mortgagor's title ; this term is not extended by reason of the mortgagor's *disability*.

*Forster v. Patteson ; Kinsman v. Rouse.*

The estate of a mortgagee in possession of realty is personalty until the mortgagor is barred, and then it becomes realty.

*Re Loveridge.*

The mortgagee's remedy on the mortgagor's covenant in the mortgage deed or collateral bond is barred after twelve years.

*Sutton v. Sutton ; Fernside v. Flint.*

But this rule is not to be extended beyond the case of an action against the mortgagor himself, *e.g.*, to a surety.

*Re Powers ; Re Frisby.*

Or to mortgages of property other than land, *e.g.*, rever-sionary personal estate.

On the principle of these cases a mortgagee suing on the covenant or bond can recover six years' arrears of interest only, and the same rule applies when a mortgagee forecloses. But in a *redemption* action or when the mortgagee has sold under his power and has a surplus, *all* arrears of interest are recoverable.

*Re Marshfield ; Dingle v. Copper ;*

*Lloyd v. Lloyd.*

It will be remembered that these Statutes of Limitation relating to land not only bar the remedy but also extinguish the title.

But the payment of interest by the tenant for life keeps alive the debt against the remainderman and also, when the tenant for life is liable to pay the interest, against the residuary estate of the original mortgagor ; and the payment of interest by a specific devisee of part of a testator's real estate may keep alive the mortgagee's right of action against specific devisees of other parts of the real estate.

### *Mortgagor—His Rights and Duties.*

- (a.) Equity regards the mortgagor as the *owner* of the mortgaged estate ; and now, to a great extent, the position of the mortgagor is the same at law as in



equity. Under the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, a mortgagor entitled for the time being to possession or receipt of rents of land as to which *no notice* of his intention to take possession or to enter into receipt of rents shall have been given by the mortgagee, may sue in his own name for possession or recovery of rents; and by virtue of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 10, he may sue for breach of covenant or re-enter. The mortgagor while *in possession* is not the bailiff of the mortgagee, and therefore not accountable for rents and profits, although the security be insufficient.

- (b.) The mortgagor, although owner, will be restrained from waste and prevented from dealing with the estate so as to injure the mortgagee, *if the security is insufficient*.
- (c.) For the purpose of eviction after default, the mortgagor is a tenant at will to the mortgagee if he has attorned tenant, and a tenant at sufferance if he has not.
- (d.) Formerly a valid lease could not be made by the mortgagor without the concurrence of the mortgagee who had the legal estate; such a lease would, however, have been good by estoppel against the mortgagor; and so the tenancies created by the mortgagor *subsequent* to the mortgage could be avoided by the mortgagee.

*Keech v. Hall.*

In such cases, if the mortgagee give notice to the tenants to pay rent to him, they will, on complying with such notice, become tenants from year to year to the mortgagee, notwithstanding their leases may be for terms of years.

In agricultural holdings under the Tenants' Compensation Act, 1890, or the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1908, the tenant will be entitled to six months' notice if the mortgagee wishes to take possession, and also to any compensation for improvements, &c., he would otherwise be entitled to from the mortgagor at the end of the tenancy.

Under the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 18, a mortgagor in possession (unless specially precluded by the mortgage deed or otherwise) has power to lease for twenty-one years in the case of an agricultural or occupation lease, and for ninety-nine years in the case of a building lease, on complying with the requirements of the Act in that behalf, and such a lease will remain valid after foreclosure.

A surrender of a lease created by the mortgagor was formerly invalid unless made to the mortgagee.

*Robbins v. Whyte.*

Now, by the Conveyancing Act, 1911, a mortgagor in possession, for the purpose of granting a new lease, is empowered to accept the surrender of a lease authorised under the Conveyancing Acts or by the mortgage deed.

- (e.) If when a receiver is appointed the mortgagor is in possession he can be made to pay an occupation rent.

#### *Mortgagee—His Rights and Liabilities.*

- (a.) The mortgagee is the *legal* owner of the land, and as such entitled immediately to the rents, and may give notice to the tenants to pay rents to him, and enforce payment by distress. *Moss v. Gallimore.*

But if a tenant pay rent in advance and subsequently the reversion is mortgaged, the mortgagee cannot claim payment again although he has no notice of the transaction.

The mortgagee is entitled to his proper expenses attending collection of rents, but he cannot charge for any *personal* trouble, and if he give notice to tenants to pay rents he will be deemed to have taken possession. To avoid being deemed in possession he should appoint a receiver, either by virtue of express agreement with the mortgagor, or under his statutory power. The possession of the receiver is deemed to be that of the mortgagor, for the receiver appointed by the mortgagee is deemed the *agent of the mort-*

*gagor*, but cannot be interfered with by him; and the mortgagee will thus obtain the advantages without the responsibilities of possession. Under the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 19, a mortgagee, when the mortgage is made by deed, has power, at any time after the mortgage money has become due, to appoint a receiver *whenever* he is entitled to exercise the statutory power of sale.

The receiver is entitled to all rents in arrear and unpaid at his appointment; and after a receiver has been appointed under the Act, the mortgagor cannot distrain without the authority of the receiver.

As soon as a mortgagee has actually entered, his possession relates back to the date he was legally entitled to possession.

A mortgagee who has once taken possession cannot go out of possession for the purpose of obtaining a receiver.

The mortgagee is in no way entitled to any benefit beyond principal, interest, and costs.

So a mortgagee renewing a lease holds the renewed lease subject to the same equity of redemption as the lapsed one.

And although the mortgagee of an advowson is the person to present on a vacancy, he must present the nominee of the mortgagor.

*Mackenzie v. Robinson.*

As to *West India* estates, a mortgagee may stipulate for payment of commission for his personal trouble as long as he is *not in possession*.

- (b.) A stipulation for the mortgagee to receive interest at a *lower* rate than that actually reserved, if punctually paid, is good, but not *vice versa*. The fines and penal payments incident to mortgages to Building Societies are, however, recoverable in full.
- (c.) Mortgagee in *possession* must keep estate in *necessary* repair, but is only bound to do so to extent of *surplus* rents.

And a receiver appointed under the statutory

power is only entitled to expend in repairs surplus rents.

- (d.) Mortgagee in *possession* is liable to account for the rents, *not* according to actual value of estate, but only for what he actually receives, or might have received, but for his *wilful default*. To a limited extent, therefore, a mortgagee in *possession* is a trustee for the mortgagor, and if he transfers the mortgage *without* the mortgagor's consent or the direction of the court, he will continue liable to account for rents subsequently received. He is not bound, however, to make the *most* of another's property, as it is in consequence of the laches of the mortgagor the land lapses into the hands of the mortgagee.

And whether the mortgagee is in possession or not, a transferee without the privity of the mortgagor takes subject to the state of account between the mortgagor and mortgagee at the time of the transfer.

The receipt of rents and profits will not *per se* make a mortgagee chargeable as mortgagee in possession. The question depends upon whether he has done anything which practically deprives the mortgagor of the management or control of the estate.

A mortgagee in *possession* may add to his mortgage debt any moneys properly expended in maintaining his title and for insurance and necessary repairs.

Where there are successive mortgages, the first mortgagee in *possession* is accountable to the second mortgagee.

A mortgagee in possession cannot claim any notice or interest in lieu of notice if the mortgagor offers to redeem.

*Bovill v. Endle.*

- (e.) When the receipts of the mortgagee in *possession* exceed the interest, the annual surplus will be applied in reduction of the principal money, which is called taking the account "with *annual rests*."



As a general rule, annual rests will not be directed if the interest is in arrear, or some other danger overhanging the security when the mortgagee takes possession; and this is so even if the receipts of the mortgagee comprise not only rents, but also purchase-moneys on sale of part of the mortgaged property.

*Wrigley v. Gill; Ainsworth v. Wilding.*

- (f.) Formerly a mortgagee could not be compelled to produce his title-deeds without payment of all moneys due on the security; but under the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 16, a person entitled to redeem can require the production of the deeds on payment of the mortgagee's costs. Upon redemption the mortgagee must hand over all title-deeds, and will be liable in damages for any missing.
- (g.) A lease from the mortgagor to the mortgagee is under no circumstances valid. Formerly a mortgagee even in possession could not make a valid lease without the concurrence of the mortgagor, but only one liable to be avoided on redemption. The Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 18, gives to a mortgagee while in *possession* (unless barred by the express provisions of the mortgage deed or otherwise) the same power to make valid leases as the mortgagor; and by the Conveyancing Act, 1911, the power is continued after the appointment of a receiver during the existence of the receivership.
- (h.) A mortgagee cannot purchase the mortgaged property under the power of sale contained in the mortgage deed; but a second mortgagee may purchase from the first mortgagee.
- (i.) Mortgagee in *possession* must not commit waste. As a general rule, unless the security were insufficient, he could not formerly fell timber, and if he did so he was subject to an onerous account. But under the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 19, a mortgagee in possession, where the mortgage is made subsequent to the Act, has power to cut and sell timber other than ornamental timber.

## THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF NOTICE.

A person who purchases, although for valuable consideration, AFTER notice of a prior claim, becomes a *malá fide* purchaser, and *cannot by getting in the legal estate* defeat such prior claim, but will be deemed a trustee to the extent of such claim, and will take subject to it quite irrespective of the question of negligence.

*Re Holmes ; Potter v. Sandars ; Jared v. Clements.*

Registration is not constructive notice to a purchaser who has omitted to search a Registry, nor will registration defeat a prior unregistered claim of which the person registering has express notice.

*Le Neve v. Le Neve.*

But as regards land in Yorkshire, the Yorkshire Registries Act, 1884, provides that registered assurances shall rank *inter se* according to date of registration, and shall not be affected by actual or constructive notice, except in cases of actual fraud. The Act contained a provision constituting registration actual notice, which however was repealed by the 48 & 49 Vict. c. 26.

Where a document is incapable of registration its priority is not affected by registration of subsequent incumbrances.

*Re Calcutt & Elvin*

A purchaser *with* notice, if his vendor bought *without* notice, and a purchaser *without* notice although his vendor bought *with* notice, may respectively protect their title, *provided* that in each case such purchaser obtained the *legal* estate, or the best right to call for it, at the time of his purchase.

*Harrison v Forth ; Pitcher v. Rawlins.*

The purchaser of land from one who bought for value without notice, actual or constructive, of a restrictive covenant is not bound by the covenant although he himself has notice of it.

*Wilkes v. Spooner.*

Notice of a *voluntary* conveyance of land never

affected a subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration under 27 Eliz. c. 4; and now by the Voluntary Conveyances Act, 1893, any such subsequent sale would be inoperative.

As regards choses in action or other personal estate a second mortgagee with notice of a first mortgage at time of making his advance will not acquire priority by giving notice. *Re Ind, Coope, & Co.*; *Re Weniger*.

#### NOTICE IS ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE.

*Actual notice*, in order to be binding, must be given by a person interested in the property and in the same transaction, or in the course of the negotiations.

Notice may be either written or verbal, except where required by statute or otherwise to be in writing.

*Constructive* or *imputed notice* has been defined as knowledge which the court imputes to a person upon a presumption, so strong that it cannot be allowed to be rebutted, that the knowledge must have been communicated.

*Hewitt v. Loosemore.*

It has also been well described as consisting "in those circumstances under which the court concludes either that notice must be imputed on grounds of public policy to an innocent person, or that the party has been guilty of such negligence in not availing himself of the means of acquiring it, as, if permitted, might be a cloak to fraud, and which, therefore, the common interests of society require should, in its consequences, be treated as equivalent to actual notice." (*Dart, V. & P.*)

A purchaser is not affected with constructive notice of that which no possible inquiries or inspection would have brought to his knowledge.

*Taylor v. L. & C. Bank.*

Constructive notice is of several kinds—

- (1.) Actual notice of a fact which would have led to notice of other facts, so

Notice of a deed is notice of its contents, except in mercantile transactions : *Bisco v. Banbury.*

Where the deed might have been inspected.

*Reeve v. Beveridge ; White v. Smith.*

A lessee has constructive notice of his lessor's title.

*Patman v. Harland.*

In order to be fixed with notice, a fair opportunity must be given of discovering what the provisions of the deed are.

- (2.) Purposely avoiding inquiry will not save a party from being fixed with notice. *Jones v. Smith.*

- (3.) Third party in possession, or appearance of property such as to put a party upon inquiry.

*Caballero v. Henty ; Allen v. Seckham ;*

*Cavander v. Bulteel.*

But although notice of a tenancy is notice of all the rights of the tenant, it is not notice of the title of the tenant's lessor. *Hunt v. Luck.*

Notice that a beneficiary is also trustee of the fund his share of which is being dealt with, fixes the purchaser or mortgagee with notice of all trusts affecting it, and the legal estate obtained from such trustee affords no protection.

*Perham v. Kempster ; Capell v. Winter.*

- (4.) Notice to agent is notice to principal, in cases where the knowledge of the agent is so material to the particular transaction as to render it the *duty* of the agent to communicate it to the principal.

*Wyllie v. Pollen ; Bradley v. Ritches.*

But where the agent is party to a fraud notice is not imputed ; and so under the Partnership Act, 1890, notice to a partner designing a fraud does not operate as notice to the firm.

Notice to *solicitor* of trustees or mortgagees is not notice to the trustees or mortgagees, unless communicated. *Saffron Walden v. Raynor.*

Under the Conveyancing Act, 1882, s. 3, in order to affect the principal with notice, counsel, solicitor,



or agent must have obtained his knowledge in the *same* transaction.

Notice that title-deeds are in the possession of another, may constitute notice of any claim that other may have: thus a legal mortgagee or purchaser, who has not obtained the deeds where

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|---|---|---|
| (1.) He made no inquiry for them,   | { | Will be postponed to a prior equitable estate or subsequent equitable owner who used due diligence. |
| (2.) He made proper inquiries and received reasonable excuses for their non-delivery, | { | Will not lose his priority.   |
| (3.) He received some deeds, reasonably believing them to be all,                     | } |   |

*Northern Counties v. Whipp.*

But now all questions of constructive notice are settled by the Conveyancing Act, 1882, under which constructive notice may be classified as follows:—

- (1.) Notice which would have come to the purchaser *indirectly*, as the result of reasonable inquiries and inspections.
- (2.) Notice which comes *directly* to his *counsel*, solicitor, or agent *as such* in the *SAME* transaction.
- (3.) Notice which would have come to his solicitor or other agent *as such* in the *SAME* transaction *indirectly* as the result of reasonable inquiries and inspections.

The effect of the words “as such” is, that a purchaser will only be affected with notice which has come to the agent, as agent for him, the purchaser.

*In re Cousins.*

Reasonable inquiries and inspections are such as would usually be made by business men under similar circumstances.

*Bailey v. Barnes.*

Purchasers with notice (actual or constructive) of *restrictive covenants* can be restrained by injunction from breach thereof, independently of the question whether

the covenants run with the land or not. This rule, known as the *Tulk v. Moxhay* rule, applies to negative covenants only. Restrictive covenants may be enforced against every person in possession of the land affected by them, unless he obtains the legal estate for value without notice.

But the covenant must have been entered into for the benefit of neighbouring land and not be merely personal to the original vendor. *Formby v. Barker.*

And now, under the Conveyancing Act, 1911, s. 11, a purchaser can insist upon notice being put on some material deed retained by his vendor giving notice of restrictive covenants affecting the land to which the deed relates.

### TACKING.

*Tacking* may be described as the union of two incumbrances on the same property by the mortgagee who has the legal estate, so as to postpone an intermediate incumbrance which is prior in point of date to the one tacked, and of which he had no notice at the time of making his subsequent advance.

The doctrine depends upon the maxim, "Where equity is equal the law shall prevail."

The leading principles or rules for this doctrine appear for the most part in the leading case of *Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough*, and may be stated thus:—

(1.) Third mortgagee making advance without notice of second, although he subsequently obtains the first mortgage with notice of second, may tack. But note

(a.) He cannot tack unless he has obtained either the legal estate or the best right to call for it.

(b.) He is allowed to tack notwithstanding he has notice of the second mortgage, because he had no notice when he made his advance, and is therefore an honest creditor. *Marsh v. Lee.*

(c.) The legal estate must be outstanding in person having no privity with prior incumbrancers.

(d.) No tacking allowed where the first mortgage

has been paid off and third mortgagee has notice before he obtains transfer, as, when paid off, the first mortgagee becomes a trustee for the second mortgagee. *Bates v. Johnson.*

The foregoing rules seem to apply equally to land subject to registration under the Land Transfer Act, 1897. *Cap., &c., Bank v. Rhodes.*

(2.) Judgment creditor buying in the first legal mortgage cannot tack, for he is not a *purchaser*, and did not lend his money in contemplation of the land.

(3.) First mortgagee making a further advance upon a judgment or another mortgage may tack. But

(a.) He must have the legal estate or the best right to call for it.

(b.) He must make the advance *without notice* of mesne incumbrance, although his first mortgage was to secure further advances.

*Rolt v. Hopkinson.*

Even if he be under a legal obligation to make such further advances. *West v. Williams.*

If there be co-mortgagees, the fact that any one of them has notice of a mesne incumbrance will prevent tacking.

But when a bank overdraft is secured by mortgage and notice of a second mortgage is given to the bank the rule in *Clayton's case* (*vide post*, chapter on Set-off) will not be applied so as to give the second mortgagee priority over the bank. *Deeley v. Lloyds Bank.*

A floating charge on the property of a company is a security which takes effect as a present effective charge on the property, both present and future, of a company, but with power for the company to deal with its property for the time being in the ordinary course of its business until a receiver is appointed or a winding up commences.

To constitute a floating charge it is not necessary for all the assets of the company to be included in the security, and an assignment of all present and future

book debts of the company is a floating charge and requires registration. *Re Yorkshire Woolcombers.*

All floating charges, debentures, and specific mortgages of land or book debts created by a company must now be registered under the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908.

Debentures creating a floating charge over the assets of a company leave the company at liberty to create specific mortgages over any part of the property charged, and such specific mortgages will rank in priority to the debentures; unless the floating charge prohibits the creation of prior incumbrances and the specific mortgagee has notice of the terms thereof.

But registration of the charge under the Act of 1908 is not notice of any such prohibition.

*Wilson v. Kelland.*

Floating securities are subject to payment of debts made preferential by the Bankruptcy Act and Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, but are entitled to be recouped, as against the unsecured debts, the amount thus taken by preferential creditors.

*Re Mannersman Tube Co.*

The floating charge gives no right to claim any specific item of the company's property until the charge has crystallised; the mere existence of a floating charge does not prevent a judgment creditor from enforcing his ordinary rights against the company's property.

*Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries.*

But property specifically mortgaged by debenture trust-deed would have priority.

- (4.) Where legal estate is outstanding, incumbrancers rank in order of date, according to the maxim, *Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure*, unless one of them has a better title to call for the legal estate.
- (5.) Building Society mortgages were formerly considered an exception to the general rule, on the ground that when a Building Society, being first mortgagee, is paid off by third mortgagee, and endorses the statutory



receipt, the legal estate vests for the benefit of all the mortgagees according to the priority of their dates.

*Pease v. Jackson.*

But it has now been decided this opinion is erroneous except as to revesting the legal estate, and that Building Society mortgages are within the general rules as to tacking.

*Hosking v. Smith.*

- (6.) Bond or simple contract debts cannot be tacked during the life of the debtor, and even after his death only as against volunteers, so as to avoid circuity of action.
- (7.) By the 7th section of the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, an attempt was made to abolish tacking; but this section was repealed by the Land Transfer Act, 1875, as from the date at which it came into operation, except as to anything duly done thereunder.
- (8.) Tacking is practically abolished, so far as lands in Yorkshire are concerned, by the Yorkshire Registries Act, 1884.
- (9.) Priority may be lost by a mortgagee's fraud or gross negligence, but not by mere carelessness on the part of the mortgagee.

*Manners v. Maw ; Northern Fire Insurance v. Whipp ;*

*Farrand v. Yorkshire Bank ; Oliver v. Hinton.*

A solicitor is usually liable for negligence in not discovering a mesne incumbrance.

### CONSOLIDATION.

“If one person should have mortgaged lands to another for a sum of money, and subsequently have mortgaged other lands to the same person for another sum of money, the mortgagee was placed by the rules of equity in the same favourable position as if the whole of the lands had been mortgaged to him for the sum total of the moneys advanced. . . . This rule, known as the *doctrine of the consolidation* of securities, was extended to the case of mortgages of different lands made to different persons by the *same* mortgagor becoming vested by transfer in the same mortgagee.”

(*Wms. R. P.*) *Vint v. Padget ; Pledge v. White.*

But the doctrine has no application when the mortgages were created by different persons, notwithstanding that both equities of redemption may have subsequently become vested in the same mortgagee; and the fact that one of the original mortgagors was trustee of the property mortgaged by him for the other mortgagor, would make no difference.

*Sharp v. Richards.*

Shortly, the right of consolidation is the right of the holder of two mortgages to refuse to be redeemed, as to one, without the other being redeemed also.

Consolidation will be applicable—

- (1.) Where at the date when redemption is sought all the mortgages are united in one hand, and redeemable by the same person;
- (2.) Or where, after that state of things has once existed, the equities of redemption have become separated.

*Pledge v. White.*

The right of consolidation does not attach—

- (1.) Where in one of the mortgages in respect of which it is claimed there has been no default.

*Cummins v. Fletcher.*

- (2.) Where one of the properties originally mortgaged has ceased to exist.

*Re Raggett.*

- (3.) Where the mortgage of one of the properties was created subsequently to the assignment of the equity of the other property to the person seeking to redeem.

*Harter v. Colman; Mills v. Jennings.*

Unless he had notice at the time of assignment that the mortgage contained a power to consolidate.

*Andrews v. City Building Society.*

And the bankruptcy of the mortgagor does not enable the mortgagee to consolidate, if he would not otherwise have the right.

*Re Pearce Trusts.*

The doctrine applies when the mortgagee is foreclosing as well as when the mortgagor is seeking to redeem, and an equitable mortgage may be consolidated with a legal mortgage.

The doctrine applies to equitable as well as legal mort-

gages and to mortgages of personalty as well as realty, but bills of sale and mortgages of realty cannot be consolidated.

*Chesworth v. Hunt.*

A mortgagee exercising his power of sale may apply the surplus proceeds of sale of one estate toward satisfaction of an insufficient security over another if the mortgagor be alive.

*Selby v. Pomfret.*

But not in payment of arrears of interest due on the other.

The right of consolidation is further curtailed by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 17, which applies where any one of the mortgages sought to be consolidated is made after 1881, *unless* the effect of the Act is expressly excluded or varied in the mortgages, or one of them, and provides that a mortgagor seeking to redeem any one mortgage may do so without redeeming any other mortgage. A clause in a mortgage excluding the operation of this section is not to be deemed a usual one.

*Farmer v. Pitt.*

Note, restrictions on the right of consolidation, however arising, have no application to the case of two or more distinct properties included in the same mortgage.

#### *Tacking distinguished from Consolidation.*

- (1.) Tacking is the right to throw together several debts lent on the *same* estate, while consolidation is the right to throw together on one estate several debts lent on *different* estates.
- (2.) Tacking depends entirely on the protection afforded by the *legal estate*, while consolidation does not.
- (3.) Tacking is based on the maxim, "Where the equities are equal, the law must prevail"; consolidation, on "He who seeks equity must do equity."
- (4.) Notice is fatal to the right of tacking, but, except as above appears, immaterial in consolidation.

#### *Special Remedies of Mortgagee.*

- (1.) Foreclosure.

The mortgagee can call in his money without notice at

any time after default, and, failing payment, will not be always liable to account, but after a reasonable time equity will hold the mortgagor to have lost his equity of redemption, *i.e.*, to be foreclosed, and the estate will become the absolute property of the mortgagee. A judgment for foreclosure may also direct possession of the mortgaged property to be given to the mortgagee. The first or any *puisne* mortgagee can bring a foreclosure action, which must be assigned to the Chancery Division. Foreclosure actions must be brought within twelve years from the accrual of the action, or the last written acknowledgment, or the last payment of any part of the principal or interest.

The *strict* right of a legal mortgagee is foreclosure and not sale.

The remedy of a debenture-holder is usually the appointment of a receiver, but in a proper case he may have a winding-up order, or even a sale of the company's undertaking may be decreed.

## (2.) Sale.

(a.) By order of the court. Under the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 25, on the request of the mortgagee the court has power to direct a sale on such terms as it thinks fit, even upon an interlocutory application.

(b.) Under power in mortgage deed. The surplus proceeds under sale must be paid to persons who (but for sale) would have been entitled to redeem.

(c.) Under statutory power. By the 19th section of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, a power of sale (unless expressly excluded) is rendered incident to every mortgage of any property, where made by *deed* after the mortgage money has become due; but by the 20th section is not exercisable until after—

(a.) Three months' default after notice in writing.  
This notice may be waived.

or (β.) Some interest in arrear for two months.

or (γ.) Breach of some provision (other than payment of money) in mortgage or Act.

An equitable mortgagee by deed may sell under



this section, but he cannot convey the legal estate to the purchaser. *Re Hobson and Howe.*

And now under the Conveyancing Act, 1911, s. 4, the statutory power includes power for the mortgagee to impose restrictions or reservations with respect to the user of the land or the beneficial working of mines and minerals, and also power to sell with a grant or reservation of rights of way or other easements.

A mortgagee of stocks or shares can sell without relying upon any express or statutory power of sale: as soon as the day appointed for payment is passed, the mortgagee may sell, the rule being founded on mercantile custom.

*Deverges v. Sanderman.*

A mortgagee *bonâ fide* exercising his power of sale is not bound to make the most possible of the mortgaged property, as he is not deemed a trustee for the mortgagor. Mere inadequacy in price is no ground for setting aside sale.

*Colson v. Williams; Warner v. Jacob; Haddington v. Hason.*

But a mortgagee who has received notice of a second mortgage is a trustee for such puisne mortgagee to the extent of any balance arising from a sale, whether by himself or the mortgagor.

*W. L. C. Bank v. Reliance Building Society.*

And as such trustee he is within sec. 8 of the Trustee Act, 1888, and can plead the Statute of Limitations.

And a mortgagee who on a sale misdescribes the property is liable to account to a second mortgagee for compensation for such misdescription reducing the purchase-money. *Tomlin v. Luce.*

And a mortgagee who has realised a surplus by a sale under his power is liable (in the absence of special circumstances) to pay interest at 4 per cent. thereon as long as he retains it.

*Charles v. Jones; Eley v. Read.*

A mortgagor may purchase from the mortgagee selling under his power of sale, but such a purchase will operate only as a *redemption* of the mortgagee if there be subsequent incumbrancers, and cannot be set up against them, that is to say, a sale by a first mortgagee to the mortgagor lets in a second incumbrancer. *Otter v. Vaux.*

But a mortgagee cannot purchase under the power of sale in the mortgage; although a second mortgagee may purchase from the first.

Where notice is required before power can be exercised, apparently it should be given not only to the mortgagor, but also to subsequent incumbrancers of whose charges the mortgagee has notice. *Hoole v. Smith.*

But a *bond fide* purchaser is not affected by such notice not having been given unless he has express notice that the selling mortgagee has not given the mortgagor the requisite notice of sale.

*Selwyn v. Garfit.*

Although he is entitled to evidence that due notice has been given, if he require it.

*Life and Reversionary v. Hand.*

And now under the Conveyancing Act, 1911, s. 6, when a mortgagee sells in professed exercise of the statutory power, the purchaser cannot require evidence that the power of sale has arisen, or that requisite notice has been given, or that the power is otherwise properly exercised.

Where mortgaged property is taken under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act compensation moneys go to the mortgagee, and where licensed houses are in mortgage compensation awarded under the Licensing Act, 1904, is payable to the mortgagee.

### (3.) Attornment clause.

Formerly it was usual, when the mortgagor was in actual possession at the date of the mortgage, to insert therein an attornment clause, whereby the mortgagor

attorned tenant to the mortgagee at an annual rent (generally equivalent to the interest), so as to give the mortgagee a power of distress. If the rent reserved exceeded the interest, the mortgagee could apply the surplus towards satisfaction of principal money.

The mortgagee exercising a valid attornment clause is in the position of landlord, so as to have power to distrain on a stranger's goods found on the premises.

*Kearsley v. Philips.*

The mere insertion of an attornment clause in a mortgage which has not been acted upon will not render a mortgagee liable to account as if he were in possession.

*Stanley v. Grundy.*

But a mortgagee who has *actually distrained* under an attornment clause will be liable to account as mortgagee in possession.

*In re Stockton Iron Furnace Co.*

Under the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, unless the mortgage deed containing an attornment clause be *registered* as a bill of sale, the mortgagee will not be able to distrain under it.

*Re Willis, ex parte Kennedy; Green v. Marsh.*

And as a bill of sale to secure money must be drawn in the statutory form provided by the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, the attornment clause cannot in future be rendered available at all for the purposes of distress.

An attornment clause, however, is still good for the purpose of creating the relationship of landlord and tenant, and the mortgagee may determine the tenancy and issue a specially endorsed writ for recovery of the mortgaged land, and proceed summarily for judgment under Order xiv.

*Mumford v. Collier.*

But the tenancy determines upon the death of the mortgagor.

#### *Generally.*

A mortgagee has three remedies: (1) foreclosure, (2) sale, and (3) action on the covenant; and he may, as a general

rule, pursue all of them *concurrently*. Thus if he obtains part payment under the covenant or bond, he may go on with his foreclosure for non-payment of the balance.

If a mortgagee selling under his power of sale obtains part only of the money due, he may sue on the covenant for any balance.

*Rudge v. Richens.*

To this general rule there is one exception, namely, the case of a mortgagee who *forecloses first*. If a mortgagee *after* foreclosure sues the mortgagor on his covenant or bond, he will by so doing *open the foreclosure*, and give the mortgagor a fresh right to redeem.

*Lockhart v. Hardy.*

He will also do so if he receive any rents of the mortgaged property subsequent to the judgment for foreclosure (not being yet absolute), but *before* the day fixed for redemption.

*Jenner Fust v. Needham.*

And after foreclosure order nisi the mortgagee's power of sale is suspended and cannot be exercised without the leave of the court.

*Stevens v. Theatres Ltd.*

If a mortgagee *after* foreclosure has *sold* the estate, he will be restrained from suing the mortgagor, since he no longer retains the mortgaged estate in his power, ready to be redeemed.

*Palmer v. Hendrie.*

But a second mortgagee who has submitted to foreclosure order absolute in an action by the first mortgagee may sue the mortgagor on his covenant.

*Worthington v. Abbot.*

Although the equity of redemption may be barred, upon the death of the mortgagee intestate, the mortgage will still be deemed a security only and pass to the next of kin.

*Proctor v. Ellis.*

The purchaser of an equity of redemption, in the absence of express contract to the contrary, is bound to indemnify his vendor against personal liability for the mortgage debt.

*Waring v. Ward.*

A mortgagee will in some cases be restrained from pursuing his remedies concurrently, *e.g.*, if he has neglected to furnish proper accounts to the mortgagor, or refused a valid tender of moneys due on his security.

When the mortgaged property consists of a railway or canal, the proper remedy of the mortgagee is to obtain the



appointment of a receiver, and he will be restrained from foreclosure or sale.

Where by the mortgage the equity of redemption is subjected to limitations different from those subsisting prior to the mortgage, it will, unless a contrary intention be manifest from the deed, follow the limitations of the original estate. Thus in a mortgage of the wife's estate by the husband and wife, reserving the equity of redemption to the husband and his heirs, the equity nevertheless results to the wife.

*Huntingdon v. Huntingdon.*

In any case, the proviso for redemption should always be strictly followed.

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## CHAPTER XVII.

### EQUITABLE MORTGAGES OF REALTY.

AN equitable mortgage—a mortgage recognised as such in equity only—may be created by a formal mortgage of the equity of redemption, or by a written agreement whereby the property is *charged* or agreed to be made a security for the advance, or by a mere deposit of deeds without any writing.

Nearly all property which can be legally mortgaged can be made the subject of an equitable mortgage by deposit.

Notwithstanding the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, providing that “no action shall be brought upon any contract or sale of lands unless the agreement or some memorandum or note thereof be in writing,” a bare deposit of deeds has been held to constitute an equitable mortgage of real estate, such deposit being of itself evidence of an *agreement executed* for a mortgage.

*Russell v. Russell.*

The statute was construed not to affect mere pledges of deeds to secure borrowed money, for courts of law would not assist a depositor to recover his deeds without payment of what was due, and to this, it is said, the doctrine owes its origin.

*Keys v. Williams.*

With regard to these mortgages by deposit, note :—

- (1.) They carry interest at £4 per cent. and extend to future advances, if such was the original intention.
- (2.) Deposit for purpose of preparing legal mortgage constitutes an interim equitable mortgage.
- (3.) If the deeds deposited are material to the title, it is sufficient, although all such are not deposited. In ease of registration the land certificate must be deposited, just as a certificate of shares.
- (4.) They are not a breach of a covenant against alienation, and in the case of a lease the deposittee is not liable on the covenants, and cannot be made to take a legal assignment.
- (5.) If made by a tenant for life, they affect *his* interest only.
- (6.) They have priority over subsequent *legal* mortgages made with *notice*. And the mere absence of the deeds is generally sufficient to affect the legal mortgagee with notice, unless he has made *bonâ fide* inquiry after them, or can show that he has not been guilty of gross negligence with regard to them. *Hewitt v. Loosemore*.  
If he make *no* inquiry, he will be postponed to the prior equitable mortgagee.
- (7.) If an equitable mortgagee parts with the deeds to the mortgagor, he may be postponed to any subsequent dealings of the mortgagor therewith. *Rice v. Rice ; Keat v. Philips*.
- (8.) If the memorandum of deposit contains a declaration that the mortgagor holds the property in trust for the mortgagee, he will be a trustee within the meaning of the Trustee Act, 1893, s. 12, so that the mortgagee will be able to appoint a new trustee in his place and secure the advantage of the legal estate.

*L. & C. Bank v. Goddard*.

*Remedies of Equitable Mortgagee of Realty.*

The proper remedy is foreclosure and not sale, in whatever way the mortgage is made.

*James v. James ; Backhouse v. Charlton.*

But now under sec. 25 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, a sale may be ordered whether there is an agreement to execute a legal mortgage or not.

*Oldham v. Stringer.*

The court will not appoint a receiver on the application of an equitable mortgagee except for good cause shown.

*Re London Pressed Hinge Co.*

Amongst the numerous objections to equitable mortgages are:—

- (1.) They are subject to all the equities affecting the mortgagor.
- (2.) They are without the benefits afforded by the protection of the legal estate.
- (3.) They cannot be enforced except through the court.
- (4.) They are in various ways liable to be postponed to subsequent incumbrances created without notice.

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## CHAPTER XVIII.

### MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES OF PERSONALTY.

A MORTGAGE of personal property has been defined as a “transfer of the ownership itself, subject to be defeated by the performance of the condition within a certain time.

“A PLEDGE only passes the possession, or at most a special property, to the pledgee, with a right of retainer till the debt is paid or the engagement is fulfilled.”

*(Sm. Man.)*

*A Mortgage differs from a Pledge.*

- (1.) In their nature, as appears from definitions.
- (2.) In respect of remedies.

- (a.) If no time is fixed for payment, the *pledgor* has his whole life to redeem (unless called upon by the pledgee), except in cases to which the Pawnbrokers Act, 1872, applies.
- (b.) *Pledgor's* remedy is generally at law and not in equity.
- (c.) *Pledgee*, after default and upon due notice, may sell without any order for sale, but payment should be demanded before sale.
- (3.) The right of the *pledgee* is not complete without possession.

*A Mortgage of REALTY differs from a Mortgage or Pledge of PERSONALTY.*

- (1.) As regards remedies.
  - (a.) After default, mortgagee or pledgee of personalty can sell upon due notice: he need not foreclose.
  - (b.) Before default, pledgee can sell or sub-pledge a negotiable instrument and thereby bind the pledgor; but in the case of a non-negotiable instrument the pledgor is only bound to the extent of the pledgee's right.
- (2.) As regards tacking.

A more extensive right appears to be enjoyed in mortgages and pledges of personalty than of realty. There is no need to prove any distinct agreement for that purpose.

A mortgagee of personalty may under special circumstances apply the surplus on a sale in satisfaction of a subsequent judgment debt, *e.g.*, in case of mortgagor's bankruptcy under the "mutual credit" clause of the Bankruptcy Act; this being a right of set-off or retention as distinguished from tacking.

- (3.) As regards form.

Mortgages of personal chattels must in all respects conform to the provisions of the Bills of Sale Acts, 1878 and 1882. A pledge is not a bill of sale. And under the provisions of the Factors Act, 1889, and



Sale of Goods Act, 1893, factors and others in possession may pledge goods of which they are not beneficial owners to *bonâ fide* lenders.

It may be noted that a legal mortgage of a ship need not be registered under the Bills of Sale Acts, but must be made, transferred, and discharged in the form prescribed by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and registered by the Registrar of Shipping. The registered mortgagee has an absolute power of sale. An unregistered mortgage is good generally against all persons (including trustee in bankruptcy) other than a subsequent duly registered mortgagee. The Act also provides that equities may be enforced against mortgagees and owners of ships, just as against mortgagees and owners of other personal chattels. Notwithstanding the registered mortgage, the mortgagor still remains legal owner until the mortgagee takes possession, and the mortgagee cannot repudiate his contracts.

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## CHAPTER XIX.

### LIENS.

A LIEN, as a general rule, gives a mere *passive* right of retainer or possession without any *active* right, and is thus distinguishable from a mortgage or pledge.

Liens, by their nature, or by giving rise to matters of account, are often involved in uncertainty, and thus become subjects of equity jurisdiction. They exhibit the following diversities:—

- (1.) On goods either,
  - (a.) Particular, confined to particular charge during retention of possession by vendor.
  - (b.) General, extending to general balance of accounts.
- (2.) On lands, commencing when possession delivered to purchaser. Lien for unpaid purchase-money.
- (3.) Solicitor's lien.

- (a.) Particular, on fund or property recovered for his costs of the suit, which may be *actively* enforced under the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127.
- (b.) General, on deeds and documents other than a will; a passive protection only, a mere equitable right to withhold from his client such things as have been entrusted to him *as a solicitor*, and with reference to which he has expended skill or labour. This lien is commensurate only with the client's right at the time of deposit, and extends merely to costs, and not to general debts. *In re Galland*.

But the lien for costs in any particular matter ranks subject to a set-off between the parties in that matter.

And there is no lien for general costs on a fund placed in a solicitor's hands for a particular purpose.

- (4.) Banker's lien. General, on securities deposited, extending to general balance of account, unless precluded by special contract, but the lien only extends to the securities of the customer and not to those of other persons.

Quasi liens are rights in equity, equivalent to liens, such as legacies charged on land, vendor's lien for advances for improvements, joint-tenant's lien for cost of renewing lease.

- (5.) Company's lien. If articles of association so provide, a company may have a lien on the shares of any member for any debt due from him to the company; and this lien may extend to the secret profits of a director.

Liens exist at law as well as in equity, but it should be noted that liens in equity are wholly independent of the possession of the property, and are enforced by sale by order of court. Liens at common law depend on retention of possession, and any right to sell must be derived from statute. Under the Innkeepers Act, 1878, innkeepers have a power of sale over goods left in their custody after six weeks' possession upon giving due notice in London and local newspapers.

## CHAPTER XX.

## PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.

WHENEVER a penalty or a forfeiture is inserted in an instrument merely to secure the performance of some act, or the enjoyment of some right or benefit, equity regards such performance or enjoyment as the *principal*, and the penalty or forfeiture as a mere *accessory*, and will give relief by ordering compensation in lieu.

*Sloman v. Walter ; Peachy v. Somerset.*

The test as to whether relief will be given depends upon another question—Can compensation be made? If so, relief will be afforded, on payment of principal and interest, or ascertained damages, as the case may be.

On the other hand, a person will not be allowed to avoid his contract by paying the penalty inserted to secure its performance. But where, by the contract, a person has an option to do one of two things, paying higher for one alternative than the other, he may do so. *French v. Macale.*

Relief will be given against a forfeiture where it is in the nature of a penalty, but not where it is in the nature of liquidated damages. As to whether a sum stipulated to be paid on breach of an agreement is a penalty or liquidated damages, the following rules have been laid down:—

- (1.) Smaller sum of money secured by larger—a penalty.
- (2.) Agreement to do several things, and one sum for breach of *any* or *all*, which sum would in some instances be too large, and in others too small—a penalty. *Kemble v. Farren.*
- (3.) Where sum to be paid is proportioned to the extent of the particular breach, or where damages on breach of one or several stipulations cannot be measured—liquidated damages.
- (4.) Where only one event on which sum to be paid and no means of measuring damage—liquidated damages.

(5.) Mere use of either term is not conclusive.

(6.) Equity leans towards construing sum to be a penalty.

In the case of deposits on sales, however, the contract must be carried out or the deposit may be forfeited.

In the case of a mere money bond the obligee cannot issue a specially endorsed writ to recover the penalty.

*Tuther v. Caralampi.*

### *Forfeitures.*

The same general principles apply, except in cases of leases, as to which equity had power to relieve from forfeiture for non-payment of rent, but apparently not for other breaches of covenant, *e.g.*, to repair or insure.

Under the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, equity was empowered to relieve against forfeiture for non-insurance, and now, by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 14, which applies to all leases whenever made, and notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary, relief may be given upon such terms as the court thinks fit, in every case of forfeiture for breach, except—

(a.) Covenant against assigning or underletting.

(b.) Condition of forfeiture on bankruptcy or execution.

(c.) Covenant to permit inspection in a mining lease.

The Conveyancing Act, 1892, extends the benefit of the foregoing section to under-leases, and agreements for leases where the lessee has become entitled to have his lease granted; and relief may be obtained by an under-lessee even if forfeiture be for non-payment of rent. This Act further provides that relief may be given in Case (b.) within one year from the bankruptcy or execution, except in the case of agricultural leases and leases of mines, public-houses, dwelling-houses with use of furniture, and property with respect to which the personal qualifications of the tenant are of importance.

Note, the relief to which under-lessees are entitled under the Act of 1892 is not restricted to cases in which the original lessee could have claimed relief.

*Imray v. Oakshette; Wardens of Cholmeley School v. Sewell.*

When by way of relief an order is made vesting the lease



in the under-lessee he will have to pay the costs of any inquiry which may be necessary. *Ewart v. Fryer.*

No relief is given under the Conveyancing Acts after actual entry by the lessor for forfeiture; nor is any relief afforded by equity against *statutory* penalties or forfeitures.

Where a lease contains an option to purchase which is exercised before the lessor enters for forfeiture, the lessee will be considered a purchaser and the power to forfeit may be gone.

When a lease contains a covenant against assignment without consent, which is not to be unreasonably withheld, the lessor cannot impose conditions. *Young v. Ashley.*

And a lessee may apply to the court for a declaration that consent has been unreasonably withheld.

The Conveyancing Act, 1892 (in the absence of express contract to the contrary), engrafts upon a covenant in a lease against assignment without lessor's consent a proviso that no money is payable for such consent, and if consent is refused except upon payment, the lessee can assign without consent and may apply to the court for a declaration that he is entitled to do so and obtain costs of action.

*West v. Gwynne.*

## CHAPTER XXI.

### MARRIED WOMEN.

AT common law the husband on marriage became entitled to the rent and profits of the wife's realty during their joint lives, and after issue born, during his whole life, if he survived her, as tenant by the curtesy. He also became entitled to the wife's personalty absolutely, subject to the necessity for reducing her choses in action into possession.

The husband is said to have acquired this interest in his wife's property in consideration of the obligation of maintaining her, which he undertook upon the marriage. Although

the rule may have worked no practical wrong so long as this duty was duly performed, yet its injustice became manifest in cases where the husband failed to do so or became bankrupt or otherwise impoverished, so as to leave his wife destitute, no matter how extensive a fortune he might have derived from her. As a result, equity began to recognise a right in a married woman to enjoy property apart from her husband, notwithstanding the common law doctrine that she was unable so to do, her very existence being deemed merged by the marriage in that of the husband.

### FIRSTLY, OF THE WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE.

#### I. THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE ESTATE APART FROM LEGISLATION.

The wife's separate estate may exist in property of every kind, and arises principally by—

- (1.) Ante-nuptial agreement.
- (2.) *Special* post-nuptial agreement, or on desertion, or by virtue of a separation deed.
- (3.) Absolute gift to wife's *separate use* by husband.
- (4.) Absolute gift to wife by stranger.
- (5.) Wife's separate trading.
- (6.) Express limitation to separate use.

It was usual to interpose trustees, in whom the legal property was vested; indeed, such trustees were formerly considered indispensable; but this has now long been settled not to be so. In the absence of trustees, the husband, in whom the legal estate vests, will be deemed a trustee for the wife.

No particular form of words is necessary to create a separate use, so long as an absolute intention appears to exclude the husband's marital right. The words most usually adopted are "for her sole and separate use," or "for her separate use," only.

*Married Woman's Power of Disposition over Separate Estate,*  
IRRESPECTIVE OF LEGISLATION.

It has been laid down that a "*feme covert* acting with respect to her separate property is competent to act in all respects as if she were a *feme sole*."

*Peacock v. Monk ; Hulme v. Tenant.*

- 1.) As to personalty. She may dispose of it, whether in possession or in reversion, in the same manner in every respect as if she were a *feme sole*.

*Fettiplace v. Gorges.*

- (2.) As to realty.

(a.) Life estates. She has the same power of disposition as if she were a *feme sole*.

(b.) Fee-simple or fee-tail estates. She cannot dispose of the *legal estate* without the concurrence of her husband and a duly acknowledged deed ; but it has now been settled that she may dispose of the *equitable estate* either by will or instrument *inter vivos*, without the concurrence of her husband and without acknowledgment, *Taylor v. Meads ; Pride v. Bubb.* and whether trustees are interposed or not,

*Hall v. Waterhouse.*

which disposition will bar the husband's right to curtesy.

*Cooper v. Macdonald.*

- (3.) As to all separate estate.

(a.) It is liable for her breaches of trust (where she is an "actual actor"), unless subject to a restraint against alienation.

(b.) The savings of income are also separate estate, and she has the same power of disposition over them as over the capital. *Gore v. Knight.*

(c.) The income which she permits her husband to receive cannot, as a rule, be recalled ; and even where she is entitled to an account, it is for one year only.

(d.) Upon her death without having exercised her power of disposition the separate use drops off, and the property (whether separate property by express

limitation or by virtue of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882) devolves as at Common Law; that is to say,

- |  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| <p>1. If personalty, goes to the husband<br/> <i>Jure mariti</i>, as to personal chattels and chattels real.<br/> <i>As administrator</i>, as to choses in action.<br/> <i>Proudly v. Fielder</i>.</p> | } | <p>Subject to wife's debts where her separate estate would be liable if wife living.</p> |
| <p>2. If realty, goes to the wife's heir; subject to the husband's right to curtesy.</p>   |   |  |

Note, the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, has not altered the devolution of the undisposed-of estate of a married woman, and the right of her husband accrues just as if separate use had never existed. *In re Lambert's Estate*.

Nor has that Act rendered it necessary for husband to take out administration in respect of wife's chattels in possession. *Surman v. Wharton*.

Nor apparently in the case of chattels real; but the purchaser should see that estate and succession duties have been paid although no letters of administration have been taken out.

Property subject to a general power of appointment of a married woman *actually exercised* by her in favour of volunteers was formerly held *not* to be assets for payment of her debts, the rule being directly the reverse of that existing in the case of a man; the reason being the distinction which existed between separate estate and powers of appointment, the latter having been always recognised at common law.

But now under the Married Women's Property Acts, the appointed property is made assets for payment of a married woman's debts, wherever her separate estate would be assets;

*Wilson v. Ann*.

whether the debts were contracted before or after the Act came into operation.



If, however, the power has *not been exercised*, the debts and engagements of a married woman cannot prevail against the parties entitled in default of appointment.

*Contracts of a Married Woman.*

Formerly a married woman could not *contract* so as to bind her separate estate. This disability has been removed by slow degrees. Thus her separate estate was held bound by—

- (1.) Instruments under seal. *Hulme v. Tenant.*
- (2.) Bills or notes. *Murray v. Barlee.*
- (3.) Ordinary written agreements. *Pickard v. Hine.*
- (4.) Ordinary simple contracts even by *parol*, where it is clear that the married woman is contracting, not for her husband, but for herself.

*Matthewman's Case; Johnson v. Gallagher;  
Vaughan v. Vanderstegen.*

This last result was attained only after a prolonged struggle. The distinction drawn between written and verbal contracts is said to have arisen from viewing the engagements of a married woman as operating either as the execution of a *power* which could not be effected by *parol*, or by way of *charge* or disposition, which must be in writing. As soon as it was clear that such engagements operated by way of contract and not of disposition, all reason for the distinction vanished.

With regard to the liability of a married woman's separate estate for her *general* engagements or contracts, note—

- (1.) Such engagements only bound separate estate belonging to her at date of entering into them.  
*Pike v. Fitzgibbon; Barber v. Gregson.*
- (2.) They only bound separate estate not subject to restraint on alienation, and which so remained at date of judgment.
- (3.) The court has no power to restrain a married woman

from disposing of her separate estate between dates of contract and judgment. *Robinson v. Pickering.*

(4.) No *personal* judgment was made against a married woman, and she could not therefore be made bankrupt in respect of her separate estate. *Re Heneage.*

(5.) Such engagements bound the *corpus* of her separate personalty, but only the rents and profits of her separate realty. *Hulme v. Tenant.*

But this restriction in respect of her realty no longer exists, the execution extending to all separate estate which the married woman is not effectually restrained from alienating.

A claim against a married woman possessed of separate estate is capable of being barred by the Statute of Limitations. *Hallet v. Hastings.*

#### *Restraint on Anticipation.*

In order to protect a married woman's separate estate against the undue influence of her husband or others, Equity allowed her to be restrained from anticipating or alienating it. *Pybus v. Smith.*

Such a restraint is invalid in the case of a man, being void for repugnancy; *Brandon v. Robinson.*

but is allowed to a married woman, since it is consistent with, and in furtherance of, the very object of a separate estate, and it may be attached to the income only or to the absolute interest. Apparently the restraint against alienation is within the Perpetuity Rule.

With regard to this restraint on alienation, note—

- (1.) It gives the married woman the present enjoyment of an *inalienable estate* independent of her husband.
- (2.) Separate estate, whether with or without restraint, exists only *during coverture*.
- (3.) It depends on, and is a modification of, separate estate, and has *no independent existence*.

Property not vested in a married woman for her separate use cannot be restrained from anticipation.

*Stogden v. Lee.*

But property which is constituted separate property by the Act of 1882 will support a restraint. *Re Lumley.*

- (4.) It is inoperative or *disattaches* during discoverture, but *reattaches* on every subsequent marriage if apt words are used. *Tullet v. Armstrong.*

It is not rendered inoperative by a protection order or decree for judicial separation. *Hill v. Cooper.*

It does not disattach by the termination of the coverture so as to benefit a creditor whose debt was contracted during coverture. *Brown v. Dimbledy.*

- (5.) No particular form of words is necessary, provided the intention be clear. Thus the words "not to be sold or mortgaged" have been held to be sufficient;

*Field v. Evans.*  
but a right to receive "with her own hands from time to time," and her receipts alone, "for what should be actually paid to be good discharges," not so.

*Parkes v. Whyte.*

- (6.) When discovert, a woman may so deal with her estate as to absolutely determine the trust for her separate use, and thus acquire it unfettered, by selling it and receiving the purchase-money. *Wright v. Wright.*

And now, upon her re-marriage, she holds the property in respect of which she has determined the restraint as her separate property under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882.

- (7.) Equity had no power to dispense with the restraint, even for the benefit of the married woman;

*Robinson v. Wheelwright.*  
but the restraint did not prevent her barring an estate tail. *Cooper v. Macdonald.*

When the fund to which a married woman is entitled for her separate use without power of anticipation is *in court*, it may be paid out to her during coverture if such restraint is not a continuing one, but otherwise only the income will be paid to her, whether the fund is an income-bearing one or not.

And now, by the CONVEYANCING ACT, 1911, s. 7 (replacing s. 39 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881), the court *may*, where it

appears to be for the *benefit* of a married woman, with her consent, make a judgment or order binding her separate property (even interests derived under her own marriage settlement) and notwithstanding she is *restrained from anticipation*.

The Act does not give the court a *general* power of removing the restraint, but only a power to remove the fetter in respect of a particular disposition.

*Re Warren's Settlement.*

The court will not exercise this power unless satisfied that to do so will be for the benefit of the married woman *herself*; it will not consider her husband or children.

If harassed by her creditors, the court may remove the restraint on the request of a married woman, so as to enable her to pay her debts, but not, in general, where such debts have been incurred by extravagance; and the court will not remove the restraint where, by so doing, there is a risk of the life-interest being forfeited.

The consent required by the Act need not be given by an acknowledged deed.

The doctrine of estoppel does not apply so as to enable a married woman to deprive herself of income of property subject to restraint.

*. Bateman v. Fuber.*

Independently of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the court has no jurisdiction to charge the costs of an action improperly instituted by a married woman upon the future income which she is restrained from anticipating.

*Ellis v. Johnston.*

But under the Married Women's Property Act, 1893, the court may order the costs of litigation instituted or initiated by a married woman to be paid out of her separate estate which she is restrained from alienating.

And by the Trustee Act, 1893, her separate estate, although subject to restraint, may be impounded to make good losses arising from a breach of trust committed by the trustee at her instigation or request or with her written consent; but the court will not readily lift off the restraint for such a purpose.



## II. LEGISLATIVE

## EXTENSIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE ESTATE.

*First, The Divorce Acts.*

By the Divorce Act, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85 (now styled "The Matrimonial Causes Act," 1857, amended by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108), a wife *judicially separated* is deemed a *feme sole* as regards her property acquired *subsequently* to the separation, and for purposes of contracts, torts, suing and being sued; and in case of subsequent cohabitation she will hold her property to her separate use. Further, a wife *deserted* by her husband may obtain a *protection* order, whereby her earnings and subsequently acquired property would in effect belong to her for her separate use. But a restraint on anticipation annexed to separate estate, to which a married woman is entitled before the protection order or judicial separation, still attaches although a protection order or judicial separation has been obtained. *Hill v. Cooper*; *Brandon v. Hughes*.

By the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, a *judicial separation* may in effect be decreed by order of magistrates where the husband is convicted of an aggravated assault upon the wife, or of persistent cruelty to her, or of wilful neglect to maintain her, and the order may provide for a weekly allowance to be paid by the husband to the wife, after proof of means has been given.

The effect of an actual divorce is to make the wife a *feme sole* as to all her unsettled property.

In Equity, independently of these statutes, a deserted married woman is deemed to hold her subsequently acquired property for her separate use.

*Second, The Married Women's Property Acts, 1870 and 1874, now  
REPEALED.*

By the Act of 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 93), which came into force on August 9, 1870, in effect—

(1.) Wages and earnings of any married woman trading

separately from her husband, *acquired after* the Act, were made her separate property.

- (2.) In the case of a woman *married after* the Act, personalty to whatever extent, and rents and profits of realty devolving upon her *ab intestato*, and any sums not exceeding £200 coming to her under a *deed or will*, were made her separate property.

As to such real estate, she could not dispose of it except by deed acknowledged. *Johnson v. Johnson.*

- (3.) The husband of a woman *married after* the Act was exempted from all liability for her *ante-nuptial debts*, and she was made exclusively liable therefor to the extent of her separate property.

Prior to this enactment, a man by marriage rendered himself liable for all his wife's ante-nuptial debts, a liability, however, which ceased on the wife's death, unless he took out administration to his wife's choses in action. *Heard v. Stamford.*

A married woman is personally liable at common law for her ante-nuptial debts, and this liability is not affected by the Married Women's Property Acts.

*Robinson v. Lynes.*

By the Act of 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 50) this provision was repealed so far as any woman *married after* July 30, 1874, was concerned, and it was provided that the husband and wife might be sued *jointly* for any such debts, but that the husband should only be liable therefor (or for his wife's ante-nuptial torts) to the extent of any property of the wife in which he had acquired an interest by the marriage.

*Third, The Married Women's Property Acts, 1882, 1884, 1893, and 1907.*

The Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75), came into force on January 1, 1883, and repealed the Acts of 1870 and 1874, without prejudice, however, to any acts, rights, and liabilities done, acquired, or incurred thereunder.

## Under this Act—

- (1.) *All* property whatsoever, whether real or personal, including the wages and earnings of any separate employment, belong to a married woman as her separate property, provided, in the case of a woman married—
- (a.) On or after January 1, 1883, it belongs to her at time of marriage or comes to her afterwards.
- (b.) Before January 1, 1883, her *title* to it accrues *after* that date.

The title which accrues under exercise of a power is deemed to accrue from the date of the operation of the appointment.

- (2.) Deposits, Consols, Government annuities, stocks, shares, debentures, &c., in the sole name of a married woman, or her name jointly with that of any other person than her husband, are to be deemed her separate property in the absence of proof to the contrary, and any liability in respect thereof, will be incident to her separate estate only. Investments made in fraud of the husband or his creditors will be deemed to remain *his* property.

Formerly investments of *capital*, the separate estate of a married woman, did not always remain her separate property ; *Wright v. Wright.*  
but under this section they will always be so.

- (3.) Under sec. 1 a married woman may hold and dispose of her separate property without the intervention of trustees, and in respect and to the extent thereof is capable of contracting and of suing and being sued, either in contract or tort, or otherwise, as if she were a *feme sole*, and without her husband being made a party to any proceedings by or against her. And by the Act of 1893, her contracts (otherwise than those entered into as agent) are rendered binding on all separate property belonging to her either at the time of contracting or subsequently (whether she has any at the date of the contract or not), and also on all property she is for the time being entitled to, both during coverture and subsequent widowhood.
- (a.) A married woman is now able to convey even the



legal estate of her separate real estate without the concurrence of her husband and without an acknowledged deed. *Riddle v. Erington.*

- (b.) The Acts of 1882 and 1893 expressly provide that nothing therein contained shall interfere with or render inoperative any restraints on alienation. The separate property of a married woman which is subject to restraint is therefore placed beyond the reach of her creditors, *except* with her consent and for her benefit, by an order of court under the Conveyancing Act, 1911, s. 7 (replacing s. 39 of the Act of 1881).

But under the Married Women's Property Act, 1893, when a married woman institutes proceedings or *initiates* litigation, the court may order payment of the costs of the opposite party out of her separate property, subject to restraint.

The income of separate estate is protected only so long as it remains subject to restraint, and the restraint is gone immediately an instalment of income becomes payable; so income actually accrued due at or before the date of the judgment, which has not been in fact paid over, is free from restraint and is liable to be taken in execution.

*Hood Barrs v. Heriott.*

But judgment cannot be enforced against income accrued due after judgment.

*In re Lumley; Whitely v. Edwards.*

Even if the coverture has ceased when the judgment is obtained on a contract made during coverture.

*Brown v. Dimbleby.*

- (c.) A married woman is, for the future, rendered liable upon all her contracts to the extent of her separate property, contracting a proprietary liability.

*Pelton v. Harrison; Scott v. Morley.*

Under the Act of 1882, in order that her contracts might bind separate property acquired subsequently to the contract, it was absolutely necessary for her to have *some* separate property at the



time with reference to which she might be reasonably deemed to contract, and the *onus* of proving this was on the plaintiff.

*Deakin v. Lakin*; *Palliser v. Gurney*;  
*Leek v. Driffild*.

And now, as has been noted, the Act of 1893 enables the creditor of a married woman to obtain payment out of any property (not subject to restraint) she may possess at time of execution.

But the debt must be created after the Act, and a mere acknowledgment by a married woman after the Act of a pre-existing liability is insufficient.

*Hankinson v. Hayter*.

And property subject to restraint at the time of contract cannot be made available even after the coverture has ceased.

*Softlaw v. Welch*; *Barnett v. Howard*.

A married woman may enter into a contract with her husband.

*Butler v. Butler*.

- (d.) The husband remains liable for the torts of his wife committed during coverture;

*Seroka v. Kattenberg*; *Earle v. Kingscote*.

but is not liable to be sued by her for a defamatory libel.

*Reg. v. Lord Mayor of London*.

- (e.) As regards the will of a married woman, the Act of 1882 applied only to property acquired during the coverture, and so property acquired after or in consequence of the husband's death did not pass under her will executed during his lifetime.

*In re Price*.

This is no longer so, as the Act of 1893 provides that the will of a married woman made during coverture is to be construed with reference to the property (*i.e.*, separate property) comprised in it as speaking from death of testatrix.

- (f.) These Acts do not enable a married woman to dispose of property by will in cases where she is prohibited by *statute* from so doing;

*Clements v. Ward*.

nor of property which is not separate property ; and if she attempts to deal by will therewith and probate is granted, the executor is merely a trustee for the husband ; *Smart v. Tranter.*

unless he has assented, but the mere fact that probate has been granted to him in general form is not sufficient evidence of assent. *Re Atkinson.*

- (g.) Final judgment on default or under R.S.C. Ord. xiv. may now be signed against a married woman, but execution can only issue against separate property, and after judgment a receiver can be appointed of her separate property which is not subject to restraint on alienation.

*Perks v. Mylrea ; Gunston v. Maynard ;*

*Robinson v. Lynes.*

- (h.) It will be observed the rule laid down in *Pike v. Fitzgibbon* as to non-liability of after-acquired property (*ante*, p. 149) is now reversed in respect of contracts entered into subsequently to the Act.

*Turnbull v. Forman.*

- (4.) A married woman cannot be made bankrupt unless she is trading separately from her husband.

*Ex parte Coulson.*

But she need not possess separate property in order to be liable to bankruptcy.

*Re Simon*, overruling *Re Helsby*.

And the mere fact that the husband manages the business does not prevent her being a married woman trading separately if the business belongs exclusively to her.

Although so trading, a bankruptcy notice cannot be issued against her. *Re Lynes.*

Even if she trade under the name of a firm.

*Re Handford.*

But she may be made bankrupt after she has ceased to so trade in respect of debts incurred whilst trading.

*Re Dagnall.*

A spinster trader against whom a bankruptcy petition

has been presented cannot be made bankrupt if she marry before the hearing.

A general power of appointment vested in her will not pass to her trustee in bankruptcy, as it is not deemed included under the term "separate property," nor can she be ordered to exercise such a power in favour of the trustee under sec. 44 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883.

*Re Armstrong.*

But property settled to her separate use without restraint on alienation passes to the trustee in bankruptcy.

*Re Onslow*

And property subject to restraint at the time of the bankruptcy will, if the coverture determine during the continuance of the bankruptcy, pass to the trustee free from the restraint.

*Briggs v. Ryan.*

A committal order under the Debtors Act, 1869, cannot be made against a married woman, even after proof of means, as a judgment against her is not a personal one, but only a charge on her separate estate,

*Draycott v. Harrison.*

although she may be carrying on a trade separate from her husband;

*Scott v. Morley; Down v. Fletcher.*

except as to debts, enforceable by committal under specific statutes, such as rates,

*Re Allen.*

or ante-nuptial debts.

*Robinson v. Lynes.*

But a married woman trustee may be attached for non-payment into court of trust money in her possession.

*Turnbull v. Nicholas.*

If a married woman lend money to her husband for the purpose of his business, and he becomes bankrupt, although entitled to prove, she will be postponed to all his other creditors for value.

And the same rule applies if the husband die insolvent and his estate is being administered in Chancery.

*Tain v. Emmerson.*

But this rule has no application to a loan made by the wife to a firm in which her husband is a partner, or to the husband for other purposes than his business, or to money paid by her as surety for her husband,

- (5.) A married woman may be an executrix, administratrix, or trustee without the consent or concurrence of her husband, and in that capacity sue or be sued and transfer property; and will be alone liable for her breaches of trust and devastavits, unless her husband has intermeddled.

The husband, therefore, need not be a party to the administration bond where his wife is administratrix.

*Re Ayres.*

Formerly a married woman trustee could not convey real estate by an unacknowledged deed;

*Re Harkness and Alsop.*

unless she was a bare trustee, in which case she could convey freeholds and copyholds, but not leaseholds.

*Trustee Act, 1893, s. 16; Re Docwra.*

The expression "bare trustee" appears to mean a trustee having no other duty than to convey the trust estate to or by the direction of the *cestui que trust*.

*Christie v. Ovington; Morgan v. Swansea; Re Docwra.*

A married woman mortgagee of real estate could (as a bare trustee), by an unacknowledged deed and without the concurrence of her husband, convey the legal estate in the mortgaged property to a purchaser from the mortgagor,

*Re Brooke v. Fremlin.*

or reconvey the legal estate on the mortgage being paid off;

*Re Howgate v. Osborn.*

except as to leaseholds vested in her as mortgagee when she is trustee of the mortgage money,

and when a mortgage of realty to a married woman has been transferred by an unacknowledged deed, and there is nothing on the face of the title to show she was a trustee, a purchaser is not entitled to inquire whether such was the case.

*Re West & Hardy.*

And now, by the Married Women's Property Act, 1907, an acknowledged deed is no longer necessary for the conveyance of a married woman's trust real or personal estate, and this alteration in the law is retrospective:

- (6.) A woman married after 1882 is liable for her ante-nuptial



debts, contracts, and torts; and the law as to the liability of the husband for his wife's ante-nuptial debts is entirely altered.

- (a.) He can now be sued without her, whether she be living or dead.
- (b.) He can be sued with her, if the plaintiff seeks to establish his claim in whole or in part against both husband and wife.
- (c.) His liability is no longer unlimited as at common law; it is limited to the value of the wife's property which he may have acquired.
- (d.) As between him and her, he is entitled to be indemnified out of her separate property.

*Beck v. Pierce.*

- (7.) A married woman has the same remedies, civil or criminal, for the protection of her separate property as if she were a *feme sole*, in enforcing which husbands and wives are competent witnesses against each other. But no *criminal* proceedings can be taken by husband or wife against the other except when living apart, nor even then, in respect of any act done whilst living together, unless done at the time of desertion.

And in any such criminal proceedings the Act of 1884 enacts that the husband and wife shall be competent and admissible witnesses, and, except where defendant, compellable to give evidence.

- (8.) A married woman, to the extent of her separate property, is liable for the maintenance of her pauper husband, and (concurrently with her husband) for her children and grandchildren. And now by the Married Women's Property Act, 1908, she is made as liable for the maintenance of her parents as a *feme sole*.
- (9.) A policy of assurance may be effected by either husband or wife on the life of the husband for the separate use of the wife, or so as to create a trust for wife and children, and for any such insurance a pecuniary interest in the life assured need not be shown. The wife may also insure her own life for the same purpose.

If fraudulent against creditors, the policy will be so far void.

Under a policy effected for the benefit of wife and children, they take as joint-tenants; and a second wife may or may not take thereunder according to the terms of the policy, but all the children would take.

If no trustee be appointed either by the policy itself or otherwise the legal personal representative of the assured is made the trustee, or the court may appoint a trustee.

- (10.) Existing and future settlements made before or after marriage, and the operation of restraints upon alienations, are not in any way affected by these Acts, and must be construed as if they had not been passed.

So that an infant married woman cannot on attaining twenty-one repudiate the settlement she made on marriage of property which but for the Act of 1882 would upon the marriage have become the property of her husband.

*Stevens v. Trevor-Garrick.*

But now under the Married Women's Property Act, 1907, a settlement by the husband subsequent to that Act respecting property of the wife is invalid unless executed by her if of full age, or confirmed by her after attaining full age; and if she die under age, any covenant by the husband in the settlement will bind any property of the wife to which he becomes entitled on her death.

But no restraint against alienation imposed by a woman *upon herself* is valid against her ante-nuptial debts; and settlements that would be fraudulent against creditors if made by a man will be equally fraudulent against her creditors. A restraint imposed by the husband or a third person is of course unaffected.

- (11.) A married woman becomes "discover" within the meaning of the Statute of Limitations (21 Jac. I. c. 16) at the date of the commencement of the Act.

*Lowe v. Fox.*

- (12.) Upon the death of his wife the husband's right to curtesy remains as before the Act; *Hope v. Hope.*

but her creditors may have her separate estate administered by the court. *Surman v. Wharton.*

## SECONDLY, PIN-MONEY AND PARAPHERNALIA.

### I. Pin-money.

Pin-money has been defined as a yearly allowance settled upon the wife *before marriage* for the purchase of clothes or ornaments, or otherwise for her separate personal expenditure suitable to her husband's rank.

It presents the following peculiarities, to explain which the object for which it is given must be remembered. The wife can claim—

- (1.) Only *one year's* arrears on her husband's death.
- (2.) *All* arrears where it appears that she has complained and all has been promised.
- (3.) *No* arrears where the husband has paid for all her apparel and private expenses.
- (4.) Her *executors* can claim *no* arrears.

### II. Paraphernalia.

The wife's paraphernalia (*παραφερνή*), things to which she is entitled over and above (*παρα*) her dower (*φέρνή*), consist of apparel and ornaments suitable to her rank and condition, given to her as ornaments of her person; but such gifts may be made by the husband to the wife absolutely and for her separate use. With regard to paraphernalia, note—

- (1.) Jewels and trinkets (except old family jewels) given to wife by husband are generally considered as paraphernalia.
- (2.) Gifts to the wife by a relation or friend, before or after marriage, will be considered gifts to her separate use.
- (3.) Wife cannot dispose of it during husband's lifetime; but husband may do so by act *inter vivos*, although not by will.
- (4.) It is subject to the husband's debts, but assets will be marshalled in the widow's favour so as to rank her claim next to creditors.



- (5.) Where husband pledges it, the wife can have it redeemed out of his personal estate.
- (6.) The Married Women's Property Acts have not abolished paraphernalia. *Tasker v. Tasker.*

### THIRDLY, THE WIFE'S EQUITY TO A SETTLEMENT AND HER RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP.

By marriage the husband becomes (apart from the Married Women's Property Acts) *prima facie* entitled to all his wife's personal property not being separate property. Where, however, being unable to recover at law, the husband was compelled to resort to equity in order to retain the property, equity would only lend its aid and allow him to receive it, subject to his making a fair settlement on the wife out of it; that is to say, subject to the wife's *equity to a settlement*, unless indeed she had waived it or was otherwise debarred.

This equity to a settlement does *not* depend upon any right of property in the wife, for the amount is in the discretion of the court, and can only be claimed for herself *and* children. It arises from the maxim, "He who seeks equity must do equity"; the court refusing its aid to the plaintiff husband till he has made proper provision for his wife.

The right of the wife, which was originally against the husband only, was extended to his trustee in bankruptcy and to purchasers from him for valuable consideration. Finally, it was established that the wife may actively assert her right as *plaintiff*. *Elibank v. Montolieu.*

The wife's right was only recognised, as a general rule, in respect of property of an *equitable* nature, to the entirety of which the wife would *not* have been entitled by *survivorship*, AND which there was a possibility of the husband obtaining *wholly* for himself. Thus in respect of—

- (I.) Leaseholds—wife had an equity out of her *equitable*, but not, as a rule, out of *legal* interest therein.
- (II.) Pure personalty—of a *legal* nature, wife had *no* equity, but where of an *equitable* nature, if



- (1.) An *absolute* interest, wife had an equity which, as has been stated, prevailed against purchasers from her husband.
- (2.) A mere *life interest*, the wife had no equity as a general rule, for no provision in such a case could be made for her children; that is to say,
  - (a.) While husband properly maintained his wife, she had no equity;
  - (b.) On his failure so to do, her equity arose.
  - (c.) Purchaser not bound to inquire as to maintenance, and wife had no equity against a purchaser without notice *previous* to husband's desertion or bankruptcy.
  - (d.) Wife had an equity against trustee in bankruptcy, for such trustee had notice *ex hypothesi* that husband was incapable of maintaining wife.
  - (e.) No equity arose in respect of arrears of income.

(III.) Realty.

- (1.) Of *inheritance*—whether of a legal or an equitable nature—wife had *no* equity, because she had something better, namely, the estate itself, the equity attaching on what the husband takes in right of the wife, not what the wife takes in her own right.

*Life Association of Scotland v. Siddall.*

- (2.) *Life estate*, wife had an equity—if of an equitable nature, but *not* if legal. *Sturgis v. Champneys.*

The equity of the wife might be defeated by alienation in the following manner:—

- (I.) As to realty—married woman might validly alienate by means of a duly acknowledged deed, with the concurrence of her husband, whatever its nature;

3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106.

*Tuer v. Turner; Briggs v. Chamberlain.*

but not a mere *spes successionis*. *Allcard v. Walker.*

- (II.) As to personalty—if in *possession*, husband might dispose thereof; but if in *reversion*, the power of disposition

(except so far as Malins' Act, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57, applied) was in abeyance, and the court had no power to assist such a disposition. The wife's choses in action belonged to the husband or his assignee, if, and only if, he reduced them into possession. Thus—

The wife, if she survived her husband, became entitled, by *right of survivorship*, to all her equitable REVERSIONARY interests in PERSONALTY which the husband had not reduced into possession, and no disposition thereof made by husband or wife, or both, was of any avail to defeat this right.

*Purdew v. Jackson; Whittle v. Henning.*

The wife's equity to a settlement and her RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP are two entirely different things. The former had no application where the fund was *reversionary*, but arose only when the fund was ready for *reduction into possession* and might be waived by the wife; but the latter the wife could not by any means during coverture deprive herself of except so far as Malins' Act would enable her to do so. The wife had no equity to a settlement of *reversionary* interests whilst they continued reversionary; her equity being in fact a right attached not upon the property, but upon the right to receive it. The right existing in respect of reversionary interests was a right of *survivorship*, and not to an equity.

The possible effects, therefore, of an assignment by the husband of the wife's reversionary interest were—

- (1.) If husband died before wife and before reversionary interest fell in, purchaser took nothing.
- (2.) If it fell in during their joint lives, purchaser took it subject to wife's equity.
- (3.) If wife died before husband, and then it fell in, purchaser took it absolutely.

The question of what amounted to a reduction into possession depended on the circumstances of each case, but a mere assignment was not sufficient;

*Hornsby v. Lee.*

nor transfer by husband of title-deeds where his wife was equitable mortgagee; but an order of court to pay wife's income to a receiver has been held to be sufficient.

*Tidd v. Lister.*

By Malins' Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. 57), however, it was provided that a married woman might, by acknowledged deed, dispose of her reversionary interests in personalty, but the Act did not apply to interests acquired under her marriage settlement or property subject to restraint on alienation.

The settlement to which a wife's equity extended must have been made on wife *and* children, notwithstanding the right of the wife to waive it and thus deprive her children. Equity recognised no original right in the children to claim any settlement. Note, therefore—

- (1.) During her life, wife (unless an infant) might waive her right at any time before the settlement was complete. After completion children's right was established.
- (2.) After wife's death, if she died—
 

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a.) Before asserting her equity by action,</li> <li>(b.) After action brought, but before judgment,</li> <li>(c.) After judgment, children's right established.</li> <li>(d.) Apart from the judicial proceedings, if the husband was bound by contract, children's right could be enforced.</li> </ol>	}	Children had no right.
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The wife's equity might be defeated involuntarily, as well as voluntarily waived by her, viz.:

- (1.) By receipt of fund by husband or his assignees.
 

*Murray v. Elibank.*
- (2.) Where wife's ante-nuptial debts exceeded the fund.
- (3.) Where adequate settlement already made on wife.
- (4.) By wife living in adultery apart from husband, unless he also was doing so.
- (5.) By wife's fraudulent suppression of her coverture.

As to the amount of settlement, the general rule was for one *half* to be settled on wife and children; but where fund was very small, or the husband had deserted his wife and



was not maintaining her, the *whole* of it was settled. Where, however, the husband was solvent and maintaining the wife, the court would only settle the fund so as to give the wife a chance of taking it by survivorship. In framing a settlement, the court directed the ultimate limitations, in default of issue, to be to the husband absolutely, whether he survived his wife or not.

With regard to the validity of settlements made in consideration of the wife's equity, note—

- (1.) A settlement made by husband *after reduction* of property into possession must conform to 13 Eliz. c. 5. As to the effect of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, *vide ante*, pp. 21, 22.
- (2.) A settlement ordered by the court will be supported as based on valuable consideration.
- (3.) A settlement made by husband of wife's property which trustees otherwise refuse to part with, is also good.

Having regard to the Married Women's Property Acts, the whole of this section dealing with a wife's equity to a settlement and her right of survivorship must be understood as having no application when the marriage has taken place or the property has been acquired *since* 1882.

Practically, therefore, the wife's equity to a settlement is now OBSOLETE, or rapidly becoming so; for it is clear that the equity attaches upon what the husband takes in right of the wife, and not upon what the wife takes in her own right; and only those interests of a married woman falling into possession on or after January 1, 1883, and her *title* to which accrued *before* that date, are excluded from its operation. A reversionary interest which became vested in a married woman before, although falling into possession after, the Act, does not belong to her as separate property under the Act.

*Reid v. Reid.*

#### FOURTHLY, SETTLEMENTS IN DEROGATION OF MARITAL RIGHTS.

The former rule being that a husband upon marriage became thereby entitled to her property, any acts done by her



secretly or in fraud of these marital rights, so as to disappoint the just expectations of her husband, were deemed null and void. *Strathmore v. Bowes.*

The following points were established: Alienations or settlements made by a woman in the course of a treaty for marriage were deemed fraudulent and void against the husband—

- (1.) If made without his knowledge of property to which she had represented herself to him as entitled.
- (2.) If made without his knowledge, although he did not know her to be possessed of the property aliened.
- (3.) If made secretly, although meritorious.
- (4.) If, and only if, made during treaty of marriage WITH HIM.
- (5.) If, and only if, he had no notice thereof before marriage.

They were, however, not void—

- (1.) When made in favour of a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice.
- (2.) Where the husband had seduced the wife before marriage.

This branch of the law has been rendered OBSOLETE by the operation of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, under which it appears that no alienations made by a woman during a treaty of marriage can be in derogation of marital rights, such rights having been practically abolished by the Act.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### INFANTS.

#### *Guardians.*

- (1.) NATURAL guardian. The father is the natural guardian of his infant children; but the mother is the natural guardian of her illegitimate infant child.

By the Custody of Infants Act, 1873 (36 Vict.

c. 12), the court may, on her application, grant to the *mother* the custody of her infant children until they attain the age of sixteen, where that is for the *benefit of the infants*.

This Act extended the operation of Talfourd's Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. 54), which only empowered the court to give the mother the custody of infants under seven.

By the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886 (49 & 50 Vict. c. 27), the *mother* if she survive is constituted the guardian of her infant children, either alone or jointly with any guardian appointed by the father.

- (2.) Testamentary guardian. By 12 Car. II. c. 24, the father may by deed or will appoint a guardian for his infant unmarried children. But not by will if he is himself a minor, for under the Wills Act (1 Vict. c. 26) the will of a minor is void. And by the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, the *mother* may by deed or will appoint a guardian of her infant unmarried children to act after the death of herself and the father, either alone or jointly with any guardian appointed by the father.

The father may delegate the power of appointing guardians after his death to another person.

*Re Parnell.*

- (3.) Guardian appointed by stranger standing *in loco parentis* cannot be set aside by the father, who has thus waived his own natural rights.
- (4.) Guardian appointed by the court. The protection of infants belonged to the Crown as *parens patriæ*. This prerogative was delegated to the Court of Chancery, and the jurisdiction is exercised in Chancery as a branch of its general jurisdiction. *Eyre v. Shaftesbury.*

By the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 34, the wardship of infants and the care of infants' estates are assigned to the Chancery Division exclusively.

And under the Matrimonial Causes Acts the Divorce Division may make an order as to the *maintenance* of children during the whole period of

minority, but as to *custody* only up to age of fourteen for males and sixteen for females, except with the consent of the minor.

*Thomasset v. Thomasset* ; *Mozley Stark v. Mozley Stark*.

An infant who is under a guardian appointed by the court is a *ward of court*, and the guardian is considered to be an officer of the court. The commencement of an action in the court relative to an infant's person or estate, or the making an order for maintenance on summons at chambers, or under the 36 Vict. c. 12, constitutes the infant (unless an alien) a ward of court. But an infant is never constituted a ward of court unless possessed of *some property*.

*Wellesley v. Beaufort*.

The court may appoint a guardian, even if the child be resident abroad, and has no property here.

*In re Willoughby*.

The court exercises jurisdiction over all guardians, and will even remove a father from being guardian where there is any serious and proximate danger to the infants arising from his guardianship, *e.g.*, where he is insolvent or neglecting their education, upon the principle that prevention of injustice is better than punishment. *Wellesley v. Wellesley*.

A divorced father may be declared unfit to continue the guardian of his children.

*Skinner v. Skinner*.

And under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, any Division of the High Court may, if satisfied that it will be for the welfare of the infant, remove any guardian and appoint another in his place.

And now, under the Custody of Children Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 3), the court has power to refuse to order the delivery up of a child even to its parent, if satisfied that the parent has deserted the child or is otherwise an unsuitable guardian.

And by the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1904, and the Children's Act, 1908, even when an infant has no property the court can give protection.

These statutes do not affect the ancient equity jurisdiction.

The guardian selects the mode and place of education of his ward.

*Hall v. Hall*.

But the infants must be brought up in the religion of their *father*, irrespective of their guardian, however appointed ;

*In re Scanlan.*

unless the father has indicated otherwise, *In re Agar Ellis.*

or by his indifference or otherwise waived his right to control the religious education of his children, *Re McGrath.*

or has abdicated his rights. *Re Newton's Infants.*

A guardian on taking a ward of court out of the jurisdiction must give security ; and in deciding whether leave should be given, the court must consider—

(1.) Whether it is to the interest of the ward.

(2.) What security there is that the order of the court will be obeyed. *In re Callaghan.*

A guardian must not change the nature of the property except when such change is necessary for the benefit of the infant, for such conversion may not only affect the rights of the infant, but also the relative rights of his representatives. Where conversion is allowed, the representatives who would have taken before the change still take notwithstanding the change, if, but only if, the infant *dies under age*.

*Foster v. Foster ; Jackson v. Talbot.*

### *Wards of Court.*

(1.) Ward must not marry without permission of the court, notwithstanding parents or guardians may be living. Persons conniving at such a marriage will be guilty of contempt of court, even if ignorant that the infant is a ward.

(2.) Guardian on being appointed must give recognisance that ward shall not marry without leave of the court.

*Eyre v. Shaftesbury.*

(3.) The court will restrain by injunction an intended improper marriage, and also communications from admirers.

(4.) Upon a marriage with consent, a settlement must be made, to be approved by the court.

(5.) A ward who has ceased to be so by coming of age, and



wishes to waive a settlement, will be protected by the court if possible.

Under the Marriage Act (4 Geo. IV. c. 76) a settlement may be decreed where minor has married without guardian's consent.

Under the Infants' Settlement Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 43), binding settlements may be made by infants of their property with the leave of the court, where such infants are not under twenty if male, or seventeen if female.

Where an infant makes a settlement without leave of the court, the settlement is not void, but voidable at the option of the infant on attaining twenty-one ;

*Duncan v. Dickson.*

but that option must be exercised within a reasonable time.

*Edwards v. Carter ; Farrington v. Forrester.*

And when a married woman after attaining twenty-one, by *unacknowledged* deed, affirms a settlement executed by her before marriage whilst an infant and without leave of the court, such settlement is binding on her.

*Williams v. Knight.*

The father is bound to maintain his children irrespective of any property belonging to them, but where he is not able to give them an education suitable to the fortune they expect, maintenance will be allowed. He will always be entitled to an allowance for maintenance where there is an express *contract* to that effect.

*Thomson v. Griffin.*

Under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, a married woman to the extent of her separate property is bound to maintain her children in case her husband be unable to do so.

In allowing maintenance the court almost always confines it to the income of the fund. Regard will be had to the condition of the family, and a liberal allowance will be made where parents are in distress, or other children are numerous and destitute. In all cases it is the *infant's* benefit alone which is considered ;

and the guardian will not be called upon to account for any surplus, provided he properly maintains the infant.

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## CHAPTER XXIII.

### LUNATICS, IDIOTS, AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND.

ALTHOUGH the Court of Chancery is the legal guardian of infants, it is NOT the curator of the person or estate of a person *non compos mentis*. *Beall v. Smith.*

The jurisdiction in lunacy was originally vested in the Court of Exchequer on its revenue side, from which it was early transferred to the Lord Chancellor, and subsequently vested in the Lords Justices concurrently with the Lord Chancellor. The Judicature Acts preserved to the Lords Justices not only their jurisdiction in lunacy (which is expressly continued by the Lunacy Act, 1890), but also their original jurisdiction in Chancery. Appeals formerly lay to the King in Council, but now to the Court of Appeal.

Unsoundness of mind, *per se*, gives equity no jurisdiction whatever. It is not by reason of such incompetency, but in spite of it, that equity exercises its jurisdiction, and after inquisition found, proceedings in Chancery would be a contempt on the lunacy jurisdiction. The committee of a person *non compos* is an officer of the Court of Lunacy only, and must act under its direction even in making applications to the Court of Chancery.

*Beall v. Smith; Vane v. Vane.*

But upon the death of the lunatic the lunacy jurisdiction comes to an end and the Chancery jurisdiction is restored.

*Re Seager Hunt.*

The Lunacy Act, 1890, makes special provision for the management and administration of lunatics' estates.

When the entire estate of the lunatic is below £2000 in value, or the income thereof does not exceed £100 per annum, the jurisdiction in lunacy is summary, and a receiver is appointed.

The rights of the creditors of a lunatic are subordinated to the needs of the lunatic; and if the lunatic become bankrupt his property vests in the trustee in bankruptcy, subject to his maintenance.

The allowance made for the maintenance of a lunatic is in the discretion of the court, and occasionally the near relations of the lunatic are indirectly benefited, the same principle applying as in the case of allowances made to infants.

The court will only allow the conversion of a lunatic's property where the change will be for the benefit of the lunatic himself; his interests alone will be consulted, and his representatives must take the fund according to its actual state. *Oxendon v. Compton.*

But, as a rule, the court protects the rights of the representatives.

In respect of the maintenance of a person of unsound mind not so found, the Chancery Division has no original or inherent jurisdiction, unless there are trusts to execute or the fund is paid into court.

Under the Lunacy Acts, 1890 and 1908, application may be made to the Masters in Lunacy for directions as to the management and administration of the property of a person of unsound mind not so found, and they are empowered to authorise the receiver to exercise any powers which a duly appointed committee could exercise.

### PART III.—THE ORIGINALLY CONCURRENT JURISDICTION.

THE concurrent jurisdiction of equity extended to cases where, although *some* remedy, yet no plain, adequate, appropriate, and complete remedy existed at law, and the aid of equity was invoked to give the exact relief required. Under the Judicature Acts, the jurisdictions at law and equity are throughout concurrent; but notwithstanding this, the Chancery Division is still the appropriate jurisdiction in cases where, previous to those Acts, relief would have been sought in equity.

The concurrent jurisdiction embraces two branches. Cases in which—

Firstly, The ground of action itself constitutes the principal foundation for the jurisdiction, viz., accident, mistake, fraud.

Secondly, The peculiar remedies afforded by equity constitute that foundation, viz., suretyship, partnership, account, set-off, specific performance, injunction, and the like.

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## CHAPTER I.

### ACCIDENT.

ACCIDENT, as remediable in equity, has been defined to be an unforeseen and injurious occurrence, not attributable to mistake, neglect, or misconduct.

To give equity jurisdiction, there must be or have been no adequate remedy at law, and the party must have a conscientious title to relief. Note, equity does not lose the jurisdiction it has always possessed merely because common law courts have been empowered to relieve.



Firstly, equity will give relief against accident in cases of—

I. Lost and destroyed documents.

II. Imperfect execution of powers.

III. Erroneous payments.

I. Lost and destroyed documents.

(1.) *Lost bonds or other documents under seal.*

There was originally no remedy at law, because there could be no *profert* and *oyer* of the instrument. Further, equity alone could grant adequate relief by requiring an indemnity. Where *discovery only* without relief was sought, equity would grant it without any affidavit of loss or offer of indemnity: now an affidavit and indemnity are always required.

(2.) *Lost title-deeds.*

The mere loss of a deed does not give equity jurisdiction, for law gave and gives relief. There must be in addition special circumstances irremediable at law. Thus, where it was uncertain whether title-deeds were lost or concealed by the defendant, equity gave relief.

(3.) *Lost negotiable instruments.*

Here the proper remedy was in equity, because no remedy originally existed at law; and further, equity possessed the power of ordering an indemnity. The plaintiff should offer a sufficient indemnity before suing. By the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, courts of law are empowered to order the loss not to be set up, and to give an indemnity. But equity is not thereby deprived of its jurisdiction.

*East India Company v. Boddam.*

(4.) *Lost non-negotiable instruments.*

Here equity has jurisdiction, but it is doubtful whether there is a legal remedy.

The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, specially provides for the case of lost bills and notes, whether negotiable or not.

- (5.) *Destroyed negotiable and non-negotiable instruments.*  
 No relief is given in equity, because there is an adequate remedy at law. *Wright v. Maidstone.*
- (6.) *Destroyed bonds.*  
 Relief may apparently be had in equity.

## II. Imperfect execution of powers.

### (1.) Defective execution of simple powers.

Where there is the *ability* to exercise a power and a distinct *intention* to exercise it in favour of a certain class, equity will aid the defective execution of it by compelling the person having the legal interest to transfer same in accordance with the defective appointment.

Equity will give relief in these cases in favour of—

- (a.) Purchaser for value, including mortgagee,  
 (b.) Creditor, (c.) Charity, (d.) Wife, (e.) Intended  
 (but not actual) husband, (f.) Legitimate (but  
 not natural) child,

where, but only where, the defect is not of the very essence of the power, or not made irremediable by statute, *e.g.*, equity will supply the want of a seal or witness, or allow an execution by will which should have been by deed, but not *vice versâ*. *Tollett v. Tollett.*

### (2.) Unexecuted powers.

Equity gives no relief in the case of *non-execution* of powers except where

- (a.) Execution is prevented by fraud.  
 (b.) Power is coupled with a trust.

*Harding v. Glynn.*

Trusts are always, but powers never, *imperative*; consequently where a trust-power is left wholly unexecuted, equity will relieve.

## II. Erroneous payments.

In the case of accidental payments by executors or administrators acting in good faith, equity afforded

protection; but there was originally no relief at law. No relief, however, will be given in case of mistake of law on the ground of accident.

Secondly, No relief will be given in equity against accident,

I. In matters of positive contract.

For injury is not *unforeseen*, and might have been provided for; thus no relief is given from an absolute covenant to pay rent or to repair where the demised premises are destroyed.

II. In contracts where the parties are equally improvident against contingencies.

III. Where accident arose through gross neglect of party seeking relief.

IV. Where party seeking relief has no vested right, but a mere expectancy only.

V. Where party seeking relief has no greater title to protection of the court than the party against whom relief is sought, *e.g.*, a *bonâ fide* purchaser for value without notice.

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## CHAPTER II.

### MISTAKE.

A MISTAKE, as remediable in equity, may be defined to be an act which would not have been done, or an omission which would not have occurred, but from ignorance, forgetfulness, inadvertence, mental incompetence, surprise, misplaced confidence, or imposition.

Mistake is either in respect of *law* or of *fact*. Equity can relieve against mistakes in law as well as against mistakes in fact, if there be any equitable ground for such relief.

## I.—MISTAKE OF LAW.

It is a general rule both at law and equity that ignorance of law is no excuse, the maxim being, *Ignorantia legis haud excusat*.

This maxim, however, only applies to the general law of the country, and not to a mere private right.

*Re Cunliffe ; Cooper v. Phibbs.*

Accordingly money paid under a mistake of law (*e.g.*, an erroneous construction of a document) may in general, and money paid to an officer of the court (*e.g.*, a trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator in voluntary winding up) under this kind of mistake may always, be recovered back.

Relief will be given, notwithstanding this rule, where

- (1.) A party acts in ignorance of a plain and well-known rule of law, upon the principle of fraud or undue influence. *Lansdowne v. Lansdowne.*
- (2.) Mistake of law is combined with surprise.

Where the mistake arises from ignorance of a doubtful point of law, a compromise, if entered into with honest intention and full disclosure, will be supported. Upon this ground family compromises are upheld, but there must always be full disclosure, and neither *suppressio veri* nor *suggestio falsi*.

*Stapilton v. Stapilton ; Gordon v. Gordon.*

Equity will not relieve against a *bona fide* purchaser for value without notice, nor in respect of a compromise where the position of parties has been altered, in the absence of gross ignorance or imposition.

Any question of foreign law is a question of fact, and accordingly a mistake of foreign law is deemed a mistake of fact.

## II.—MISTAKE OF FACT.

As a general rule, equity gives relief against mistake of fact where the fact is



- (1.) Material, whether mistake be unilateral or mutual ; even if the agreement has been sanctioned by the court ; *Paget v. Marshall ; Cochrane v. Willis ; Huddersfield Bank v. Lister ; Scott v. Coulson.*

And (2.) Such as party could not ascertain by inquiry ;

And (3.) Such as contracting party having knowledge is under a legal obligation to disclose.

Where, however, the means of information is equally open to both parties, and there is no confidence reposed, no relief will be given. And where the mistake is unilateral, relief *after* completion will only be given, as a rule, if it would be a fraud in the other party to retain the advantage of the mistake.

Oral evidence is admissible, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, to show that by accident, mistake, or fraud a written agreement is not what the parties intended. The mistake must not be of law, and must be admitted or expressly established or fairly implied from the nature of the case.

Thus a partnership debt, though joint at law, is considered in equity to be joint and several.

*Kendal v. Hamilton.*

But where there is no inference of an original several liability, no relief will be given in equity without evidence of mistake.

*Sumner v. Powell.*

Mistakes of fact are either unilateral or mutual, and in the latter case the remedy is *rectification*. To obtain rectification of a written instrument

- (1.) There must be a definite intention which the instrument fails to carry out ;
- (2.) Such intention must exist at the time of execution of the instrument ; and
- (3.) Such intention must be strictly proved.

*Relief will be given in Equity against Mistakes of Fact in the following particular Cases :—*

1. Rectification of mistakes in marriage settlements.

(1.) Where both marriage articles and a definitive settlement exist before marriage.

(a.) As a general rule the settlement is the binding instrument. *Legg v. Goldwire.*

(b.) If the settlement purports to be, or can be shown by admissible evidence to have been intended to be, in pursuance of the articles, and there is a variance, the settlement will be rectified according to the articles.

(2.) When the settlement is made after marriage, it will in all cases be controlled by the ante-nuptial articles.

In no case will the *true contract* of the parties be varied. *Barrow v. Barrow.*

The mistake in marriage contracts must be *mutual* or no relief will be given.

2. Instrument delivered up or cancelled under a mistake will be set up again.

3. Defective execution of powers. Relief is given on the same general principles as in cases of accident.

4. Mistakes in wills. In order to relieve, the mistake must be apparent on the face of the will, but parol evidence is admissible to remove a latent ambiguity.

(1.) Mere misdescription of legatee will not defeat legacy unless given to legatee under a character which he has falsely assumed.

(2.) Revocation of legacy on mistake of fact (where such mistake constitutes the sole reason given by testator for the revocation) is a ground for relief. *Kendall v. Abbott.*

*No Relief will be given against any Defects or Mistakes.*

(1.) Where party claiming relief has not a superior equity.

(2.) Between volunteers.

(3.) Where defect is declared fatal by statute ; provided

the statute expressly or necessarily excludes the equitable remedy.

*Barrow v. Isaacs ; Hall-Dare v. Hall-Dare.*

## CHAPTER III.

### ACTUAL FRAUD.

FRAUD is infinite, and equity has always refused to lay down any general rule beyond which it will not go in affording relief. Although it is a rule both at law and in equity that fraud is not to be presumed, yet positive proof of fraud is not absolutely necessary, and equity practically acts upon weaker evidence than law in inferring it. Fraud is divided into two sections—actual fraud and constructive fraud.

An actual fraud has been defined as something said, done, or omitted with the design of perpetrating what the party must have known to be a positive fraud.

Actual frauds may be considered under two heads—

- I. Frauds which receive that denomination from a consideration of the conduct of the guilty parties, irrespective of any peculiarity in the condition of the injured parties.
- II. Frauds which receive that denomination mainly or in a great measure from a consideration of the peculiar condition of the parties upon whom they are practised. (Sm. Man.)

*I.—Frauds arising irrespective of any Peculiarity in the Position of the Injured Party.*

#### (1.) Misrepresentation, or *suggestio falsi*.

A misrepresentation of a material fact intentionally made to mislead another amounts to a positive fraud, even when the person making the representation does not know it to be true or false, or believes it to be true if he ought to have known it to be false.

It is equally a fraud where, the misrepresentation being made to another, a third party acts upon it, and by so doing is injured or damaged; provided the misrepresentation was made with the intent that it should be acted upon by the third party in the manner that occasions the injury or loss.

*Pulsford v. Richards; Derry v. Peck.*

The case of *Derry v. Peck* overruled all the old cases, abolished the doctrine of constructive fraud, and settled that a man cannot now be sued for misrepresentation without dishonesty.

*Lievre v. Gould.*

A misrepresentation, to be a ground of relief, must

- (a.) Be a false representation. Falsity is essential; and there must be a *representation* or statement of fact, not of law, made by some party to the contract, or his agents, not by a third person.
- (b.) Be of some material fact *inducing* the contract.
- (c.) Be of something in which there is a confidence reposed, at least in case of vendor and purchaser; and not be a mere matter of opinion.
- (d.) Mislead the party to his prejudice.

*Redgrave v. Hurd.*

Under the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908, in respect of misrepresentations in prospectuses, &c., the presumption is against the directors.

A company is responsible to the extent of the profits it has made thereby for the misrepresentations of its directors, but otherwise the remedy is against the directors personally, and the fraudulent directors are liable jointly and severally. No action lies against the executors of a deceased director further than the extent his estate has profited by his fraudulent misrepresentation.

*Peck v. Gurney.*

If a misrepresentation can be made good, the injured party has the option of compelling it to be done.

A person can derive no benefit from the fraud of



another unless he is both free from any participation in it and has given a valuable consideration.

*Marsh v. Joseph.*

The defrauded party may deprive himself of relief by his subsequent acts amounting to ratification.

(2.) Concealment, or *suppressio veri*.

Like misrepresentation, the concealment must be to the injury or prejudice of another, and the fact concealed must be one which the party was under a legal or equitable *obligation to disclose*.

*Fox v. Mackreth ; Boswell v. Coaks.*

With regard to the sale of *personal chattels*, the rule is *caveat emptor*, unless there be some misrepresentation, or artifice, or warranty, or vendor is under an obligation to disclose.

*Nam qui tacet non videtur affirmare*, but in exceptional cases, such as *insurance*, silence is tantamount to direct affirmation; and the insured is bound to communicate to the insurer all facts and circumstances material to the risk within his knowledge.

(3.) Inadequacy of consideration.

Mere inadequacy of price does not by itself constitute a ground of relief; but inadequacy will be evidence of fraud where it is of such a character as to shock the conscience, or when it is coupled with other suspicious circumstances.

Apparent inadequacies may, however, be explained away.

*Harrison v. Guest.*

No relief is given where the parties cannot be placed *in statu quo*, or where the rights of third parties have intervened.

(4.) Frauds by force of statute merely.

Under the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908, promoters are liable for concealment as well as misrepresentation; and any conveyance or disposition which would amount to a fraudulent preference in the case of the bankruptcy of an individual is constituted a fraudulent preference in the winding up of a company.

And any clause in the prospectus waiving the right of applicants for shares to full disclosure is void.

Generally payment out of capital as if it were a profit is a fraud in the nature of a misfeasance for which directors are answerable to shareholders, unless the payment can be justified under the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908, sec. 91. A company may not buy its own shares, although under the Act of 1907 it may reissue redeemed debentures.

A company is not fraudulent merely because it is what is known as "a one-man company," *i.e.*, a private company absolutely controlled by one person who holds all the shares except six, which are held by his own nominees.

*Saloman v. Saloman.*

But if a man is insolvent when he transfers his business to a company, the transfer may be set aside as fraudulent under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883.

*Re Hirth; Re Slobodinsky.*

#### (5.) Refusal of consent to marriage.

Gifts and legacies on condition of marriage with consent will not be defeated by the fraudulent or corrupt withholding of such consent.

Note that contracts affected by fraud are in general not void, but only voidable at the option of the defrauded party, and such avoidance will be impossible after the rights of third parties have intervened. *Oakes v. Turquand.*

No repudiation is necessary where the contract is actually void, and there is no rescission against innocent third parties.

### *II.—Frauds arising chiefly from the Peculiar Condition of the Injured Parties.*

Full and free consent is necessary to every agreement. Such consent, from the nature of the case, is impossible in contracts entered into with the following classes of persons:—

#### (1.) Persons of unsound mind.

These contracts are usually void, but contracts entered into with them in good faith and for their benefit, as for necessities, will be upheld.

It appears, however, that the onus is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff knew him to be so insane as not to know what he was about.

*Imperial Loans Co. v. Stone.*

(2.) Intoxicated persons.

To obtain relief, the party must have been so far intoxicated as to be utterly deprived for the time being of the use of his understanding, otherwise both parties will be left to their remedy at law.

But relief will be given where there has been any contrivance to draw the party into drink, and so obtain an advantage.

(3.) Imbecile persons.

The burden of proof is on the other party in contracts with persons of weak understanding to show that no unfair advantage has been taken of such weakness.

(4.) Persons who are not free agents, being under undue influence.

(a.) Under duress or fear.

(b.) In extreme necessity.

(5.) Infants.

The contracts of infants, except for necessities, are as a general rule not binding on them. They differ from contracts of a person *non compos mentis* in this respect—these latter are *ab initio* void, while the former used to be only voidable, but some are now wholly void. Where, however, a contract can never be for the benefit of an infant, it is utterly void.

Under the Infants' Relief Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 62), all contracts for loans of money or sale of goods (except necessities) to, and all accounts stated with infants, are absolutely void and incapable of confirmation; and all other contracts are void *against* the infants, who may, however, sue on them.

Certain contracts by infants remain binding on them after they have attained majority, unless within a reasonable time thereafter they repudiate

same. Of this character are contracts by which a permanent interest in property is immediately conferred on the infant, and he himself is laid in return under a continuing obligation to be performed partly or wholly after he has attained full age.

(*Wms. V. & P.*)

Infants are not liable even for necessities if they are already fully supplied.

*Johnstone v. Marks; Barnes v. Toye.*

And the onus is on the plaintiff to prove the infant is not so supplied. *Nash v. Inman.*

And marriage articles appear to be good as a contract for necessities.

#### (6.) Married women.

Although formerly protected because of her disability, yet, by virtue of the Married Women's Property Acts, 1882 and 1893, a married woman is now, so far as her separate property is concerned, fully capable of entering into contracts of every kind, except so far as she may be restrained from alienation.

The doctrine that where one of two innocent persons has to suffer through fraud of another that one must suffer who has enabled such other to commit the fraud, does not apply where nothing has been done by one of the innocent parties which has misled the other. *Farquharson v. King.*

## CHAPTER IV.

### CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD.

CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUDS are acts, statements, or omissions which operate as virtual frauds on individuals, or, if generally permitted, would be prejudicial to the public welfare, and are not clearly resolvable into mere accident or mistake, and yet may have been unconnected with any selfish or evil design, or may amount in the opinion of the



persons chargeable therewith to nothing more than what is justifiable or allowable.

These cases may be divided into four classes—

- I. Constructive frauds, so called because they are contrary to some general public policy or to the policy of the law.
- II. Constructive frauds which arise from the abuse of some peculiar, confidential, or fiduciary relation between the parties.
- III. Constructive frauds in the case of persons peculiarly liable to be imposed on.
- IV. Constructive frauds which operate as virtual frauds on individuals, irrespective of any fiduciary relation or any peculiar liability to imposition. (*Sm. Man.*)

*I.—Frauds on Public Policy.*

- (1.) Marriage brokage contracts—incapable of confirmation.
- (2.) Contracts to promote marriage—by means of rewards.
- (3.) Secret contracts in fraud of marriage—whereby open marriage agreements are rendered inoperative.
- (4.) Contracts to influence testators—for they encourage scheming.
- (5.) Contracts or conditions in *general* restraint of marriage—as tending to promote immorality, &c.

*Scott v. Tyler.*

Conditions in restraint of marriage, whether precedent or subsequent, are good if annexed to gifts in favour of a *widow* or *widower*. All limitations *until* marriage with a gift over are good, and cease on marriage.

Conditions imposing *particular* restraints on marriage are good, *e.g.*, any particular person, or a native of any particular country, or a domestic servant.

- (6.) Contracts or conditions in *general* restraint of trade—as tending to discourage industry. But *particular*

restraints are good where the restraint is nothing more than what is necessary for the *reasonable* protection of the party; in fact, the only criterion is reasonableness, and it is not necessarily invalid because unlimited in point of time, in point of space, or in respect of persons. The contract requires consideration, but the court will not inquire into its adequacy. *Nordenfelt v. Maxim; Mallan v. May; Rousillon v. Rousillon.*

- (7.) Contracts in violation of public trust or confidence—as for public offices, suppression of criminal proceedings, champerty or corrupt considerations, or in relation to a bill in Parliament.
- (8.) Frauds in relation to transfer of shares in joint-stock companies. Thus a transfer subject to reservation in favour of transferror, so as to get rid of liability for calls, is fraudulent. As between trustee and *cestui que trust* the trustee whose name is on the register is liable.

It should be noted that all these contracts against public policy are VOID, and not voidable merely. It is a general rule that where parties are concerned in an illegal agreement, no relief will be given to any of them; but where the agreement is illegal as against *public policy*, relief will be given on the ground of the public interest.

## II.—*Frauds in the Case of Persons in Fiduciary Relations.*

The general principle underlying all these cases is that where influence is acquired and abused, or confidence reposed and betrayed, equity will give relief. It is independent of any admixture of imposition, being based upon a motive of general public policy. Voluntary donations *inter vivos* to persons standing in some confidential, fiduciary, or other relation towards the donor in which dominion may be exercised by them may be set aside. Influence is presumed until the contrary is shown. *Huguenin v. Basely.*

- (1.) Parent or person *in loco parentis* or relative having influence, and child.

Gifts from latter to former void, unless made in perfect good faith, and reasonable under the circumstances. *Davies v. Davies.*

To support such a gift it must be proved that—

- (a.) The deed in question is the actual deed of the child, and intended by him to operate as it does.  
 (b.) Such intention was fairly produced.

The child should have independent and disinterested advice.

- (2.) Guardian and ward.

Incapable of dealing with each other whilst relation continues, and dealings shortly after it has terminated will be viewed with suspicion.

- (3.) *Quasi* guardians, medical and confidential advisers, ministers of religion.  
 (4.) Solicitor and client.

*Gift* from client to solicitor pending that relation cannot be sustained ;

*Thomson v. Judge ; In re Luddy.*

or even to the wife or any member of the family of the solicitor ; *Liles v. Terry ; Barron v. Willis.*

and can even be impeached by the legal representatives of the client after his decease. *Tyars v. Alsop.*

Lapse of time will not make such gifts good, and the employment of an independent solicitor makes no difference if the relationship in fact continues.

*Wright v. Castle.*

Gift from client to solicitor by *will* is good.

*Hindson v. Weatherill.*

*Purchase* is good if there is perfect *bona fides*, but the whole onus of proving the fairness of the transaction is thrown on the solicitor ; and the fact that the client has not been separately advised will be taken into account.

Purchase by solicitor from client made in name of another can under no circumstances be maintained.

*McPherson v. Watt.*

Agreements to pay a solicitor a gross sum for past or future services, although formerly void, are now good if in writing, but every such agreement is subject to taxation.

*In re Russell*; 33 & 34 Vict. c. 28;  
44 & 45 Vict. c. 44.

(5.) Trustee and *cestui que trust*.

The rule is, not that a trustee cannot buy from *cestui que trust*, but that he shall not buy from himself. A trustee may purchase from *cestui que trust* where there is a clear and distinct and perfectly fair contract that the latter intended the former to purchase; he may also purchase from *cestui que trust* who is *sui juris*, and has discharged him, but the onus is upon the trustee to prove the fairness of the bargain and of his conduct.

Trustee *for sale* cannot purchase without leave of the court. *Fox v. Mackreth*.

*Gift to trustee by cestui que trust* only supported if it would be good between guardian and ward, *i.e.*, the relation and the influence arising from it must have ceased.

(6.) Principal and agent.

The utmost good faith and full disclosure are required in dealings between them; no secret profit may be made by the agent out of his agency.

An agent instructed to buy shares cannot himself sell to his principal. *King v. Howell*.

(7.) Miscellaneous fiduciary persons, such as counsel, auctioneers, and others who have been consulted as to sale, or a receiver appointed by the court.

*Martinson v. Clowes*; *Nugent v. Nugent*.

(8.) Debtor, creditor, and surety, between whom entire good faith is required.

III.—*Frauds in the Case of Persons Peculiarly Liable to be Imposed on.*

(1) Bargains with heirs and expectants.



Such bargains will be set aside unless purchaser, on whom onus rests, can show that the transaction is reasonable and *bonâ fide*.

*Neville v. Snelling* ; *Aylesford v. Morris*.

If confirmed by expectant after death of ancestor, will not be relieved against. *Chesterfield v. Jansen*.

But there can be no ratification by acquiescence until the reversion falls in. *Fry v. Lane*.

The Act 31 Vict. c. 34, enacts that no purchase made *bonâ fide* without fraud of a reversionary interest shall be set aside MERELY *on the ground of undervalue*. This Act does not affect the equity jurisdiction, for undervalue is in itself evidence of fraud, and will always be a material element where it does not constitute the sole ground for relief.

*Miller v. Cook* ; *Tyler v. Yates* ;  
*Aylesford v. Morris*.

Where relief is granted, it is upon payment of the sum actually advanced with interest.

Under the Moneylenders Act, 1900, every money-lender must be registered or the loan is void and no repayment can be claimed.

Knowledge of the transaction by the father or other person *in loco parentis* renders it *primâ facie* good.

- (2.) Post-obits, &c., upon similar principles, are set aside when made by heirs and expectants.
- (3.) Common sailors are treated on same footing as expectants, irrespective of the provisions in their favour contained in the Merchant Shipping Acts.
- (4.) Tradesmen selling goods at extravagant prices to expectants are liable to have their claims reduced by a court of equity.
- (5.) Dispositions by persons shortly after attaining majority.

IV.—*Virtual Frauds on Individuals irrespective of any Fiduciary Relation or any Peculiar Liability to Imposition.*

- (1.) Statute of Frauds not allowed to be used as an engine of fraud.
- (2.) Knowingly producing a false impression so as to mislead another, or enabling another to commit a fraud, or making representations in forgetfulness of one's own title. *Slim v. Croucher; Rice v. Rice.*

Thus a company which has issued certificates to the effect that shares are fully paid will be estopped from saying this is not the case.

- (3.) Frauds on auctions.

Agreements between parties not to bid against each other are void. The employment of a puffer, whereby bidders are misled, avoids the auction. But by 30 & 31 Vict. c. 48, the vendor of real property may bid if he reserve the right in the particulars or conditions of sale and strictly adheres to the limits therein laid down, otherwise the sale is voidable; and sales under the direction of the court are not to be reopened in the absence of fraud. The Sale of Goods Act, 1893, has similar provisions in respect of personal property.

- (4.) Frauds upon consenting creditors to a composition deed.
- (5.) Frauds in case of voluntary gifts; the donee being always obliged to prove *bona fides*.
- (6.) Frauds under 27 Eliz. c. 4, now practically abolished by the Voluntary Conveyances Act, 1893.
- (7.) Fraudulent appointments.

A power of appointment must be exercised *bona fide* for the end designed by the donor.

*Topham v. Portland; Aley v. Belchier.*

A power may, however, be validly released even though the effect of the release is to benefit the donee of the power. *Radeliffe v. Bewes; In re Somes.*

Appointments by father in favour of sickly children not in need are usually set aside. *Henty v. Wrey.*

And a void appointment may be good as to part, if that part be free from fraud and severable.

Where a contract is entered into with the appointee to dispose of the property for the benefit of some person not an object of the power, then the appointment is fraudulent and void, and an appointment which is a fraud on a power can be set aside against a *bond fide* purchaser without notice if he does not get the legal interest in the property.

*Cloutte v Storey.*

Formerly the appointment of merely *nominal* shares to one or more objects of the power (although valid at law) was set aside as an *illusory* appointment.

By 1 Will. IV. c. 46, illusory appointments were in effect made valid in equity as well as at law, and under 37 & 38 Vict. c. 37, in the absence of a contrary intention in the instrument creating the power, any object of the power may be *altogether excluded*.

- (8.) A man cannot derogate from his own representations which formed the inducement to contract.

*Piggott v. Stratton; Hudson v. Cripps.*

## CHAPTER V.

### SURETYSHIP.

CONTRACTS of Suretyship require the utmost good faith between all parties.

It has been laid down that the concealment by creditors from a surety of facts which go to increase his risk releases the surety; but this requires qualification thus. The fact concealed must either—

- (1.) Be one which the creditor is under an obligation to discover; *Hamilton v. Watson.*

*Or*

- (2.) Form an integral part of the immediate transaction. *Pidcock v. Bishop.*

Creditors, although not bound, as a general rule, to inquire into the circumstances of the suretyship, yet must do so if there is reasonable ground to suspect fraud. *Owen v. Homan.*

The rights of a creditor against the surety are wholly regulated by the *instrument of suretyship*; *In re Sass.*  
and apparently a surety cannot compel the creditor to proceed against the debtor.

### *Remedies of Surety.*

- (1.) Surety cannot force creditor to take action against debtor, but may himself institute proceedings in the nature of *quia timet* against debtor to compel him to pay creditor, as soon as the latter has a present right to sue and refuses to do so.

*Padwick v. Stanley.*

- (2.) Action for judicial declaration of discharge.  
(3.) Action for reimbursement after payment.

This right has been based upon an implied contract. The contract being one of indemnity, the surety can only recover from the debtor what he has actually paid.

- (4.) Action for delivering up of securities by creditor to surety on payment.

The surety has always been entitled to all securities held by the creditor, except such as were actually extinguished by the payment, and now by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 5) a surety is entitled to *every* security held by creditor, whether deemed at law to be satisfied or not.

Further advances made by the creditor to the debtor will be subject to this right of the surety, for the creditor knows of the surety's interest in the securities. *Forbes v. Jackson.*

- (5.) Action for contribution against co-sureties.



One of several sureties paying the debt has a right to reimbursement or contribution from his co-sureties; for *Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus*.

This right of contribution does not spring from contract, but is founded on general principles of equity and justice. *Dering v. Winchelsea*.

The right exists whether the sureties are bound jointly or severally, in the same or in different instruments, and though ignorant of their mutual relation, provided they are bound for the same debtor and in the same transaction, *i.e.*, there must be a common liability.

No contribution can be required beyond the amount for which a surety has agreed to be bound; for the right, although not founded on, may be qualified by, contract, and any surety can limit his liability by express contract. *Swain v. Wall*.

The right of a surety to contribution from a co-surety arises—

- (1.) When the surety is liable to pay or has paid either the whole or more than a just proportion of the debt;
- (2.) When the surety has not paid, but has had judgment against him for the full amount of the debt;
- (3.) Where the claim of the creditor against the deceased surety has been allowed.

*Re Snowdon; Re Wolmershausen*.

When a surety becomes bankrupt, his co-surety is entitled to *prove* for the *whole* debt, and not merely the proportion the bankrupt ought to have paid, but he cannot actually recover more than such proportion. *Morgan v. Hill*.

Co-sureties are entitled to the benefit of all securities obtained by one of their number, whether they knew of such securities or not. *Steel v. Dixon*.

A surety can only charge the debtor what he has actually paid to discharge his obligation.

*Reed v. Norris*.

Co-directors and co-trustees also (in the absence of fraud) are, as a general rule, entitled to this right to contribution.

*Ramskill v. Edwards ; Fletcher v. Green.*

But if one of them is a *cestui que trust*, and has authorised the breach which has been satisfied out of his beneficial interest, he cannot claim contribution.

*Chillingworth v. Chambers.*

But one trustee has no right of indemnity or recoupment against his co-trustee except where there are special circumstances.

*Bahin v. Hughes.*

As, for example, where the co-trustee is the solicitor to the trust, and derived a personal benefit from the breach, or has acted unreasonably although not dishonestly.

*Re Lingley.*

Under R.S.C. Order xvi., provision is made for a surety who is sued to obtain indemnity and contribution from principal or co-sureties in the same action by means of a third party notice.

*Differences between Law and Equity as regards Suretyship  
abolished by the Judicature Acts.*

- (1.) In case of insolvency or death of a co-surety, the solvent or surviving sureties could be compelled to contribute for the deficiency at equity, but not at law.
- (2.) Parol evidence was admissible to show that an apparent principal was a surety only at equity, but not at law.

*Circumstances Releasing Sureties.*

- (1.) If creditor varies contract with debtor to the prejudice of the surety without his privity.
- (2.) If creditor gives time in a binding manner to debtor so as to prejudicially affect the remedies of the surety without his consent.

*Rees v. Berrington.*

The surety will not be discharged, however, where

the creditor, on giving time, *reserves* his rights against the surety; for the surety cannot be prejudiced by such an arrangement.

The agreement to give time must be made with the *debtor*, in order that the surety may be released.

- (3.) If creditor actually *releases* the principal debtor or a co-surety.

But the surety is not discharged—

(a.) If the release can be construed as a *covenant not to sue*.

(b.) If in the case of a mere *purported* release, or a covenant not to sue, the creditor reserves his rights against the surety. The reservation should appear on the face of the release, parol evidence being inadmissible.

Where, however, there is a novation of the debt, the surety is discharged even if rights against him are reserved.

And a surety may contract with a creditor to remain liable although the principal be released.

- (4.) If the principal debtor is otherwise released, *e.g.*, if a lessee become bankrupt, and the trustee in bankruptcy disclaim the lease, the term is determined and the surety for the rent is released.

*Stacey v. Hill.*

- (5.) If creditor loses securities, or allows them to go back into debtor's hands, or fails in making them perfect, the surety is *pro tanto* discharged.

- (6.) If a surety executes an instrument in the belief that certain other parties named therein as sureties will also do so, and all such parties do not execute, he is discharged from the suretyship.

*Hansard v. Lethbridge.*

When the liability of the surety does not arise until after default by the debtor, he is discharged by the death of the debtor before default.

When a surety is discharged, the securities given by him are discharged also.

The doctrines of marshalling and consolidation apply as against sureties.

In ascertaining the liability of sureties in mortgage deeds, it is necessary to distinguish sureties who are mere covenanting parties from those who are co-mortgagors.

*Williams v. Owen; Bowker v. Bull.*

Where a mortgagor and his surety covenant to pay mortgage money on demand, the Statute of Limitations runs from time of demand made, and not from the date of the deed.

*Brown v. Morgan.*

And where the principal debtor is discharged by the statute the surety is generally also discharged.

## CHAPTER VI.

### PARTNERSHIP.

IN matters of partnership, equity exercises a practically exclusive, although nominally concurrent, jurisdiction, the relation between partners being a quasi-fiduciary one; and by the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 34, the dissolution of partnership and the taking of partnership and other accounts are assigned to the Chancery Division exclusively.

At common law, as a general rule, no action lay by one partner against another in respect of partnership accounts except—

- (1.) Where an account had been stated between them, and a *final* balance struck.
- (2.) Where money had been received by one partner for the separate use of the others, and wrongfully carried to the partnership account.
- (3.) Where one partner had improperly used the partnership name in making a promissory note for his private debt, and it had been paid by the others.
- (4.) Where the cause of action accrued before the commencement of the partnership. (*Chit. Cont.*)

The Partnership Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 39), has



practically codified the law of partnership, but does not (except where expressly so provided thereby) affect the rules or jurisdiction of equity. The Act defines partnership as "the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of profit."

A partnership is constituted by agreement, express or implied.

An agreement to enter into partnership will not be enforced unless—

- (1.) A definite term has been fixed.

*And*

- (2.) There have been acts of part performance.

During the continuance of the partnership, injunctions against the breach of partnership articles will be granted in cases of—

- (1.) Omission of name of a partner when resulting from studied delay.
- (2.) Carrying on another business.
- (3.) Destruction of partnership property.
- (4.) Exclusion of partner.

Neither specific performance nor any injunction will be decreed

- (1.) Where remedy at law is perfectly adequate.
- (2.) Where there is an agreement to refer to arbitration; in which case a stay of proceedings is generally ordered: but after the award either party may for sufficient reason apply to have it set aside.

*A Partnership may be Dissolved by*

- (1.) Operation of law in cases of (a) death, (b) bankruptcy, (c) conviction for felony of a partner.
- (2.) Mutual consent.
- (3.) Any partner at any time, if a partnership at will, unless irreparable mischief would ensue.
- (4.) Effluxion of time.
- (5.) Judgment of Chancery Division in cases of—
  - (a.) Partnership induced by fraud.

- (b.) Gross misconduct and breach of trust in relation to partnership.
- (c.) Continual breaches of contract, resulting in *substantial* failure by defendant to perform agreement.
- (d.) Wilful and permanent neglect of business.
- (e.) Disagreements or incompatibility of temper preventing the carrying on of business.
- (f.) Permanent insanity of an active partner.
- (g.) Generally, under the Partnership Act, 1890, whenever it is "just and equitable" so to do.

Subject to the provisions of any partnership agreement, the Partnership Act, 1890, provides that on dissolution—

- (1.) Partnership losses are to be made good.
- (2.) Assets are to be applied in paying
  - (a.) Partnership debts and liabilities other than to partners.
  - (b.) Advances made by partners.
  - (c.) Capital of partners.
  - (d.) Surplus to partners in proportions in which they are entitled to share in profits.

The share of a partner is a right to money after the partnership has been wound up. A limited account will sometimes be decreed where no dissolution is intended, but a manager or receiver will never be appointed except with a view to dissolution, or to a sale where there has been dissolution by notice.

The representatives of a deceased partner have no lien on any specific part of the partnership assets; and it is the duty of the surviving partner to realise all the partnership assets, including real estate, for the purposes of winding up the partnership affairs, and the survivor has for this purpose full power not only to mortgage but to sell such real estate.

*Bourne v. Bourne.*

The purchaser of a share in a partnership must indemnify the vendor against liability in respect of the share and expressly covenant so to do.

The relation between surviving partners and representa-

tives of deceased partners is not a fiduciary one, and the right of the latter to an account may be barred by the Statute of Limitations, except in cases of fraud.

*Knox v. Gye.*

And the statute does not run until discovery of the fraud.

*Betjemann v. Betjemann.*

Land forming an asset of the partnership, or "substantially involved in the business," whether purchased or devised, is money, for equity regards partnership realty as held by the partners on an implied or constructive trust for sale; as such it goes to the personal representative, and was liable to probate duty, now estate duty.

*Waterer v. Waterer.*

The goodwill of a business is, in general, a partnership asset, and on the death of a partner is to be valued as such.

*Re David & Matthews.*

Upon the retirement of a partner the assignment of his share should expressly include the goodwill.

And when, upon the determination of the partnership, the goodwill goes to one of the partners, the other partner, although entitled to carry on a rival business, may not solicit the old customers of the firm.

*Curl v. Webster; Trego v. Hunt.*

And further, in the absence of agreement to the contrary in the partnership articles, each partner may use the partnership name after dissolution, provided such user does not expose the outgoing partner to liability.

*Burchell v. Wilde.*

On the death of a partner, creditors of the partnership may sue the surviving partner, or, at their option, institute proceedings in equity for payment of their debts out of the assets of the deceased partner. Notwithstanding this, joint creditors are not ranked equally with separate creditors, but can only claim the surplus remaining after satisfaction of the separate debts. On the other hand, the separate creditors are not entitled to be paid anything out of the joint estate until all the joint creditors have been satisfied.

*Ex parte Ruffin and Rowlandson.*

The liability of partners in equity has been stated to be joint and several—that is to say, where there is in equity

no survivorship of property there is no survivorship of liability. *Beresford v. Browning.*

A partnership, although dissolved by death, is, in equity, taken to be still subsisting for every purpose of liquidation, so that what was before joint becomes several by the dissolution and by the exclusion in equity of the survivorship which takes effect in law. *Kendall v. Hamilton.*

And the Partnership Act, 1890, provides that every partner is liable jointly with the other partners for all debts of the firm while he is a partner, and after his death his estate is also severally liable in a due course of administration for the same, so far as they remain unsatisfied, subject to the prior payment of his separate debts.

Partnership firms having a common partner, although formerly not able to sue one another at law, could always do so at equity.

As a general rule, no partner can prove in competition with the creditors of the firm except

- (1.) Where two firms having a common partner, or a firm and one of its partners, carry on distinct trades and have business dealings together, but only in respect of debts which have arisen in the ordinary course of business.
- (2.) Where separate property of a partner has been fraudulently converted to the use of the firm or *vice versa*.

Under the Limited Partnership Act, 1907 (7 Edw. VII. c. 24), persons may now enter into a limited partnership, which would have to be registered with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, and any change in such a partnership would also have to be duly registered. The "limited partner" will only be liable for the partnership debts to the extent of the capital contributed by him, but there must be at least one "general partner" who will remain fully liable for all the debts and obligations of the partnership. A limited partner cannot withdraw any portion of his capital nor take any part in the management of the business, and his death, lunacy, or bankruptcy will not dissolve the partnership. With the consent of the general partners a limited



partner may assign his share, and the assignee will become a limited partner. The Act contains certain provisions for winding up a limited partnership by the court like a limited company under the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ACCOUNT.

ACTIONS OF ACCOUNT, although always recognised at law, were dilatory and inconvenient, and practically confined to cases

- (1.) Where privity between the parties, of deed or of law.
- (2.) Between merchants.

Equity jurisdiction was preferred mainly for two reasons :

- (1.) Discovery could not formerly be obtained at law.
- (2.) Courts of law possessed no proper machinery for taking accounts, and, as a consequence, frequently referred actions of account to arbitration. Equity courts, on the other hand, provided ready means for this purpose.

The cases in which an account might be had at equity, and in which the Chancery Division is still the more appropriate tribunal, may be classified thus—

- (1.) Principal against agent.

On the ground of the fiduciary relation between the parties. *Mackenzie v. Johnson.*

But not agent against principal, in which case there is no such relation. *Padwick v. Stanley.*

Agent can set up Statute of Limitations unless relation between them amounts to trustee and *cestui que trust*. *Friend v. Young.*

Accounts will also be decreed in favour of—

- (a.) Patentee against infringer, and assignee against licensee.
- (b.) *Cestui que trust* against trustee.
- (c.) Mortgagor against mortgagee.

- (2.) Where there are mutual accounts between plaintiff and defendant.

Mutual accounts are "where each of two parties has received and also paid on the other's account."

*Phillips v. Phillips.*

There is no action of account if it is a mere question of set-off.

- (3.) Where there are circumstances of special complication.

The test as to what amount of complication would give equity jurisdiction has been stated to be—Can accounts be examined on a trial at *Nisi prius*?

*O'Connor v. Spaight.*

But this test has not been universally followed, and the difficulty of examining accounts at *Nisi prius* will only amount to a strong circumstance in favour of equity jurisdiction.

Under the Judicature Acts, as modified by the Arbitration Act, 1889, matters of account may be referred to official or other referees.

### *Chief Defences to Actions of Account.*

- (1.) Stated or settled account.

An open account is one of which the balance is not struck, or which is not accepted, by both parties.

A stated account is one that is accepted, either expressly or impliedly, by both parties.

A settled account is one which has not only been accepted by both parties, but discharged.

In reply to this defence the plaintiff—

- (a.) As a general rule, has only liberty to surcharge and falsify (*vide ante*, p. 57), the *onus probandi* being on him.

- (b.) Where fraud or mistake is proved, may have the whole account opened and taken *de novo*.

- (2.) Laches and acquiescence.

Except where the parties occupy a fiduciary relation, and *mala fides* is alleged. Formerly the Statute of

Limitations did not apply where a fiduciary relation existed between the parties, but the Trustee Act, 1888, provides that except in cases of fraud the statute shall in future apply just as if the parties were not in a fiduciary relation.

Note that the relation between

(a.) Broker and client is a fiduciary one.

*Ex parte Cook, in re Strachan.*

(b.) Banker and customer is not a fiduciary one, but merely that of debtor and creditor.

*Foley v. Hill.*

In the absence of *fraud*, accounts, however irregularly taken, are, as a general rule, to be treated as "settled accounts," if they appear to have been so intended by the parties.

*Ex parte Barber; Holgate v. Shutt.*

## CHAPTER VIII.

### SET-OFF AND APPROPRIATION OF PAYMENTS AND OF SECURITIES.

#### SET-OFF.

SET-OFF has been defined as a defence which the defendant in an action sets up against the plaintiff's claim, counter-balancing such claim in whole or in part.

*Stooke v. Taylor.*

No set-off was originally allowed at common law in cases of *mutual unconnected debts*. This was remedied by the Statutes of Set-off (4 Anne, c. 17; 2 Geo. II. c. 22; 8 Geo. II. c. 24), which provided that the right of set-off should exist first of all in the case of bankrupts only, but finally in all cases of *mutual debts*. In the case of *mutual connected debts* the balance only was recoverable, both at law and in equity, thus allowing the right of set-off.

### Equity allowed the right of set-off

- (1.) In all cases of mutual independent debts where there was *mutual credit* or the debts had a common origin, and this apart from the Statutes of Set-off, upon the ground either of presumed intention of the parties or natural equity.
- (2.) In the case of mutual equitable debts, or of legal debt on one side and an equitable debt on the other, where there was a mutual credit as to such debts.
- (3.) In the case of cross demands, where some equitable ground existed for claiming relief.

Now, in all these cases, under the Judicature Acts and rules, there would be a set-off both at law and in equity.

### No set-off was or is allowed

- (1.) In cases where there is an intervening equity, *e.g.*, in the winding up of a company, a debt cannot be set off against calls unless both the company and the shareholder are insolvent. *Grissel's Case.*
- (2.) In cases of debts accruing in different rights or of intrinsically different qualities, *e.g.*, joint against separate debts (unless under special circumstances such as fraud) or statute-barred debt against one not so barred.

A legacy may in general be set off against a debt owing by the legatee to the testator's estate, even though statute-barred or the legatee has become bankrupt since the testator's death.

Set-off is allowed under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 38, in cases where there have been mutual credits, debts, or other mutual dealings; the rule extending not only to liquidated damages but even to unliquidated damages, if arising in connection with a *contract*. *Re Mid Kent Fruit Co.*

But money paid for a specific purpose cannot be applied to any other purpose.

Note that even under the Statutes of Set-off mutual *debts*



only could be set off; but now under the Judicature Acts a defendant may set off or set up a counter-claim, whether such set-off or counter-claim *sound in damages* or not.

A counter-claim is to be distinguished from a set-off, being the assertion of a separate independent demand, not answering or destroying the claim of the plaintiff.

*Stooke v. Taylor.*

#### APPROPRIATION (or, as termed in Roman Law, Imputation) OF PAYMENTS.

Where a debtor, owing several debts to the same creditor, makes a payment to him, the question arises, In respect of which debt was it paid? As to this the following rules have been established by

##### *Clayton's Case.*

- (1.) The *debtor* has the right, in the first instance, to appropriate the payment to which debt he chooses, provided he does so at the time of making the payment, either expressly or by implication.
- (2.) The *creditor*, on the debtor failing, has the next right of appropriation, which he may exercise at any time before action brought.

The creditor may even appropriate the payment towards satisfaction of a statute-barred (but not an illegal) debt.

Such appropriation will not, however, *revive* a debt already barred; *Mills v. Fowkes.* but a general payment will take a debt not already barred out of the statute.

- (3.) On both debtor and creditor failing to exercise this right, the law will appropriate the payment to the debt earliest in point of date, commencing with the liquidation of any interest which may be due. The account is not to be taken backwards and the balance struck at the head instead of the foot of it.

*Clayton's Case.*

This rule is only a presumption of law, and may therefore be excluded: thus it does not apply between a guaranteed account and one not so secured, or between trustee and *cestui que trust*.

*In re Sherry; In re Hallett's Estate.*

### APPROPRIATION OF SECURITIES.

Where securities are appropriated by a debtor to specific debts, then to the extent the creditor disposes of the securities they go in discharge of such debts, whether there be only one debt or successive debts.

In the case of the bankruptcy of *both* debtor and creditor, this rule is known as the rule in *Waring's Case*. In such a double bankruptcy the securities remaining in specie are to be applied according to their appropriation; and the rule applies even to third party holders. It has no application, however, if neither party be bankrupt.

The rule in *Waring's Case* is only applicable where there is a double bankruptcy; and the appropriation must in all cases be proved.

*Phelp Stokes & Co. v. Comber.*

## CHAPTER IX.

### SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

THE doctrine of specific performance is based on the principle that in equity the plaintiff is entitled to have the specific thing for which he has contracted. While at law the only remedy for breach of contract was an action for damages, in equity the actual contract might be compelled to be carried out; the absence or inadequacy of the legal remedy constituting the ground for the interposition of equity. It is, therefore, a general principle in these cases that equity will not interfere where damages would amount to a complete compensation.

Equity will not, however, interfere to compel specific performance in the following cases:—

- (1.) Illegal or immoral agreements.
- (2.) Voluntary or revocable agreements.

An agreement for a mere tenancy from year to year will not be enforced.

- (3.) Agreements which are incapable of being actually enforced by the court, such as agreements—

(a.) Where personal skill or knowledge is involved, *e.g.*, a contract to write a book or sing at a theatre. *Lumley v. Wagner.*

Even negative stipulations will not be enforced by injunction and notwithstanding being reasonable, if the result would be in effect to force a person to give personal service to another. *Re W. Robinson.*

(b.) For sale of the goodwill of a business *without* the premises.

(c.) To build or repair, as being too uncertain.

- (4.) Agreements wanting in mutuality.

The remedy *must* be *mutual*, or action for specific performance will not be entertained ;

*Adderley v. Dixon.*

so an infant cannot sue for specific performance, although he may have his remedy for damages.

The Statute of Frauds, s. 4, creates no exception to this rule, for the plaintiff, although he has not signed the agreement, makes the remedy mutual by suing.

- (5.) Agreements for loan of money, as damages afford adequate remedy; but an agreement to take the debentures of a company may now be enforced under the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908.

- (6.) An agreement by donee of a power to make a particular appointment. *Hill v. Schwartz.*

When a contract comprises several matters, some of which—standing alone—would be susceptible of being specifically enforced, specific performance may be obtained of such part of the contract, if clearly severable and a piece—

meal performance of the agreement is consistent with the intention of the parties.

There must, of course, be a complete agreement; and with regard to agreements by correspondence, it may be noted that an offer to sell may be withdrawn before acceptance without formal notice; and the post-office is the common agent of both parties, so that as soon as a letter of acceptance is delivered to the post-office the agreement is complete.

The subject may be divided into two heads:—

### I.—AGREEMENTS RESPECTING PERSONAL CHATTELS.

As a general rule, agreements of this character will not be enforced, for damages at law would afford an adequate compensation; where, however, this would not be the case, specific performance may be decreed: *Cuddee v. Rutter.*

As in the case of agreements—

(1.) For the sale of *shares* in a private undertaking.  
*Duncuft v. Albrecht.*

(2.) For sale of assigned debts under a bankruptcy.  
*Adderley v. Dixon.*

And specific *delivery* instead of damages will be decreed—  
(1.) In cases of articles of unusual beauty or rarity, when damages would not compensate.

*Dowling v. Betjemann.*

(2.) In cases of heirlooms and chattels of peculiar value.  
*Somerset v. Cookson*; *Pusey v. Pusey.*

(3.) Where a fiduciary relation exists between the parties.  
*Wood v. Rowcliffe.*

By the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, courts of law were empowered to order specific delivery of chattels in actions of detinue; and now, under the Judicature Acts, the powers of courts of law and equity are co-extensive.

And under the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, the court may, if it think fit, in any case of



breach of contract to deliver specific goods, decree specific performance instead of damages.

## II.—AGREEMENTS RESPECTING LANDS.

These agreements are generally enforced specifically, for land may have a peculiar value in the eyes of the purchaser, so that damages will not be a sufficient remedy, since they would not, as in the case of personal chattels, enable him to go and buy other property of exactly the same description and value to him. This jurisdiction of equity extends to lands out of the jurisdiction, if the parties are within it, for the jurisdiction is against the defendant personally.

*Penn v. Lord Baltimore.*

The term “specific performance” is used in a double sense, namely, in the sense of

- (1.) Turning an executory agreement into an executed one by ordering execution of document stipulated for.
- (2.) Carrying out *in specie* the subject-matter of the agreement.

The 4th section of the Statute of Frauds does not avoid the agreement, but only prevents its being proved; and notwithstanding the provisions of the statute, equity will decree specific performance of a *parol* agreement in the four following cases, on the ground that it would be inequitable to allow the statute to be set up as a bar to relief:—

1. Where the sale is by the direction of the court.
2. Where it is fully set forth by the plaintiff in his statement of claim, and admitted by the defendant in his defence, and the defendant does not set up the statute as a bar.

In such a case the defendant may be deemed to have waived his right, the rule being *Quisque renuntiare potest jure pro se introducto*.

3. Where it was intended to be reduced into writing, but this has been prevented by the fraud of the defendant.
4. Where it has been partly performed by the plaintiff.

*Hussey v. Horne Payne; Lester v. Foxcroft.*

In order that an agreement may be taken out of the statute by acts of part performance, there must be a valuable consideration on the part of the person seeking to enforce it. *In re Hudson.*

As to what acts will be deemed a

### PART PERFORMANCE.

- (1.) Acts introductory or ancillary only to the agreement do *not* amount to part performance, *e.g.*, delivering abstract of title.
- (2.) Acts, to be deemed part performance, must be *exclusively* and unequivocally referable to the agreement, *e.g.*, where possession is delivered and obtained *solely* under the agreement.

*Alderson v. Maddison.*

- (3.) Acts of part performance, in order to take a parol agreement out of the statute, must be of such a nature that specific performance could be decreed if it were in writing; and must be such that it would amount to fraud in the defendant to take advantage of the contract not being in writing; acts of part performance will not of themselves supply the want of jurisdiction.
- (4.) Acts, to be deemed part performance, must not be capable of being undone. Thus

Payment of purchase-money, in whole or in part, is no act of part performance, for on repayment the parties will be in the same position as before.

Compare as to part payment, sec. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, and sec. 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893.

- (5.) Marriage is not *per se* deemed a part performance, but acts in furtherance of the agreement independently of the marriage are.

*Surcombe v. Pinniger; Caton v. Caton.*

And a return to cohabitation may be a sufficient act of part performance.

A post-nuptial *written* agreement in pursuance

of a pre-nuptial *parol* agreement is enforceable as between the parties, but such an agreement may be impeached by third parties either under 13 Eliz. c. 5, or the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. *Gregg v. Holland*.

In marriage as well as other agreements, *parol* representations intended to influence the conduct of the other party, and on the faith of which he acts, will be enforced, but not representations of a mere *intention*. It must be a representation of some state of facts alleged to be at the time actually in existence, *i.e.*, representation of existing facts.

- (6.) The *parol* evidence must prove the agreement.

#### GROUND OF DEFENCE

to an action for specific performance apart from the Statute of Frauds.

- (I.) Misrepresentation by plaintiff in relation to the agreement, even where misrepresentation would not be a ground for rescission by the defendant: and a misrepresentation by an agent would be deemed the misrepresentation of the principal, if made for principal's benefit.
- (II.) Mistake rendering specific performance a hardship, and this whether the mistake be mutual or unilateral.  
*Parol* evidence of mistake is admissible in equity, for the Statute of Frauds merely provides that an *unwritten* agreement shall *not* bind.
- (III.) Error of defendant even if arising from his own negligence; for defendant may be answerable for *damages* at law without being liable to specific performance.

*Malins v. Freeman.*

With regard to mistake or *parol* variation, evidence of it was wholly inadmissible at law, and as a general

rule is only allowed to be offered in equity by a *defendant resisting* specific performance, and not by a plaintiff seeking to compel such performance, on the ground that if one seeks to enforce a written contract he is bound by the words used in the writing in which it is expressed, and extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show that the real intention of the parties is different from that expressed in writing.

Parol evidence may, however, be gone into by the *plaintiff*.

- (1.) Where the parol variation is in favour of the defendant, and the plaintiff offers to perform the agreement with the variation.
- (2.) Where the defendant sets up a parol variation, and the plaintiff seeks specific performance of the agreement with the variation.

*Woollam v. Hearn ; Townshend v. Stangroom.*

- (3.) Where there have been such acts of part performance of the parol portion as would justify a decree for specific performance in the case of an original agreement.
- (4.) Where an omission has occurred by fraud.

*(Sm. Man.)*

As to the effect of a mistake or parol variation  
when set up as a *défence*.

- (1.) Where the error arose, not in the original agreement, but in its reduction into writing, specific performance decreed with the parol variation.

No relief will be granted where the error arose from a misunderstanding in the original agreement, as the parties were never *ad idem*.

- (2.) Evidence of a parol agreement subsequent to a written agreement is inadmissible unless there have been such acts of part performance as would enable it to be enforced if an original agreement.



(IV.) Misdescription. This defence may be classified under two heads—

Cases where the misdescription

- (1) Is of a substantial character so as not fairly to admit of compensation; a purchaser ought to have what he bargained for.
- (2.) Is of such a character as fairly to admit of compensation. *Seton v. Slade.*

A. In cases where VENDOR seeks Specific Performance.

- (1.) Purchaser is not compelled to take—
  - (a.) Freehold instead of copyhold.
  - (b.) Under-lease instead of original lease.
  - (c.) Compensation where there has been fraud.
- (2.) Purchaser will be compelled to take, with compensation, where the difference is slight, as a mere deficiency in acreage.

Where there is a provision for compensation in the agreement, a claim for compensation for *misdescription* will be allowed even after conveyance; unless expressly barred by the agreement. *Palmer v. Johnston; Clayson v. Leech.*

But this does not extend to cases of defect of title. *Debenham v. Sawbridge.*

B. In cases where PURCHASER seeks Specific Performance.

- (1.) Purchaser can compel specific performance with an abatement in price. The vendor must sell what interest he has. *Hill v. Buckley.*
- (2.) But where partial performance would be unreasonable or prejudicial to third parties it will not be enforced.

Where the terms of the agreement exclude compensation in case of a deficiency of acreage, and there is a considerable deficiency, the rule is that the purchaser cannot enforce specific performance with compensation, nor can the vendor without compensation. The vendor may, however, annul the agreement under the usual condition.

(V.) Lapse of time.

At law, time used to be always of the essence of the contract, but in equity time is deemed to be *prima facie* non-essential. *Seton v. Slade.*

And under the Judicature Act, 1873, the rule in equity now prevails at law.

Time is, however, deemed to be of the essence of the contract, and its lapse will therefore be a bar to relief even in equity in the following cases.

- (1.) Where originally of the essence of the contract by
  - (a.) Express agreement.
  - (b.) The nature of the case.
- (2.) Where made of the essence of the contract by subsequent *reasonable* notice.
- (3.) Where its lapse is such as to constitute laches or abandonment.

(VI.) The agreement is tainted with fraud; and the person defrauded or prejudiced may also rescind the contract.

Formerly in the case of sales by trustees under depreciatory conditions, specific performance would not be enforced; but now the Trustee Act, 1893, expressly deprives the purchaser of the right of making any objection or requisition on this ground.

(VII.) Where the agreement would work great hardship, or involve an unlawful act or breach of trust: *e.g.*, where trustees contract to sell and the purchaser resells to one of them, the contract for subsale will not be enforced while the original contract remains executory. *Delves v. Gray.*

(VIII.) The agreement is not established; that is, if it be not a complete agreement as such, because some term wanting or some condition unfulfilled.

(IX.) The vendor cannot deduce a title.

But the purchaser can only require such a title as is stipulated for in the agreement. In the

absence of stipulation the purchaser can insist on a good title, and he will not be compelled to accept a "good holding title," nor to take land subject to restrictive covenants.

Freehold property means unencumbered freehold.

*Philips v. Caldeclough.*

And if there are restrictive covenants the vendor must disclose them, and if he fails to do so the purchaser is entitled to be released from the contract.

*Hone v. Gadstatter.*

Although precluded by the agreement from objecting to the vendor's title, the purchaser will not be compelled to complete if the vendor cannot give a holding title, *e.g.*, if the purchaser might be turned out of possession at once.

*Scott v. Alvarez.*

If the vendor makes title through, or is himself, an undischarged bankrupt to property acquired after the bankruptcy, then, if the trustee has not intervened, the title is good in the case of leasehold property, a legacy or share of residue, or partnership realty, whether the purchaser has or has not knowledge of the bankruptcy.

*Cohen v. Mitchell ;*

*Hunt v. Fripp ; Re Kent Gas Light Co.*

But as regards *real* estate or equitable estates in *realty*, even though the trustee has not intervened a good title cannot be made without the concurrence of the trustee.

*Re New Land Co. v. Gray ; Preston's Trustee v. Cooke.*

The taking of possession by the purchaser is generally, and under a sale by the court always, deemed an acceptance of the title.

### *Repudiation and Rescission.*

The purchaser may repudiate the agreement on any one of the grounds above mentioned as constituting a good defence to an action for specific performance and will be entitled to return of his deposit ; but if he repudiate without

sufficient ground he will be liable in damages, and his deposit will be forfeited even in absence of express stipulation.

In respect of restrictive covenants not disclosed to him, the purchaser's remedy is rescission and not specific performance with compensation. *Rudd v. Lascelles.*

The vendor may rescind the agreement when he has specially reserved to himself a right so to do; but in the exercise of the power he must act reasonably, and not arbitrarily.

Where vendor rescinds for purchaser's default, deposit, although forfeited, must be allowed against deficiency on resale.

The expenses for improvements executed under the Public Health Act, 1875, or the Private Street Works Act, 1892, are, as between vendor and purchaser, a charge on the property which takes effect from the completion of the work or from the time some one becomes personally liable to execute or pay for it. Under an open contract the charge in general falls on the vendor.

Under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, s. 9, a summons may be issued for the decision of any question arising out of an agreement for the sale of land. Under this Act—where the contract as regards its initial validity is not disputed—the parties may have many questions decided which could otherwise only be decided in an action for specific performance, but damages properly so called cannot be awarded under such a summons.

Under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, courts of law had power to compel the specific performance of contracts by means of a mandamus. This power, however, was restricted to contracts relating to some *public duty*.

*Benson v. Paull.*



## CHAPTER X.

## INJUNCTIONS.

AN INJUNCTION is a judicial order (formerly a *writ*), the general purpose of which is to restrain the commission or continuance of some wrongful act of the party enjoined.

The jurisdiction of equity arose from the fact that at law there was either no remedy at all, or else only an imperfect and inadequate remedy. The object of an injunction is usually preventive rather than restorative. The purpose of the majority of injunctions is the protection of proprietary rights. They are either prohibitive or mandatory.

A prohibitive injunction is an order granted to restrain the commission or continuance of some wrongful act or the continuance of some wrongful omission.

A mandatory injunction is an order calling upon a person to do some act.

Injunctions have been generally divided into two classes—

I. Common injunctions, to prevent the inequitable institution or continuance of judicial proceedings.

Under the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 24, the power of equity courts to restrain proceedings actually *pending* in other courts is practically abolished, and the court before which the action is pending may itself direct a stay of proceedings in a proper case; and since the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the Court of Bankruptcy, having become an integral part of the High Court, has lost its power of restraining proceedings in other courts by injunction. Now, therefore, instead of injunctions of this class, there is an order to stay proceedings.

II. Special injunctions, to restrain wrongful acts unconnected with judicial proceedings.

Under the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, an injunction may be granted by an interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it appears to the court just or convenient, either conditionally or unconditionally.

But this provision does not give the court any new power to issue an injunction where no court had such jurisdiction prior to the Judicature Acts.

# I.—ORDER TO STAY PROCEEDINGS, *or other like Remedial Orders.*

Equity, in issuing the old injunction to restrain proceedings at law, did not interfere with the jurisdiction of common law courts, but merely acted *in personam*, operating on the conscience of the party enjoined.

*Earl of Oxford's Case.*

Upon the same principle, when the parties were within its jurisdiction, equity restrained them from proceeding in a foreign court, and any division of the High Court may now do the like.

The old injunction was granted in cases where the remedy at law would be complete if proofs could be had and in cases of purely equitable rights. In similar cases now, an order to stay will be granted.

Formerly proceedings at law *were restrained* by equity, and now a stay of proceedings will be directed by the court before whom the action is pending in cases—

- (1.) Where an instrument has been obtained by fraud or undue influence.
- (2.) Where assets have been lost by an executor or administrator without his default; or in lieu of a stay of proceedings, the court may order a transfer of the action into the Chancery Division.
- (3.) Where a person has only a bare legal title, as against one possessing an equitable title.

*Newlands v. Paynter.*

- (4.) Where a creditor has obtained judgment in an action for administration, or a transfer of the action into the Chancery Division may be directed.
- (5.) Where more than one action is brought for the same purpose, and even in the formerly excepted case of a mortgagee the whole relief sought must now be claimed in one action.

(6.) Equity will protect its officers who execute its own processes.

Equity would *not* grant injunctions to stay proceedings at law—

- (1.) In matters criminal, or not *purely civil*, unless the parties seeking relief were also plaintiffs in equity.
- (2.) Where defence was equally available at law, in the absence of special equitable grounds for relief.
- (3.) Where the matter has been duly adjudicated upon at law. *Bateman v. Willoe.*

The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, provided that equitable defences should be allowed at law, but this was confined to cases in which equity would grant an unconditional and perpetual injunction.

*Jeffs v. Day.*

This provision was optional; but now, under the Judicature Acts, the defendant at law *must* plead every kind of defence of which he intends to avail himself.

Where there is a subsisting agreement to refer to arbitration, an order staying proceedings may be made.

## II.—SPECIAL INJUNCTIONS TO RESTRAIN WRONGFUL ACTS *unconnected with Judicial Proceedings.*

Consider these under two heads—

Firstly, Injunctions to enforce a contract (express or implied), or to forbid a breach thereof.

Secondly, Injunctions to prevent a tort.

Firstly, Injunctions in cases of contract.

- (1.) This jurisdiction is supplemental to that of enforcing specific performance; for, as a general rule, what equity will compel to be done it will restrain from being left undone; and even where it cannot enforce performance, it will frequently restrain acts contrary to the tenor of the agreement. *Catt v. Tourle.*

But if agreement is not in writing, Statute of Frauds may be a defence. *Reeve v. Jennings.*

Equity will only grant an injunction to indirectly compel specific performance where damages would

be an absolutely inadequate remedy. A purchaser who, before completion, has notice of restrictive covenants will be compelled to observe them.

- (2.) Negative contracts are specifically enforced by means of injunctions, unless covenantee disentitled to relief.
- (3.) The breach of part of an agreement may be restrained although specific performance of the remainder cannot be enforced; *Lumley v. Wagner*.  
but not, as a general rule, where the court cannot secure performance by the plaintiff on his part.
- (4.) Breaches of *implied* contracts resulting from the misrepresentations or acts of the parties are restrained, unless there has been acquiescence.

*Piggott v. Stratton*; *Neesom v. Clarkson*.

- (5.) Breaches of statutory contracts will be restrained without proof of actual damage, but there must be no laches.

Secondly, Injunctions against torts, *i.e.*, wrongs independent of contract. Wherever there is a right, there is a remedy for its violation. To afford sufficient grounds for an injunction, there must be something more than a mere inconvenience—there must be a legal injury.

The more important cases are—

#### (I.) Waste:

Waste is a material alteration of things forming an integral part of the inheritance. Waste, as distinguished from trespass, could only be committed by a limited owner, between whom and the party aggrieved there was a privity of estate. Waste is either Voluntary, *e.g.*, the destruction of buildings, or Permissive, *e.g.*, permitting buildings to fall out of repair.

The remedy at law was the old writ of waste under the statutes of Marlbridge, Gloucester, and Westminster. In many cases the law provided no effective remedy, and the jurisdiction of equity arose from the incompetency of the law. Thus equity would restrain—

- (1.) In cases not within the statutes; *e.g.*, where the party had not the *inheritance*. *Garth v. Cotton*.



- (2.) Tenants without impeachment of waste from committing *equitable waste*, such as pulling down the family mansion-house or felling ornamental timber.

*Lewis Bowle's Case.*

Tenants in tail after possibility of issue extinct, and tenants in fee with executory devise over, are on same footing as tenants expressly stated to be without impeachment of waste.

- (3.) Where the title of the aggrieved party is purely equitable.

- (4.) Where waste is only apprehended.

- (5.) In cases of mortgages, if the mortgagor should fell timber and thereby render the security insufficient.

Permissive waste by a legal tenant for life was *not* remediable in equity, on the ground that the party aggrieved could obtain damages at law, and equity will no longer interfere to stay *ameliorative waste*, or to prevent or remedy *permissive waste*.

A remainderman has no remedy against a tenant for life in respect of permissive waste, unless the tenant for life is subject to an obligation to repair.

*Avis v. Newman ; Parry v. Hopkin.*

An equitable tenant for life of leaseholds is not bound to put same into better repair than they were at testator's death.

*Re Courtier.*

But is liable to perform the continuing obligations under the lease during his life interest.

*Re Gjers.*

Under the Judicature Act, 1873, the distinction between legal and equitable waste is practically abolished; for by sec. 25 it is provided that an estate for life without impeachment of waste shall not give the tenant for life any *legal right* to commit *equitable waste* in the absence of intention to confer such right in the instrument creating the estate.

Ecclesiastical waste. A rector or vicar is in the same position as an ordinary tenant for life, and has no right to fell timber, except for necessary repairs to the parsonage and premises.

## (II.) Nuisances.

*Public* nuisance—remedy, indictment at law, or injunction or information at the suit of the Attorney-General in equity. Where a public nuisance causes special damage to a private person beyond that suffered by the rest of the public, he may himself have his remedy by action. *Soltau v. De Held.*

Where the nuisance is directly authorised by statute, there is no remedy either at equity or law.

*Private* nuisance—remedy, action at law for damages or injunction in equity; also by abatement or removal of the nuisance by the party injured.

As a general rule, equity does not interfere by injunction where damages would be an adequate compensation; *e.g.*, a mere trespass, where temporary and without claim of right.

Equity will, however, interfere wherever the injury is not susceptible of being adequately compensated by damages or is irreparable. Thus equity will grant an injunction to prevent or remedy such nuisances as—

## (a.) Darkening ancient lights.

But to obtain an injunction it must be proved that sufficient light is not left for the ordinary purposes of inhabitancy or business, according to the ordinary notions of mankind. *Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores.*

A right to light is not rendered indefeasible even by twenty years' enjoyment unless and until action is brought in which the right is called in question; and a tenant in occupation may give a consent which will prevent the landlord acquiring a right.

*Hymen v. Van den Bergh.*

(b.) Disturbance of rights to lateral support independently of prescription. *Humphries v. Brogden*

## (c.) Pollution of streams injuring riparian owners.

*Att.-Gen. v. Birmingham.*

## (d.) Smoke or noxious fumes visibly diminishing the value of property.

*Tipping v. St. Helen's Smelting Co.*

Where the property from which the nuisance proceeds

is in lease, the reversioner may be liable equally with the occupying tenant.

### (III.) Libels, slanders, &c.

Equity will restrain by injunction the utterance or repetition of libels, slanders, injurious trade circulars, &c.

*Thorley's Cattle Food v. Massam*; *Thomas v. Williams*.

Under the 58 & 59 Vict. c. 40, the repetition of libellous statements at elections may be restrained.

Under the Patents and Designs Act, 1907 (7 Edw. VII. c. 29), re-enacting like provisions in the Patent Designs and Trade-Marks Act, 1883, an injunction may be obtained against any person who by circular or otherwise threatens proceedings as for infringement of a patent or design unless action be commenced forthwith.

### (IV.) Patents, designs, copyrights, and trade-marks.

Equity exercises jurisdiction and grants injunctions in these cases wherever there is a *prima facie* title founded upon long enjoyment to prevent irreparable mischief and to suppress multiplicity of suits. It is clear that damages would be no adequate compensation for infringement, and that actions at law would give no sufficient remedy.

#### 1. Patents.

A patent has been defined as a grant from the Crown by letters patent of the exclusive privilege of making, using, exercising, and vending some new invention.

The law of patents is now regulated by the Patents and Designs Act, 1907, which provides that the duration of a patent shall be fourteen years, which may be extended by the court for a further seven or even fourteen years, on proof that the patentee has been inadequately remunerated by the patent. Unless a patent has been registered under the Act, no injunction can be obtained in respect thereof; but the Act does not interfere with the jurisdiction in equity.

Formerly it was immaterial whether the infringer of a patent was aware of the existence of the patent, but now, under the Act, no damages can be recovered

from an innocent infringer where the patent has been granted since 1907.

Formerly joint patentees might grant licences separately, but now, under the Act, a licence can only be granted with the consent of all the patentees; but joint patentees need not account for profits made by working the patent.

*Steers v. Rogers.*

Under the Act of 1907, upon application for a patent an official search is made to ascertain whether the invention has been previously claimed.

Prior publication is usually fatal to the application for a patent, but the Act protects the patentee from being prejudiced if he can prove that such publication was made without his knowledge, that the matter published was derived from him, and that he has made his application with reasonable diligence.

Upon a motion for an interlocutory injunction three courses are open to the court in acceding to the application—

- (a.) Injunction simply.
- (b.) Interim injunction, plaintiff undertaking as to damages.
- (c.) Injunction directed to stand over until trial, defendant keeping an account.

The plaintiff must deliver particulars of breaches and the defendant particulars of objections to the patent.

It may be noted that the first statute defining patent rights is the Statute of Monopolies (21 Jac. I. c. 3), patent rights being originally a privilege granted by the Crown as restrained by legislative enactments; and by the Act of 1907 "invention" is declared to mean any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent within the Statute of Monopolies.

A foreign patent, to be effective in England, must be worked, or *bonâ fide* attempted to be worked, here.

When a design is registered under the Patents and Designs Act, 1907, the registered proprietor has copyright in the design for a period of five years, which



period can be extended for a further five years on payment of the prescribed fees; and the Comptroller has power to grant a third period of five years.

## 2. Copyrights.

Irrespective of the Copyright Act, 1911, which comes into force July 1, 1912. The copyright in a book endures for the life of the author and a further seven years, or the period of forty-two years, whichever period is the longer.

Copyright comprises both

- (a.) The right of the author to publish or not, and to restrain others from publishing.

And the publication of *unpublished* manuscript may be restrained.

*Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare.*

- (b.) The right after publication of republishing, and restraining others from doing so.

The plaintiff must in the first place make out his title by *registration* and otherwise, and this done, the principal question at issue is whether or not there has been an infringement, *i.e.*, piracy or no piracy; and

- (a.) Quotations, abridgments, use of common materials will not constitute any infringement if *bonâ fide*, otherwise if *malâ fide*.
- (b.) Copyright exists in orally delivered lectures, and publication by hearers is an infringement.

*Abernethy v. Hutchinson.*

Even if the publication be in shorthand only.

*Nicols v. Pitman.*

By 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 65 (repealed by Copyright Act, 1911), a lecturer, in order to obtain copyright in his lecture, must give two previous days' notice thereof to two justices of the peace residing within five miles of the place proposed for delivery. The statute does not affect lectures delivered in a university or public school.

The reporter of a lecture or speech acquires copyright in his report.

*Walter v. Lane.*

There is no copyright in the title of a book or news-

paper, although there may be in its mere external appearance. *Walter v. Emmott*; *Walter v. Howe*. And there is no copyright in libellous or immoral works.

(c.) As to private letters, literary or otherwise—

(1.) The writer may restrain their publication.

*Pope v. Curl*.

(2.) The party written to may restrain their publication by a stranger.

(3.) Publication may, however, be permitted on grounds of public policy.

As to *dramatic* pieces and *musical* compositions, there are two rights of property: (a.) The copyright; (b.) the right of representation or performance.

And these rights may be separated, and the right of representation will not pass by the assignment of the copyright unless so expressed.

Copyright is in the *description* and not in the thing described, whereas patent is in the *thing described*.

Under the Copyright Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 46), the privilege of copyright is given throughout our dominions so far as the Act extends in respect of every original literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic work, if, in case the work is published, it was first published within such parts of our dominions, or, in case it is unpublished, the author was at the date of making it a British subject or resident within such parts; and copyright is defined as the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatsoever, to perform, or in the case of a lecture to deliver, the work or any substantial part thereof in public; if the work is unpublished, to publish the work or any substantial part thereof. Under the Act copyright will endure (except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act) for the life of the author and a further period of fifty years.

And (1.) Dealing fairly with a work for review, study or summary;

(2.) Reproductions in school books of short passages from published works, limiting the number of passages to two from same author;

(3.) Reports of lectures, except where a report is prohibited by conspicuous notice, are not to be deemed infringements.

(3.) Trade-marks.

A trade-mark has been defined as the symbol by which a man causes his goods or wares to be identified and known on the market. The law on this subject is now regulated by the Trade-Marks Act, 1905 (5 Edw. VII. c. 15), under which a "trade-mark" signifies a mark used in connection with goods for the purpose of indicating that they are the goods of the proprietor of such trade-mark by virtue of manufacture, dealing with, or sale, and "mark" includes a name or signature as well as a device. But in order that a *word* may be registered as such it must be an invented word or a word having no direct reference to the character or quality of the goods, and not being a geographical name or surname.

The registration of a trade-mark is for a period of fourteen years, but may be renewed from time to time in accordance with the Act.

Prior to the Trade-Marks Registration Acts, 1875-1876, the right of equity to protect from infringement of trade-marks was based not upon any *property* in them, for it was said there is no property in a trade-mark, but upon the *fraudulent* misrepresentation.

*Turton v. Turton*; *Burgess v. Burgess*; *Cocks v. Chandler*.

Some doubt, however, existed as to whether this jurisdiction was not founded upon property in the sole application of the symbol.

*Leather-Cloth Co. v. American Leather-Cloth Co.*

At any rate, it was laid down that it was not

necessary to prove fraud in order to entitle a party to relief. *Singer Machine Manufrs. v. Wilson.*

But now, if a trade-mark has been duly registered under the Trade-Marks Act, 1905, the owner has a true property in it, to the extent the trade-mark is used in connection with goods, but not further, and may restrain the use of it by others.

A duly registered trade-mark can only be assigned in connection with the goodwill of the business concerned in the goods for which it has been registered, and is determinable with that goodwill.

Under the Act no person can sue for infringement of a trade-mark unless it is duly registered; the registered proprietor is entitled to the exclusive right to use it. Registration is *prima facie*, and after seven years is practically conclusive, evidence of right to the trade-mark, unless the registration was obtained by fraud or would be otherwise disentitled to protection in a court of justice.

An injunction will only be granted if defendant's mark is so similar to the plaintiff's as to be calculated to deceive. But notwithstanding the Act, a distinctive symbol applied to goods may by user become a trade-mark, and things incapable of registration may be protected by injunction in an action for "passing off."

The principle of law is that nobody has any right to represent his goods as the goods of somebody else. *Reddaway v Banham.*

And if the effect of the use of a person's own name is to mislead the public, although there is no fraudulent intention, an injunction will be granted.

*Valentine v. Valentine.*

All that has to be proved is that the natural result of the conduct complained of will be to pass off goods as the goods of another. *Cellular Clothing Company.*

#### (V.) Breach of contract.

An injunction will be granted to restrain the breach of a restrictive covenant of which the purchaser of land has notice.



By *Lord Cairns's Act* (21 & 22 Vict. c. 27) power was given to equity courts to award damages, wherever they have jurisdiction to grant an *injunction* or *specific performance*, either in addition to or in substitution for such injunction or performance. It is now repealed, but the right of the Chancery Division to award damages in lieu of or in addition to an injunction is preserved.

And now, under the Judicature Acts, as has been stated, all courts are upon the same footing in respect of granting injunctions, although relief is generally sought in the Chancery Division, whenever before these Acts the aid of equity would have been invoked.

A *mandatory* injunction is one which directs the performance of a positive act, and generally requires a much stronger case to be made out than a prohibitory injunction, especially if interlocutory. *Durrell v. Pritchard.*

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## CHAPTER XI.

### PARTITION.

THREE kinds of co-owners are recognised at law—

- (1.) Coparceners—where a person leaves several co-heirs. These alone could originally compel partition; hence their name, *parceners*.
- (2.) Joint-tenants—where property is limited to two or more persons without words of division.
- (3.) Tenants in common—where property is limited to several, with words defining the aliquot shares each is to take. (*Haynes' Eq.*)

Courts of law, however, had power given them by statute to compel partition in every case by means of a writ of partition.

Equity assumed jurisdiction wherever the title was purely equitable, so that partition could not be directed at law, and generally in all cases on the ground of the inadequacy of the

legal remedy; for courts of law could not effectuate a partition by mutual conveyances, or order any other than an *equal* partition. The procedure in suits for partition was to issue a commission to be completed by mutual conveyances. Now, a reference to chambers is made to ascertain what would be a proper division. *Agar v. Fairfax.*

No suit for partition could be maintained by a reversioner or a person claiming under a disputed title.

Equity had no power to order a sale in lieu of partition; great inconvenience and difficulty consequently occurred where property small. *Turner v. Morgan.*

Now, however, by the Partition Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 40), amended by the Partition Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 17), the Court (Chancery Division)—

- (1.) Has *power*, on request of any interested party, notwithstanding the dissent or disability of any others, to order a sale in lieu of partition, in the event of special circumstances rendering it more beneficial, and also notwithstanding the majority dissent, and are ready to purchase the shares of those requesting a sale. *Gilbert v. Smith.*
- (2.) Is *bound*, on request of parties interested to extent of a moiety, to order a sale, unless good reason to the contrary. *Pemberton v. Barnes.*
- (3.) Has *power*, on request of any interested party, to order a sale unless the other interested parties undertake to purchase his share.

Although the sale is usually carried out under the direction of the court, it may for good reason be ordered to be made altogether *out of court*, the proceeds being in that case paid into court.

If any one of the parties beneficially interested be an infant or of unsound mind, the proper court will effectuate the decree for partition or sale by making an order vesting their shares or directing a conveyance thereof.

## CHAPTER XII.

## INTERPLEADER.

AN INTERPLEADER has been defined as a proceeding by which a person from whom two or more other persons, whose rights he cannot readily determine, have claimed the same thing, wherein he himself claims no interest, other than for charges or costs, can compel them to contest the matter between themselves, without involving him in any vexatious litigation respecting it. (Sm. Man.)

Interpleader, although it existed at law, had a very limited application, being (prior to the 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 58, and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 124) restricted to cases of joint bailments.

To enable a party to interplead in equity, it was essential that

- (1.) He should have no personal interest in the subject-matter. *Mitchell v. Hayne.*
- (2.) The whole of the rights claimed by the defendants should be finally determined by the litigation, and the plaintiff therefore be under no personal liability. *Crawshay v. Thornton.*

But the court may direct an interpleader, reserving the question of liability.

- (3.) The titles of the claimants should be derived the one from the other, or both from a common source.

No interpleader *was* allowed in equity, as a general rule, in cases of

- (1.) Adverse *independent legal* titles.
- (2.) Agent against principal, unless the latter had created a lien in favour of a third party.
- (3.) Tenant against landlord, and a stranger claiming by a paramount title, unless the *same* rent was claimed by persons in privity of contract or of tenure.
- (4.) Sheriff against claimants, for by the seizure

he became a wrongdoer, unless there were conflicting equitable claims.

Under the 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 58, and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 124, courts of law acquired more extensive jurisdiction, the former statute extending the benefit of interpleader to sheriffs, and the latter to parties whose titles were not derived from a common source. These statutes, however, only extended this benefit to *defendants in an action*, while in equity it was not necessary that proceedings should have been actually commenced.

Now, the whole procedure in interpleader cases is governed by Order lvii. under the Judicature Acts, whereby the old distinctions between law and equity in this respect have been practically abolished, and a sheriff empowered to interplead immediately after seizure. It is provided by this order that the applicant for relief must satisfy the court that—

- (a.) He claims no interest in the subject-matter.
- (b.) He does not collude with other claimants.
- (c.) He is willing to pay or transfer the subject-matter into court.

When amount in dispute does not exceed £500 proceedings may be transferred to county court under the Judicature Act, 1884.



## PART IV.—THE AUXILIARY JURISDICTION.

NOW OBSOLETE AS A SEPARATE JURISDICTION.

*Section I.—Discovery and Bills to perpetuate Testimony and to take Evidence* DE BENE ESSE.

A. *Discovery.*

A BILL of discovery sought no relief, but merely discovery, usually of facts in the knowledge, or documents in the possession or power, of the defendant. Every such bill was in *aid* of proceedings already commenced in another court.

The jurisdiction of equity arose from the former inability of the common law courts to admit the evidence of litigants themselves, or of interested parties, or to compel the production of material documents in the custody of parties.

Defence to a bill of discovery rested upon the following (among other) grounds, which, with comparatively slight modifications, may still be raised as objections to discovery.

- (1.) The subject was cognisable in a judicial court.
- (2.) The plaintiff was disentitled by his disability.
- (3.) The plaintiff had no interest in the subject.
- (4.) The defendant was not bound to discover his own title.
- (5.) The defendant was protected from making discovery.
- (6.) The defendant would thereby expose himself to criminal proceedings or forfeiture.
- (7.) The defendant was a mere witness.

Thus—

- (a.) An heir at law could not, while an heir in tail could, obtain discovery of title-deeds during ancestor's lifetime, for the latter had, but the former had not, a present title.

- (b.) No discovery was granted in aid of matters not purely civil, or where it would involve a forfeiture.
- (c.) No discovery from a married woman of facts where-with to charge her husband, or from any one in breach of professional confidence.
- (d.) A defendant who was a *bond fide* purchaser for value without notice could formerly object to discovery; but he cannot do so now.

*Lyell v. Kennedy*; *Emmerson v. Ind.*

Courts of law subsequently acquired jurisdiction, so that the aid of equity was no longer needed; and under the Judicature Acts the peculiar jurisdiction of equity to grant discovery in *aid* has become obsolete.

## B. *Bills to perpetuate Testimony and to take Evidence*

DE BENE ESSE.

### 1. Bills to perpetuate testimony.

Their object was to preserve evidence in danger of being lost before a question could be litigated.

A great objection to these bills was that the depositions were not published until after the death of witness. Equity refused to perpetuate testimony if the matter could at once be litigated.

The doctrine of equity as to these bills has been thus stated—

- (1.) Any interest, however small and remote, and although contingent only, is sufficient to sustain it.
- (2.) Equity will not perpetuate evidence of a right which may be immediately barred.
- (3.) A mere expectancy or *spes successionis* was not enough.
- (4.) It was only allowed where right to *property* involved.

*Dursley v. Fitzhardinge*; *Townshend Peerage Case*.

By the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 69—

- (a.) The right to perpetuate was extended to persons claiming titles, dignities, or offices.

- (b.) A person who would, under the circumstances alleged by him, become entitled upon the happening of *any future event*, may perpetuate testimony.

So that by this Act points 3 and 4 above enumerated were altered and no longer exist.

Under the Legitimacy Declaration Act, 1858, the Divorce Division has power to perpetuate testimony by making decrees declaratory of the legitimacy of the petitioner, or of the validity of his marriage, or that of his parents or grandparents, and *vice versâ*.

The Judicature Acts do not specifically deal with this subject, and under them an action in the nature of a bill to perpetuate testimony may still be brought.

## 2. Bills to take evidence *de bene esse*.

These bills were distinguished from those to perpetuate testimony by the fact that the former related to matters involved in an *existing action*, while it was a fatal objection to the latter that they might be subjects of immediate litigation.

These bills would be allowed for the purpose of taking evidence of important witnesses, too aged or infirm to travel, or in a precarious state of health, or resident abroad.

Courts of law were sufficiently empowered in this respect by the 13 Geo. III. c. 63, and 1 Will. IV. c. 22, and now, under the Judicature Acts, in lieu of any bill or action there would be a mere order to examine *de bene esse*, obtained on a summary application in the pending cause or matter under Order xxxvii. r. 5.

## Section II.—Bills QUIA TIMET and Bills of Peace.

### A. Bills *quia timet*.

In the nature of writs of precaution in order to prevent wrongs, as by appointment of receivers, directing security to be given or granting injunctions. Actions in the nature of bills *quia timet* may still be

brought, but in general seek other substantive relief. No such action will lie unless the plaintiff prove the apprehended danger to be both imminent and of a substantial kind, or the apprehended injury to be irreparable.

*Fletcher v. Bealey.*

#### B. Bills of peace.

Distinguished from bills *quia timet* by the circumstance that they were most generally brought after the right had been tried at law.

A bill of peace has been defined as a proceeding filed to establish and perpetuate, in favour of or against a number of persons, some general private right, which from its nature is likely to be sought to be established or overthrown by different persons at different times and by different actions; or to conform and perpetuate a right which has been satisfactorily established by two or more trials, but is in danger of being again controverted.

*(Sm. Ma.)*

They were thus brought to prevent—

##### (1.) A multiplicity of suits.

*Sheffield Waterworks v. Yeomans; Mayor of York v. Pilkington.*

##### (2.) Oppressive litigation. *Earl of Bath v. Sherwin.*

Prior to *Rolt's Act* (25 & 26 Vict. c. 42), equity would direct the right of the plaintiff to be established by a trial at law, but under that Act it had power to determine the right itself.

Actions in the nature of bills of peace may still be brought, and under the Judicature Acts the court before whom the action is pending will both establish the right and grant an injunction in the same judgment.

And by the 59 & 60 Vict. c. 51 vexatious litigation may be suppressed.

#### *Section III.—Cancelling and Delivering up Documents.*

Courts of equity have jurisdiction in certain cases to direct the cancellation, rescission, or delivery up of instruments which have answered their purpose or are voidable or void,



upon the principle of *quia timet*, for fear such instruments should be subsequently vexatiously used when evidence has been lost. This relief is in discretion of the court, and not granted as a matter of right.

Voluntary instruments are not, as a rule, relieved against, and even where relief is granted, the plaintiff is put upon terms. The mere fact that no power of revocation is reserved does not amount to proof that he did not know what he was doing.

Relief was generally granted to a plaintiff who had a good defence in equity not available at law; although all defences are now available at law, the equity jurisdiction remains practically exclusive.

The following rules have been laid down:—

#### I. Voidable instruments :

##### (1.) Cancelled, where

- (a.) Defendant guilty of actual or constructive fraud, in which plaintiff has not participated.
- (b.) Constructive fraud on public policy, in which plaintiff has participated, if public policy defeated by allowing instrument to stand.
- (c.) Constructive fraud in both parties, but both not actually *in pari delicto*.

##### (2.) Not cancelled, where

- (a.) Plaintiff sole guilty party.
- (b.) Plaintiff has participated equally in the fraud.
- (c.) Instrument is founded on illegality.

#### II Void instruments.

- (1.) Delivered up—where the perpetration of further wrong would be thereby prevented.
- (2.) Not delivered up—where the illegality appears on the face of the instrument; for in such a case there can be no fear that lapse of time will deprive a party of his defence.

The Judicature Acts have not altered the grounds of this jurisdiction, and have assigned it to the Chancery Division exclusively.

*Section IV.—Bills to Establish Wills.*

Formerly ecclesiastical courts had cognisance of wills of personalty, and common law courts of wills of realty, the jurisdiction of equity only existing where a will came incidentally before it; in which case, if the parties did not admit the validity of the will, and it had not been established elsewhere, equity would either itself establish the will, proving it *per testes*, and enjoin the heir, or direct an issue to be tried for that purpose.

Under the Probate Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. 77) the Court of Probate (Probate Division) is the proper court having jurisdiction over wills of personalty, and also of realty upon citation of the heir and devisee.

A devisee in possession, whether legal or equitable, might have had a will of realty established in equity against the heir, even though the heir had not brought ejectment.

*Boyse v. Rossborough.*

And not only against the heir, but against all other opposing parties.

*Lovett v. Lovett.*

But the heir could only come into equity to have the will established *by consent*, for he had a legal remedy by ejectment.

Now under the Probate Act a will proved in *common* form is *prima facie* proof of the will; but if in *solemn* form, is not only sufficient, but conclusive proof.

When wills (whether dealing with realty or not) deal with *personalty*, or contain the appointment of an *executor*, the Court of Probate has sole jurisdiction over them, even though fraud or mistake be alleged.

*Allen v. MPherson; Meluish v. Milton.*

But the Court of Probate (even since the Judicature Acts) has had no jurisdiction in the matter of wills dealing with real estate *only*, and not containing any appointment of executor.

Under the Land Transfer Act, 1897, however, probate and letters of administration may be granted in respect of real estate only, although there is no personal estate.

*Section V.—Writ of NE EXEAT REGNO.*

The writ of *ne exeat regno* is a prerogative writ issued to prevent a person from leaving the realm.

It was originally applied to great political purposes only, and is hence employed in favour of private rights with great caution.

In modern times the writ has only been known as the equity equivalent for common law arrest on mesne process.

As a general rule, the writ was only granted in the case of *equitable* debts, which must be certain in their nature, of a pecuniary character, actually payable, and not contingent. To this rule there were two exceptions, the writ being issued in respect of the following *legal* debts.

(1.) Alimony decreed.

(2.) Where there was an admitted balance due from defendant to plaintiff, who claimed a larger sum.

Since the Judicature Acts a writ of *ne exeat regno* can be issued only in cases which come within the provisions of the Debtors Act, 1869, s. 6.

*Drover v. Beyer.*

The application for a writ of *ne exeat regno* is made in the Chancery Division by an *ex parte* motion, and may be made before service of the writ of summons, the reason being that the giving of notice might operate to occasion the mischief which the writ is intended to prevent.

The Debtors Act provides that where the plaintiff proves, at any time before final judgment, to the satisfaction of a judge, that—

(1.) The plaintiff has good cause of action against the defendant to the amount of £50 or upwards;

(2.) That there is probable cause for believing that the defendant is about to quit England unless he is apprehended; *and*

(3.) That the absence of defendant will materially prejudice the plaintiff in the prosecution of his action;

the judge may order such defendant to be arrested and imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months, unless and until he has sooner given the prescribed security, not

exceeding the amount claimed in the action, that he will not go out of England without the leave of the court. Where the action is for a penalty or sum in the nature of a penalty other than a penalty in respect of any contract, it is not necessary to prove item No. 3, and the security given is to be to the effect that any sum recovered against the defendant shall be paid, or the defendant rendered to prison. These circumstances are practically the same as those under which an order to hold to bail can be obtained in the King's Bench Division.

Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, a debtor may be arrested if he is about to abscond after a bankruptcy notice has been issued or a bankruptcy petition presented against him.

And under the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908, a contributory may be arrested on proof that he is about to abscond or remove his property for the purpose of evading payment of calls or avoiding examination.



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
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